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ABSTRACT 
 
This study attempted to replicate and extend the study of Doherty, Mynatt, 
Tweney, and Schiavo (1979), which introduced what is here called the Bayesian 
conditionals selection paradigm.  The present study used this paradigm (and a script 
similar to that used by Doherty et al.) to explore confirmation bias and related errors 
that can appear in both search and integration in probability revision. Despite selection 
differences and weak manipulations, this study provided information relevant to four 
important questions. 
First, by asking participants to estimate the values of the conditional 
probabilities they did not learn, this study was able to examine the use of “intuitive 
conditionals”. This study found evidence that participants used intuitive conditionals 
and that their intuitive conditionals were affected by the size of the actual conditionals. 
Second, by examining both phases in the same study, this study became the 
first to look for inter-phase interactions. A strong correlation was found between the 
use of focal search strategies and focal integration strategies (r=.81, p<.001). 
However, when the sample was limited to participants who selected at least one 
probability conditioned on each hypothesis, the relationship was near random (r=.02).  
Third, this study was the first in the Bayesian conditionals selection paradigm 
to provide a basis for selecting information that would be expected to confirm rather 
than disconfirm the focal hypothesis. No support was found for predictor selection 
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bias, but a nearly significant interaction was found between Attention and Motivation 
(p=.07) in applying Bayes’ theorem only to information favoring the focal hypothesis. 
Fourth, this study was the first to have a single normative posterior probability, 
against which participants’ posterior probability estimates could be compared to yield 
a quantitative measure of confirmation bias. This permitted measuring the 
confirmation bias uniquely contributed by each phase, assuming the participant was 
normative in the other phase. Focused attention was found to increase confirmation 
bias in the integration phase (p=.03) but not in the search phase. 
These last three findings challenge the field’s assumption that the search and 
integration phases can be examined separately, and call for reinterpretation of research 
done on only one phase. 
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Introduction 
Decision making is defined as “selecting and committing oneself to a course of 
action” (Anderson, Deane, Hammond, McClelland, and Shanteau, 1981, p. 73).  
Studies have shown people have trouble with risky (probabilistic) decision making.  
One reason for this difficulty is difficulty with probability revision, the changing of a 
belief on the basis of new information.  Nickerson (2004) states that, “Everybody 
thinks probabilistically, whether knowingly or not” (p. ix). Probabilistic decision 
making is both required by daily life (e.g., estimating the probability of finding a 
parking space in various locations) and demonstrated to be flawed in non-experts and 
occasionally in experts (Tversky & Kahneman, 1971). As Persi Diaconis said in 
commenting on the topic, “Our brains are just not wired to do probability problems 
very well, so I'm not surprised there were mistakes.” (Tierney, 1991, p. A1).  
For example, the importance of probabilistic reasoning in decision-making is 
highlighted by the trend away from defined benefit plans (social security, defined 
benefit private pensions) towards individually managed retirement plans (IRAs, 401k, 
potential private social security accounts). This trend will require more Americans to 
make important probabilistic decisions. 
The decision making process is commonly divided into two phases, 
information search (where the decision maker gathers information to use in the 
decision) and information integration (where the decision maker combines 
information to make a decision). Non-expert decision makers suffer from many errors 
in both phases. One class of errors that has been repeatedly demonstrated is a variety 
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of common biases that are associated with the existence of a preferred or focal 
hypothesis. These biases have been extensively researched (115,073 hits on the 
PsychInfo Data base on 11/2/05) and demonstrated across a variety of paradigms and 
cover stories. These biases are usually grouped together and commonly called 
“confirmation bias” (or some variant of the term). 
Unfortunately, this term has been not been consistently defined. Confirmation 
bias has been used as a catchall for virtually any bias related to decision-making that 
involves some form of focal hypothesis bias in selecting, remembering, or interpreting 
information or in judging the likelihood of the focal hypothesis. This label has covered 
both motivated and unmotivated biases and both those that occur in the information 
search phase and in the integration phase. The various definitions have included: a) 
biases in the search phase favoring information about the focal hypothesis (Doherty, 
Mynatt, Tweney, & Schiavo, 1979); b) limitations of the range of information 
collected to that which is consistent with the focal hypothesis (Trope & Bassok 1984); 
c) preference for the collection of information that is expected to be supportive to the 
focal hypothesis (Jonas, Schulz, Frey, & Thelen, 2001); d) biases caused by 
differential rates of memory for favorable and unfavorable evidence (Perkins, Farady, 
& Bushey, 1991); and e) interpretation of evidence in ways that support the focal 
hypothesis. (Kelley, 1950). These five terms each refer to a different phenomenon, of 
which only the last four will always result in a confirmatory effect. 
Because the term “confirmation bias” has been used to describe a variety of 
phenomena, the use of the term has led to difficulty in comparing results across 
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paradigms and researchers. This has led to the recommendation that the term be retired 
(Fischhoff & Beyth-Marom, 1983). However, the position taken in this paper is that it 
would be better to define the term clearly than to retire it. In this paper, "confirmation 
bias” will be used to refer to any bias that actually results in a confirming effect (i.e., 
an increase in the estimated probability of the focal hypothesis above the normative 
posterior probability). Confirmation bias as thus defined is a resulting effect of other 
cognitive processes. These may be search or integration processes, which will be 
referred to respectively as “Search Confirmation Bias” and “Integration Confirmation 
Bias”. This definition works for all paradigms that result in judgment or choice 
(Bayesian Conditionals Selection Paradigm, Bayesian Data Sampling Studies, 
Covariation and Causation Studies, and Dissonance Theory Studies, see Research 
Paradigms for a description of these paradigms). 
This paper will use three terms that can be confused with confirmation bias and 
with each other, and which therefore need to be clarified. These are the search phase 
biases of “pseudodiagnosticity”, “hypothesis focus bias”, and “predictor selection 
bias”.  
 “Pseudodiagnosticity” is here accepted as defined by Doherty, et al. (1979) in 
a study examining participants’ search-phase behavior. They used the term to describe 
the search phase phenomenon of participants selecting only one member of a matching 
pair of conditional probabilities. A matching pair is defined as two probabilities both 
relevant to the same datum with one conditioned on each of the hypotheses [e.g. 
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selecting both p(Di|H1) and p(Di|H2)]. (See Tables 1 and 2). Matching pairs are 
necessary for the application of Bayes' Theorem.  
 
 
p(H1|D) =  
  
 
Bayes' Theorem is the correct method for revising probability estimates on the basis of 
new information. [p(H1|D) is the probability of hypothesis 1 given the new data, p(H1 
or 2) is the original probability of hypothesis 1 (or 2),  p(D|H1 or 2) is the probability of 
the data given hypothesis 1 (or 2)]. 
p(H1) * p(D|H1) + p(H2) * p(D|H2) 
             p(H1) * p(D|H1) 
______________________________________ 
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Table 1 
Definition of Four Quadrants of Conditional Probabilities 
Expected direction 
of dimension’s 
diagnosticity 
Data 
(Given) 
Probabilities 
conditioned on the 
focal hypothesis (H1)   
(Selected) (Hit Rate)  
Probabilities conditioned 
on the alternative 
hypothesis (H2) 
(Selected)  (False Alarm 
Rate)   
Predictor expected 
to favor focal 
hypothesis  
D1 Quadrant 1: p(D1|H1) Quadrant 3: p(D1|H2) 
Predictor expected 
to favor non-focal 
hypothesis  
D2 Quadrant 2: p(D2|H1) Quadrant 4: p(D2|H2) 
Note: Data would be in the form of the urn has two handles. The conditional probabilities in quadrants 1 
and 2 would be in the form of the percentage of urns from Shell with two handles. 
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Table 2 
Examples of the Biases Using Quadrant Definitions from Table 1 
Name of Bias Definition of Bias Example from Table 1 
Pseudodiagnosticity Selecting only one member of a 
matching pair 
Selecting p(Dx|H1) 
without p(Dx|H2) 
Hypothesis focus 
bias 
Selecting more probabilities 
conditioned on the focal 
hypothesis than the non-focal 
hypothesis 
Selecting more 
probabilities from 
Quadrants 1 & 2  
Predictor selection 
bias 
Selecting more probabilities from 
dimensions expected to favor the 
focal hypothesis 
Selecting more 
probabilities from 
Quadrants 1 & 3 
 
 
Doherty, et al. (1979) found that participants tend to choose disproportionate 
number of probabilities conditioned on the focal hypothesis (hereafter symbolically 
represented as H1, with the alternative hypothesis represented as H2). [This can also be 
stated as choosing more p(D|H1) than p(D|H2)]. (See Tables 1 and 2). Doherty labeled 
this bias “confirmation bias”. However, in order to avoid confusion, in this paper we 
will substitute what we believe to be the more precise term “hypothesis focus bias”. 
Pseudodiagnosticity is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for hypothesis focus 
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bias. Participants must be pseudodiagnostic in order to show a hypothesis focus bias, 
but they can be pseudodiagnostic without showing hypothesis focus bias (by selecting 
non-matched conditionals that are evenly split between the two hypotheses or that are 
more often conditioned on the alternative hypothesis).   
A key point stressed in this paper, which was first noted for hypothesis focus 
bias by Fischhoff and Beyth-Marom, (1983) is that neither of these search phase 
biases alone or in combination necessarily results in making confirmation more likely 
(that is, showing what is here called confirmation bias). The extent to which these 
biases have a confirming effect would depend upon the conditionals selected and the 
integration strategy utilized, as first noted by Snyder and Swan (1978). For example, 
use of a hypothesis focus bias or pseudodiagnosticity would not result in confirmation 
bias in combination with a Bayesian integration strategy and, in fact, would result in 
no revision at all, due to the lack of matching pairs. 
The third term that can be confused with confirmation bias, “predictor 
selection bias”, is the preference for information from a variable that is expected to 
confirm a focal hypothesis. [This can also be stated as selecting more p(D expected to favor 
H1 |H1 or 2) than p(D expected to favor H2 |H1 or 2)]. (See Table 1 for a description of a design 
that would enable examination of predictor selection bias and Table 2 for examples of 
these conditional probabilities). For this bias to operate there must be some basis for 
expecting some variable or variables to favor the focal hypothesis more than other 
variables (See Table 3 for definitions). This bias can exist with the selection of either 
matched or unmatched conditional probabilities. 
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Table 3 
Definition of the Terms 
Phase Bias Name Page Original Name Definition 
Search 
Phase 
Only 
(Selecting) 
Search 
Confirmation Bias 
2-3  p(H|D) greater than  
normative from search phase 
Pseudodiagnosticity 3  Not selecting both 
conditional probabilities on a 
dimension [p(D1|H2) &  
p(D1|H1) 
Hypothesis Focus 
Bias 
4 Confirmation 
Bias (Doherty, 
et al., 1979) 
Selecting more conditional 
probabilities  conditioned on 
the focal hypothesis p(D| H2) 
than the alternative 
hypothesis p(D|H1) 
Predictor Selection 
Bias 
4 Confirmation 
Bias (Jonas, 
Schulz-Hardt, 
Frey, & 
Thelen, 2001) 
Selecting more conditional 
probabilities from 
dimensions that are expected 
to support the focal 
hypothesis 
Integration 
Phase 
Only 
(Using) 
Integration 
Confirmation Bias 
2-3  p(H|D) greater than 
normative from integration 
phase 
Pseudodiagnostic 
Integration 
4-5  Not using both conditional 
probabilities on a dimension 
[p(D1| H2) &  p(D1|H1) 
Hypothesis-Focus 
Integration Bias 
4-5  Using more conditional 
probabilities  conditioned on 
the focal hypothesis p(D| H2) 
than the alternative 
hypothesis p(D|H1) 
Predictor Selection 
Integration Bias 
4-5  Using more conditional 
probabilities from 
dimensions that are expected 
to support the focal 
hypothesis 
Both 
Phases 
Confirmation Bias 2  p(H|D) greater than 
normative from all causes 
Base Rate Neglect 26  Ignoring or underweighting 
p(H) 
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These three search phase biases (pseudodiagnosticity, hypothesis focus bias, 
and predictor selection bias) all have corresponding integration phase biases, which 
here will be referred to, respectively, as “pseudodiagnostic integration”, “Hypothesis-
Focus Integration Bias”, and “predictor selection integration bias”. (The reason 
“pseudodiagnostic integration” is not referred to as “pseudodiagnostic integration 
bias” is because this error does not imply a direction in the participants’ departure 
from normative). All three of these integration phase biases need to be studied in 
addition to their search phase counterparts, because information that is selected is not 
necessarily used. 
Pseudodiagnostic integration is the use in integration of unmatched conditional 
probabilities. Hypothesis-Focus Integration Bias is the disproportionate use of 
probabilities in integration that are conditioned on the focal hypothesis. (As was the 
case in the search phase, pseudodiagnostic integration bias is required for the 
possibility of Hypothesis-Focus Integration Bias). Predictor selection integration bias 
is a bias towards using predictors in integration that are expected to support the focal 
hypothesis. This last definition is problematic in the abstract, because some predictors 
could be expected in the search phase to support the focal hypothesis but in the 
integration phase, on the basis of the data now in hand, to support the alternative 
hypothesis. This problem is avoided in this study by making all predictors either 
consistently favor or consistently oppose the focal hypothesis. 
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Literature Review 
Research Paradigms 
 Research on search and integration biases that can result in confirmation bias 
has been conducted under at least the following seven paradigms: Bayesian 
conditional selection studies, Bayesian data sampling studies, Wason selection task 
studies, Wason rule-discovery task studies, classification studies, covariation and 
causation studies, and dissonance theory studies.  
 In the Bayesian conditional selection studies, participants are asked to select 
and/or incorporate conditional probability information to make revised probability 
estimates. This paradigm usually, but not always, focuses on the search phase. In the 
Bayesian data sampling studies, participants are asked which population a sample of 
data was drawn from. These studies usually focus on the integration phase. The Wason 
four-card selection task requires participants to select the information (cards) 
necessary to test a logical rule and looks exclusively at the search phase. The Wason 
rule-discovery task requires participants to seek information to assist in their 
formulating and evaluating hypotheses. This task is the most open and involves 
hypothesis creation, information search, and information integration. The 
classification studies are similar in logical structure to the rule-discovery task. As in 
that paradigm, participants must think up questions to test a hypothesis, but this time 
about category membership. The covariation and causation paradigm asks participants 
to select or evaluate information necessary to make a decision regarding the degree of 
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covariation or causation. These studies, with one exception, examine only the 
integration phase.  
Finally, the dissonance theory research paradigm has participants make an 
initial decision and then presents them with the opportunity to select information that 
would support or oppose this decision. These studies focus on the search phase. 
Bayesian conditional selection paradigm. Research under this paradigm 
presents participants with cover stories that require a probability revision. Typically, 
participants are given the opportunity to select some but not all of the available 
information in the form of conditional probabilities. These probabilities are 
conditioned on two possible hypotheses, one of which has already been determined, 
on some basis, to be the favored or focal hypothesis. As previously noted, the correct 
way to incorporate new information into a probability estimate involves the 
application of Bayes' Theorem. As applied to Bayesian conditional selection studies 
Bayes’ theorem requires a prior probability estimate (typically provided to participants 
as a base rate), one or more items of data (also usually provided to participants) and a 
matching pair of conditional probabilities for the data. Participants usually chose 
which conditional probabilities to be informed of, after being informed of the related 
data. The focus of this paradigm is on the extent to which participants fail to select 
matching pairs (exhibit pseudodiagnosticity) and the extent to which these unmatched 
probabilities are conditioned on the focal hypothesis (exhibit hypothesis focus bias). 
The groundbreaking study using a Bayesian conditional selection paradigm to 
study search biases was Doherty, et al. (1979), to which the present study is closely 
Literature Review 12 
 
  
M
ethod 12 
related. They used an ocean archeology cover story to present participants with an 
information search problem. Their experiment involved two steps. In the first step, 
they presented participants with the problem (deciding which island an artifact was 
made on), the base rate for each hypothesis, and descriptive data about the artifact. 
Next, participants were required to choose two conditional probabilities from four 
relevant to the descriptive data. Last, each participant was asked which hypothesis was 
now more likely. This hypothesis was taken to be that participant’s focal hypothesis.  
 Half the participants were provided an equal base rate (odds ratio p(h)|p(-h) = 
1:1), and half were provided a base rate that favored one of the hypotheses (odds ratio 
of 10:1). This 10:1 ratio was designed to be so strong that the estimate as to which 
hypothesis was more likely would not be changed even by either of the data favoring 
the less likely hypothesis (with diagnostic ratios of 1:5).  
 The unequal base rate group produced two main findings. The first finding was 
that the participants were pseudodiagnostic, with 49 of the 64 participants choosing 
one conditional probability from each dimension, rather that the two required to form 
a diagnostic pair. Therefore, these participants did not have sufficient information to 
revise their probability estimates using Bayes’ Theorem. The second finding was that 
52 of the 64 participants indicated as more likely the hypothesis favored by the data 
rather than the base rate. This choice was incorrect for both those who chose 
diagnostically (for whom the base rate was normatively stronger than the data) and 
those who chose pseudodiagnostically (who had no normatively relevant evidence 
other than the base rate). The authors stated that this effect was an indication of base 
Literature Review 13 
 
  
M
ethod 13 
rate neglect. Doherty, et al. (1979) did not report the degree to which the participants 
who demonstrated the first error (pseudodiagnosticity) were same as those who 
demonstrated the second error (base rate neglect).  
In the second step, Doherty, et al. (1979) asked participants to select six 
conditional probabilities from a set of twelve, to assist in making a second probability 
revision. Six of these probabilities were conditioned on the focal hypothesis and six on 
the alternative hypothesis, forming six matching pairs. Doherty, et al. examined this 
second step in terms of both pseudodiagnosticity and hypothesis focus bias, and found 
evidence for both search errors. First, 110 of the 121 participants failed to choose three 
matched pairs, thus demonstrating some degree of pseudodiagnosticity. Because one 
must be pseudodiagnostic to demonstrate hypothesis focus bias only the 110 
pseudodiagnostic participants were examined for hypothesis focus bias. Each of these 
110 pseudodiagnostic participants showed one of three possible patterns: a) choosing 
probabilities conditioned evenly on the two hypotheses (50), b) choosing more 
probabilities conditioned of the alternative hypothesis (9), or c) choosing more 
probabilities conditioned of the focal hypothesis (51). The propensity of participants to 
choose conditional probabilities conditioned on the focal hypothesis when they did not 
choose evenly (51 to 9), indicates hypothesis focus bias (labeled “confirmation bias” 
by Doherty, et al.).  They interpreted this finding as a “strong bias to confirm”, despite 
the fact that any actual confirmatory effect would be dependent on the participant’s 
integration strategy. 
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Doherty, Schiavo, Tweeny, and Mynatt (1981) conducted an experiment to 
determine whether people can be induced to think diagnostically. They based their 
experiment on the first step of the Doherty, et al. (1979) experiment, (specifically the 
equal base rate condition), where participants had been asked to choose two 
conditional probabilities from four that formed two matched pairs that favored one of 
the hypotheses. They made four changes from the original experiment that were 
intended to help participants think diagnostically.  
Three of these changes were made for all participants: a) presenting the 
problem four times, using different cover stories each time, b) providing accurate 
feedback after each story as to which hypothesis was more likely, and c) making all 
conditional probabilities above 50%. The fourth change was to give the half the 
participants a third conditional probability from the original four. For participants who 
chose non-diagnostically, this third conditional probability necessarily completed a 
diagnostic pair whose diagnostic direction favored the second hypothesis. This 
diagnostic pair would contradict the conclusion that would likely have been drawn by 
participants who choose both probabilities conditioned on the first hypothesis. In this 
case, the two conditional probabilities would both be above 50% and both would 
likely be interpreted as supportive of the first hypothesis.  
Following the initial study, Doherty, et al. (1981) found that participants who 
did not receive the third conditional probability did marginally improve their rate of 
diagnostic search over the four trials. However, those who received the third 
conditional probability nearly tripled their rate of diagnostic search over the four trials. 
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This suggests that participants have the capacity to think diagnostically when the 
situation presents them with diagnostic information.  
Two years later, Beyth-Marom and Fischhoff (1983) published a series of 
studies that examined participants’ search phase behavior. In the first study, the 
authors asked participants whether p(H1) (the base rate), p(D| H1) (the hit rate), and 
p(D| H2) (the false alarm rate) are relevant to a probability revision. Approximately 
90% of participants reported that p(H1) and p(D| H1) were relevant, but only 50% 
reported that p(D| H2) was relevant. This was true regardless of whether the alternative 
hypothesis was stated as a single possibility, multiple possibilities, or only an implied 
other. This rate of interest in the alternative hypothesis declined even further when 
subjects were told to stick to relevant information only. In a second study, Beyth-
Marom and Fischhoff asked participants why each type of information was relevant. 
Most (69%) of those who thought p(D| H2) was relevant, saw it as being relevant in 
order to evaluate the alternative hypothesis directly (H2), rather than to make a  
diagnostic comparison with p(D| H1). In a third study, Beyth-Marom and Fischhoff 
asked participants to make a revision with either diagnostic information (non-equal 
p(D| H1) and p(D| H2)) or non-diagnostic (equal p(D| H1) and p(D| H2)). Beyth-Marom 
and Fischhoff found that participants were more likely to revise on the basis of 
diagnostic information than non-diagnostic, and to revise in the correct direction. 
However, there was some evidence of base rate neglect, use of averaging strategies, 
and use of non-diagnostic information. Therefore, Beyth-Marom and Fischhoff 
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concluded that, while not perfect, people are better at using information than at 
seeking it out.  
Fischhoff and Bar-Hillel (1984) examined the integration phase using a 
between-subjects design. Across the cover stories, they varied the representativeness 
of the data. Next, they provided conditional probabilities for these data (i.e., there was 
no search phase). They found evidence of base rate neglect, which was stronger when 
representativeness of the data was high, as well as the use of averaging integration 
strategies.  
Ofir (1988) used a series of between-subjects studies to examine integration 
strategies. Information was provided to participants (i.e., there was no search phase); 
and the base rate, the hit rate and the false alarm rate were all manipulated. Ofir had 
two findings. The first was that his participants did not exhibit base rate neglect. The 
second finding was that participants would use the false alarm rate data [p(D| H2)] 
only if the base rate and the hit rate [p(D| H1)] were on different sides of .5 and 
therefore psychologically inconsistent. This process appears similar to that identified 
by Smith, Schoben and Rips (1974), in which thinking becomes more precise only 
when necessary.  
Mynatt, Doherty and Dragon (1993) examined participants’ search choices 
(but not their integration phase) on two logically identical problems which were 
worded differently. One problem was worded as a choice between two actions, and the 
second, as a comparative evaluation between two hypotheses. They provided the 
participants with a single hit rate and the choice to gather one more conditional 
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probability from among a second hit rate and one of the two corresponding false alarm 
rates.  
Mynatt, Doherty and Dragon’s (1993) principal finding was that participants 
were both less hypothesis focused and less pseudodiagnostic (i.e., more likely to select 
the matching false alarm rate) when choosing between actions than when evaluating 
hypotheses. Mynatt, et al. theorized that this difference was due to the outcome values 
being intrinsic to the evaluation of action choices but extrinsic to hypothesis 
evaluation, a difference that is more encouraging of comparison in action choices. 
This difference between action choices and hypothesis evaluation supports the 
conclusion that hypothesis focus bias is not an artifact of grammar or logical structure.  
A second finding of this study was that participants in the inference condition 
were more likely to choose diagnostically when the provided probability conditioned 
on the focal hypothesis was below .5. The authors theorized that the low value of this 
probability switched participants’ focus to the alternative hypothesis. 
Bayesian data sampling studies. The Bayesian data sampling studies use the 
same Bayesian framework but differ from the Bayesian conditional selection studies in 
that the participants in the Bayesian data sampling studies are given the conditional 
probabilities and must select data, while those in the Bayesian conditional selection 
studies are given the data and must select conditional probabilities.  
The same situation can be presented to participants using either Bayesian 
paradigm. The Bayesian conditional selection paradigm might, for example, present 
participants with two kinds of data (two handles, and picture of a horse) and ask them 
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to choose among four conditional probabilities to use in revising their probability 
estimate (see Table 4). 
 
Table 4 
Bayesian Conditional Selection Example  
Feature of urn in 
question 
Percentage of Urns made 
on Shell Island that have 
feature 
Percentage of Urns made 
on Coral Island that have 
feature 
Urn has two handles ? % have two handles ? % have two handles 
Urn has picture of a 
horse 
? % have a horse ? % have a horse 
 
The Bayesian data sampling paradigm might, for example, present participants 
with four conditional probabilities and ask the participants to select which (of the two) 
kinds of data to use in revising their probability estimate (see Table 5). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Table 5 
Bayesian Data Sampling Example 
Feature of urn in 
question 
Percentage of Urns made 
on Shell Island that have 
feature 
Percentage of Urns made 
on Coral Island that have 
two handles 
Two or One Handle(s)? 80% have two handles 40% have two handles 
Picture of a horse? 30% have a picture of a 
horse 
60% have a picture of a 
horse 
 
Phillips & Edwards (1966) conducted the ground breaking study using this 
paradigm. Their focus was on the integration phase and examined how participants 
used the data that were provided (i.e., no search phase). They found that participants 
tended to under-adjust for the new information, an effect they labeled “conservatism.” 
(See Slovic & Lichtenstien, 1971 for a review of this and the other early studies on 
conservatism).  
Mynatt, Doherty and Sullivan (1991) conducted experiments on information 
search using the Bayesian data sampling paradigm. They presented participants with 
the decision as to which of two populations a sample had been drawn from. 
Participants were told that the two population proportions were 70:30 and 30:70 and 
that the proportion in the sample was 7:5. Participants were then presented an 
opportunity to draw another sample from either the population from which the first 
 
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sample had been drawn or from the other population. Similar to the findings using the 
Bayesian conditional selection methodology, participants preferred to gather 
information repeatedly about the focal hypothesis. This bias appears whether gathering 
data or selecting conditional probabilities. This study collected no integration phase 
information. 
Trautman and Shanteau (1977) found that non-diagnostic information caused 
participants to move towards a 50%-50% estimate of the probability that the data 
probability came from one of two sources. Nisbett, Zukier, and Lemley, (1981) 
replicated this finding, now called the “dilution effect”. This effect is non-normative, 
and usually anti-confirmatory, diluting the impact of other information. Kemmelmeier 
(2004) manipulated the instructions in order to examine the dilution effect in the 
integration phase. Half of the participants were instructed to identify non-diagnostic 
information before integrating. The other half of the participants were instructed to 
identify non-diagnostic information and completely black it out with a marker before 
integrating. The participants who blacked out the non-diagnostic information did not 
exhibit the dilution effect. However, those who did not black it out exhibited the 
dilution effect despite correctly identifying the non-diagnostic information.  
Wason selection task studies. Wason (1966) introduced a new information 
search paradigm with his four-card problem. In this paradigm, participants are 
presented with four cards. They are told that each card has a number on one side and a 
letter on the other. The four cards are displayed with one of each possibility showing: 
even, odd, consonant and vowel. Participants are asked to indicate which cards must 
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be turned over to test the rule that all the cards that have an even number on one side 
have a vowel on the other (“If E then V”, more generally and commonly expressed as 
the conditional rule, “If P Then Q”).  
Wason found that participants most commonly asked to turn over two cards, 
the E and the V cards, a pattern which he labeled “verification bias”. This pattern is 
similar to hypothesis focus, gathering information about the focal hypothesis. If the 
focal hypothesis is taken to be “If E then V”, then participants gather information 
about the E and V cards, elements of the statement of the focal hypothesis.  
Wason and Johnson-Laird (1970) replicated Wason (1966) and additionally 
found that instructions to evaluate the effects of each card prior to choosing did not 
improve performance, despite participants demonstrating that they understood the 
effects of each card. Evans (1972) disagreed with Wason’s conclusion that this was a 
focal bias or verification bias. Instead, Evans argued that it was a matching bias 
(matching the surface terms used in the hypothesis). Evans found that when the 
problem was presented “If E then not V”, participants chose the same cards as when 
asked to test “If E then V” (the E and V cards). However, Ormerod, Manktelow, and 
Jones (1993) found that by changing the instructions to E only if V enhanced 
performance. Platt and Griggs (1993) improved participants’ performance by 
instructing them to look for violations of the rule. Additionally, there have been many 
studies providing contradictory evidence as to whether or not a realistic context 
improves performance. (See Manktelow, 1999, for a review). 
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Wason rule-discovery task studies. In the first study using the rule-discovery 
paradigm, Wason (1960) asked participants to formulate and test a hypothesis or rule 
to account for the data. In this paradigm participants are told that the series of numbers 
2-4-6 follows a rule that the experimenter is thinking of. The participants are then 
asked to determine the rule by testing other series of three numbers, hereafter triads, 
by discovering whether they fit the rule or not. Participants are told to stop when they 
are sure what the rule is. 
Wason (1960) found that participants typically chose the rule of even 
increasing numbers in sequence as their initial hypothesis. Participants usually then 
proceeded to test their hypothesis by asking about triads that fit their focal rule, 
following what has been called a “positive testing strategy” (Klayman & Ha, 1987). 
Many studies have followed up this finding and have found that participants do not 
understand the value of a falsification strategy (Kareev & Halberstadt, 1993). The 
primary way researchers have found to improve participant performance is to ask 
participants to consider or test more than one hypothesis simultaneously (Klayman & 
Ha, 1989). 
Classification studies. Classification studies are similar to rule discovery task 
studies, in that they require participants to create questions to test hypotheses. These 
studies ask participants to think up (presumably) diagnostic questions for classifying a 
person or object. For example, when participants were testing whether “Bob is an 
extrovert”, a typical question they used would be similar to, “Does Bob like to go to 
parties where he does not know anyone?”  
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If the participants are choosing rationally, they will ask questions that they 
believe are diagnostic and whose diagnostic direction they know. Snyder and Swan 
(1978) found participants favored questions that they expected to be answered by a yes 
response if the focal hypothesis were true. Trope and Bassok (1982) disagreed, finding 
that people preferred evidence that would be diagnostic to evidence that would be 
highly probable if the hypothesis were true. Skov and Sherman (1986) found mixed 
evidence on this point. They found that people preferred diagnostic questions but, to a 
lesser extent, also preferred information that was likely given the hypothesis and 
therefore expected to be confirmatory. 
Covariation and causation studies. Whether judging covariation or causation, 
participants have been shown to fail to consider all relevant data. Data have been 
presented either serially or in a two-by-two table. Smedslund (1963) found that even 
experts (nurses) fail to use all necessary information. He found the best predictor of 
participants’ judgment of covariation to be the present-present cell (both predictor and 
criterion present). Ward and Jenkins (1965), Shaklee and Tucker (1980), Shaklee and 
Mims (1982), and Arkes and Harkness (1983), using different methodologies, 
replicated the finding that the majority of participants’ judgments are based on the 
present-present cell.   
However, other studies have found evidence that participants use both 
predictor-present cells. Shaklee and Goldston (1989) and Shaklee and Hall (1983) 
both found that the most common strategy for participants was using only evidence 
when the possible cause was present. In contrast, using a serial presentation, Jenkins 
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and Ward (1965) found that participants based their judgments of contingency on the 
present-present cell and the absent- absent cell. 
Additional research has attempted to identify the variables relevant to 
participant’s poor performance at judging covariation and causation. Evidence has 
been found that performance improves with age in youth (Shaklee and Goldston, 
1989). Poor performance has been found to be due to limited memory (Shaklee and 
Mims, 1982), and sequential presentation (Ward & Jenkins, 1965). The sequential 
method of presentation requires participants to store the evidence in working memory, 
which has been found to be limited to at most seven (see Simon, 1986 for a review) or 
as little as three (Broadbent, 1975) chunks of information. Thus this limitation of 
memory is probably the cause of poor performance in sequential presentation. 
Additionally, Jenkins and Ward (1965) found that their pre-training participants using 
examples of contingent and non-contingent sequences with feedback failed to improve 
in judgments of contingency. 
Shaklee and Hall (1983) classified participants’ covariation strategies on the 
basis of a) participants’ verbal descriptions, b) participants’ selections from a multiple 
choice list of verbal descriptions, and c) the patterns of participants’ judgments. These 
three different methods of classifying covariation strategies produced only somewhat 
similar results (correlating between .45 and .58 with each other). Shaklee and Hall 
found it useful to interpret these correlations as reflecting two different types of 
participants, normative and non-normative. Participants who judged covariation 
normatively were more able to identify their strategies accurately. However, the 
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participants who judged covariation non-normatively were less able to identify their 
strategies accurately. 
Typically, these studies have presented subjects with all the information and 
therefore have no search phase. Shaklee and Goldston (1989), however, had 
participants choose which information to select and found that they did select 
information from all four cells, but the authors did not report the patterns of selection. 
Their analysis of participants’ judgments was limited to the binary direction of 
contingency and was not analyzed in conjunction with the search phase data. 
Dissonance theory studies. An entirely different paradigm with which to 
approach confirmation bias is based on Festinger’s (1957) cognitive dissonance 
theory. Studies using this paradigm have examined the effects of a focal hypothesis on 
information search, presumably resulting in search that minimized cognitive 
dissonance (Jonas, Schulz-Hardt, Frey, & Thelen, 2001). Cognitive dissonance theory 
predicts, among other things, that once a person accepts a position he or she will prefer 
to be exposed to information consistent with that belief and avoid information that is 
inconsistent with it, in order to avoid an experience of “cognitive dissonance” 
(Festinger, 1957). 
Many studies have been conducted using this method (Frey, Schulz-Hardt, & 
Stahlberg, 1996; Frey, 1986). Typically, participants are presented with real world 
problems and then their initial position is measured or manipulated. Next, participants 
are given an opportunity to expose themselves to additional information relevant to the 
correctness of their position. Participants choose additional information to read based 
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on the titles that imply which side of the issue the information supports. Research 
under this paradigm has consistently found that people select and read more 
information that agrees with their existing beliefs (Jonas, Schulz-Hardt, Frey, & 
Thelen, 2001). Recent research in this paradigm has found the same bias in 
information search prior to commitment, for alternatives that have emerged as 
promising (Russo, Medvec, & Meloy, 1996; Luce, Bettman, & Payne, 1997; Simon, 
Pham, Le, & Holyoak, 2001) 
As previously noted, this paper will use the term “predictor selection bias” to 
refer to this phenomenon of search biased in favor of variables expected to be 
confirmatory. (See page 4 for an explanation of this term). This bias has been 
replicated in many dissonance theory studies, across a variety of topics, methods and 
participants. Researchers have explored social stereotypes (Johnston, 1996), attitudes 
(Lundgren & Prislin, 1998), negotiations (Pinkley, Griffith, & Northcraft, 1995), self-
image (Frey, 1981), expert decision makers (bank managers) (Schulz-Hardt, Frey, 
Lüthgens, & Moscovici, 2000), and motivated decision makers (Ditto & Lopez, 1992). 
Consistent Findings Across Paradigms 
Many of the findings are similar across these seven paradigms. This suggests 
that the biases identified are not artifacts of the task or of the cover story, but reflect 
general cognitive processes. These similar findings include: failure to use base rate 
information, searching for less than maximally diagnostic information, searching for 
information associated with the focal hypothesis, integration of non-diagnostic 
information, and use of averaging integration strategies. 
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Failure to use base rate information. Since, Kahneman and Tversky (1973) 
reported base rate neglect, it has been repeatedly replicated both in the Bayesian 
conditionals selection studies (Doherty, et al., 1979; Fischhoff & Bar-Hillel, 1984) and 
in studies specifically examining the size and condition of the effect (see Bar-Hillel & 
Fischhoff, 1981 for a review). The opposite effect, of under-revising for evidence has 
also been found in other circumstances and is called “conservatism” (Phillips and 
Edwards (1966), see Slovic and Lichtenstien, 1971 for a review).  
Searching for less than maximally diagnostic information. There are two 
different ways that participants have sought less than maximally diagnostic 
information: seeking wholly non-diagnostic information and seeking minimally 
diagnostic information. The Bayesian conditionals selection studies have consistently 
found that people choose pseudodiagnostic information during the search phase 
(which is wholly non-diagnostic). Doherty, et al.’s (1979) finding of 
pseudodiagnosticity has been replicated in all studies in the paradigm (Doherty, et al., 
1981; Beyth-Marom & Fischhoff, 1983; Mynatt, et al., 1993). Similarly, most 
evidence points to the same bias in the Wason (1966) selection task. Wason (1996), 
and Wason and Johnson-Laird (1970) found that participants consistently chose the 
non-diagnostic evidence of Q (when testing If P then Q). In the Wason rule discovery 
task, participants repeatedly used a positive testing strategy, which seeks minimally 
diagnostic information. In the classification studies, there is some support that people 
preferred questions that would be answered yes if the focal hypothesis were true to 
diagnostic questions (Snyder & Swan, 1978; Skov & Sherman 1986). These findings 
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across paradigms indicate that participants do not grasp diagnosticity or its 
importance. 
Searching for information about or associated with the focal hypothesis. 
Searching for information that is about or associated with the focal hypothesis is the 
most consistent finding across paradigms. The Bayesian conditionals selection studies 
have repeatedly found this effect in the form of hypothesis focus bias (preference for 
information conditioned on the focal hypothesis) (Doherty, et al., 1979; Doherty, et 
al., 1981; Beyth-Marom & Fischhoff, 1983; Mynatt et al., 1993). Similarly, Mynatt, et 
al. (1991) found the same preference for focal information using the Bayesian data 
sampling methodology. Research in the Wason selection task paradigm has often 
found a hypothesis focus bias to different degrees in different circumstances 
(preference for the P and Q cards when testing If P then Q) (Wason, 1966; Wason & 
Johnson-Laird, 1970; Platt & Griggs 1993; Ormerod, Manktelow, & Jones 1993). 
Studies under the Wason (1960) rule discovery task have been consistent in their 
finding of a positive test strategy, testing new triads that are positive examples of their 
current hypothetical rule (Klayman & Ha, 1987). In the covariation and causation 
literature, most studies do not have a search phase, however Shaklee and Goldston 
(1989) did. They found evidence of uneven searching, but did not report the direction 
of the bias.  
Integration of non-diagnostic information. Ofir, (1988) using the Bayesian 
conditionals selection method found that participants often based their judgments on 
the hit rate [p(D| H1)] without using the complementary false alarm rate [p(D| H2)] 
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(i.e., showed pseudodiagnostic integration). Kemmelmeier (2004), using the Bayesian 
data sampling method, found that the presence of non-diagnostic information had an 
impact on the outcome of integration (the dilution effect, discussed earlier).  While, it 
is impossible to say whether pseudodiagnosticity was involved in the dilution effect, 
diagnosticity was clearly not properly weighed. The covariation and causation 
paradigm has consistently demonstrated participants’ reliance on insufficient data in 
making judgments, for example, integrating data most commonly from only a single 
row, column, or cell, instead of the entire table (Shaklee & Goldstone 1989). 
Use of averaging integration strategies. The Bayesian conditionals selection 
literature has found evidence that participants often use averaging strategies (Ofir, 
1988; Fischhoff & Bar-Hillel, 1984). Similarly, the Bayesian data sampling literature 
has also found the use of averaging strategies (Troutman & Shanteau, 1977; Nisbett, et 
al., 1981; Kemmelmeier, 2004). 
Causes and Cure of Biases  
Attention. Participants’ attention is the most widely researched cause of biases. 
In all seven paradigms every study examined attention. It was not manipulated as an 
independent variable but one hypothesis was assumed to be the focal hypothesis from 
the script. Doherty, et al., (1979) is the single exception to this, they measured the 
participants’ belief about which hypothesis was more likely, and assumed that this 
hypothesis was now the focal hypothesis. The focusing of the participants’ attention 
on one hypothesis is believed to be the primary cause of the search phase biases 
outlined in the paragraphs above (Searching for less than maximally diagnostic 
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information and Searching information that is about or associated with the focal 
hypothesis). 
Motivation. The dissonance theory paradigm is the only one to examine 
motivation. These studies manipulated the potential level of cognitive dissonance, 
which should in turn manipulate the participant’s motivation (see Frey, 1986, for a 
review). These studies have consistently found that increased cognitive dissonance 
causes increased predictor selection bias. 
Timing-of-feedback. Covariation and causation is the only paradigm to 
manipulate the timing (sequential vs. simultaneous) of feedback as an independent 
variable. Ward and Jenkins (1965) found that simultaneous feedback caused less 
frequent use of sub-optimal strategies.  
Surprise. The possibility of a surprising result improving participants thinking 
has been explored in the Bayesian conditional selection paradigm. Ofir (1988) 
factorially manipulated the base rate, the hit rate and the false alarm rate. Ofir found 
that participants used the false alarm rate when the hit rate and base rate were 
seemingly inconsistent (which can be assumed to be surprising). Doherty, et al. (1981) 
manipulated surprise as an independent variable by providing half the participants an 
additional conditional probability that completed a matched pair of conditionals. The 
pair was constructed so that it would be inconsistent (and therefore surprising) with 
their assumed interpretation of the single conditional probability they already had. The 
participants who received the extra surprising conditional probability performed better 
(less pseudodiagnostic search) on later trials than those who did not receive it.   
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Problems with Current Research. 
Despite the areas of agreement outlined above, there remain three major 
problems with the current research: a) the common practice across paradigms of 
investigating only one phase of decision-making at a time; b) the lack of quantification 
of any effect of confirmation bias (as defined here); and c) a lack of research exploring 
predictor selection bias (with the exception of the Dissonance theory paradigm). 
The first problem stems from the common practice of conducting studies that 
explore only one decision making phase at a time (search or integration). Research on 
“confirmation bias” (however defined) has commonly been conducted looking at only 
one of these phases in a given study. This practice prevents examination of any 
interaction between these phases, for example, asking whether information search 
phase strategy influences integration phase strategy. Additionally, this practice 
prevents following the effects of errors in the search phase to see whether they 
actually result in what is here referred to as confirmation bias in the final judgments. 
Table 6 lists the studies by paradigm and phases they examine. 
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Table 6  
Studies by Paradigm and Decision Phases Examined  
Paradigm Search Studies Integration Studies 
Bayesian 
conditionals 
selection 
Studies 
Doherty, et al. (1979); Doherty, et al. (1981);  
Beyth-Marom & Fischhoff (1983) 
Mynatt, et al. (1993) Fischhoff & Bar-Hillel (1984); 
Ofir (1988) 
Bayesian 
data 
sampling 
studies 
Mynatt, et al. (1991) 
 
Phillips & Edwards (1966); 
Trautman & Shanteau (1977); 
Nisbett, et al. (1981); 
Kemmelmeier (2004) 
Wason 
selection task 
studies 
Wason (1966); Wason & Johnson-Laird 
(1970); Evans (1972); Ormerod, et al. 
(1993); Platt & Griggs (1993) 
 
Wason rule 
discovery 
studies 
Wason (1960); Klayman & Ha (1987); 
Klayman & Ha (1989); Kareev & 
Halberstadt (1993) 
 
Classification 
studies 
Trope & Bassok (1982); Snyder & Swan 
(1978); Skov & Sherman (1986) 
 
Covariation 
and causation 
studies 
Shaklee & Goldston (1989) 
 Smedslund (1963); Ward & 
Jenkins (1965); Jenkins & Ward 
(1965); Shaklee & Tucker 
(1980); Shaklee & Mims (1982); 
Arkes & Harkness (1983); 
Shaklee & Hall (1983) 
Dissonance 
theory 
studies 
Frey (1981); Frey (1986); Ditto & Lopez 
(1992); Pinkley, et al. (1995); Frey, et al. 
(1996); Johnston (1996); Russo, et al. 
(1996); Luce, et al. (1997); Lundgren & 
Prislin (1998); Schulz-Hardt, et al. (2000); 
Simon, et al. (2001) 
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In all seven paradigms, no study examines the effects of an individual’s search 
strategy on his or her integration strategy or decision. In the seven paradigms, only 
four articles even reported data on both phases. In one of these, Shaklee and Goldston 
(1989), using the covariation and causation paradigm, reported data from both phases, 
but the integration data were limited to group-level data, which in addition were only 
binary. Group level data prevent the examination of any possible linkage between an 
individual’s search strategy and his or her integration strategy and final judgment. The 
other three articles reporting data on both phases used the Bayesian conditionals 
selection paradigm. Doherty, et al. (1979) and Doherty, et al. (1981) were both 
primarily studies on the search phase. In Doherty, et al. (1979), integration data were 
collected only for the first preliminary step, which existed merely to demonstrate base 
rate neglect and to measure the focal hypothesis. Doherty, et al. (1981) replicated this 
first step of Doherty, et al. (1979) with minor changes. As with Shaklee and Goldston 
(1989), only group-level (binary) integration data were collected, again preventing the 
examination of any possible linkage between an individual’s search strategy and his or 
her integration strategy and final judgment.  Beyth-Marom & Fischhoff (1983) 
examined both phases but only in separate experiments, once again preventing 
examination of this possible linkage. 
The practice of studying search and integration phases separately implies the 
assumption that the search and integration phases are independent and can be 
appropriately treated as separate systems. Using the definition of a system proposed by 
Lendaris (1986), systems are composed of sub-units operating together to manifest 
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emergent properties that are not apparent by examining the sub-units separately. In 
these terms, the entire Bayesian revision process may constitute a system. Phase 
interactions (for example search phase effects on integration strategy and search phase 
effects on probability revision) would constitute the emergent properties required by 
this definition of a system. The existence of phase interactions could be directly tested. 
Any evidence of the existence of phase interaction would attack the appropriateness of 
the view that search and integration are sub-units of a single belief-revision system. 
The finding that people are better at using information that is presented to them than at 
seeking it out suggests an interaction of this kind (Beyth-Marom & Fischhoff, 1983).  
This common practice of studying the two phases of decision making 
separately may contribute to the other common practice of using generic names that 
are not specific to a phase. 
The second problem in the research literature is the lack of quantification of 
confirmation bias (as defined here). This lack of quantification could be caused by any 
combination of the following three factors. (1) The practice of studying each phase 
separately prevents the measurement of any confirmation bias caused by the search 
phase. (2) The imprecise use of any term (especially “confirmation bias”) impedes its 
quantification. Typically, the effects of biases are not actually measured in terms of 
change in the final judgment or decision. (3) The seven paradigms either can not or 
have not been structured to produce a precise correct normative answer on an interval 
scale against which participants’ responses could be compared.  
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 The third problem in the literature is a lack of research exploring predictor-
selection bias. As stated before, predictor-selection bias is a form of search phase bias, 
where participants choose to learn about predictors that they expect will have a 
confirmatory impact on their focal hypothesis. In the real world, people often have 
expectations as to the direction of diagnosticity of the predictors available. For 
example, a person gathering information about buying a car would likely know, prior 
to gathering the actual data, that safety information would more likely favor buying a 
Volvo while cost information would more likely favor buying a Ford. The only 
paradigm that has examined predictor-selection bias is the dissonance theory 
paradigm. Dissonance theory research has consistently found that participants favor 
information that agrees with beliefs to which they have committed (Jonas, Schulz-
Hardt, Frey, & Thelen, 2001). However, this paradigm has not quantified the 
confirmatory effect of this bias against a normatively correct standard, nor examined 
interactions with the integration phase. Additionally, this paradigm confounds two 
possible biases, a motivational one (from their commitment) and a cognitive one (from 
the participants’ attention focus). 
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The Present Study 
The present study is designed to overcome the three weaknesses in the existing 
research by a) investigating both phases of Bayesian revision, b) exploring predictor 
selection bias, and c) quantifying confirmation bias from sources in each phase.  
The first decision in the design of this study is the choice of which of the seven 
paradigms to use. The Bayesian conditionals selection paradigm was chosen primarily 
in order to create a situation with a normative outcome on an interval scale, so that the 
combined effects of confirmation biases can be quantified. Of the seven paradigms, 
four do not yield a normative answer on an interval scale (Dissonance theory studies, 
Wason rule discovery task, Wason selection task, and classification studies). The 
dissonance theory studies typically do not even require integration, much less quantify 
the effects of new information. The Wason rule discovery task does not produce a 
normative outcome; the participant can never eliminate all the possible alternative 
rules with which the triads are consistent. While the Wason selection task produces a 
normative outcome; it is binary; the rule is disproved or not. The classification studies 
do not produce a normative outcome on an interval scale, because the diagnosticities 
of the questions are never explicitly quantified. 
Two other paradigms, the covariation and causation studies and the Bayesian 
data sampling studies, do produce at least an interval-scale normative-outcome (the 
correlation coefficient and the probability of a sample having been drawn from a 
specific population, respectively). However, quantitative dependent measures suitable 
for comparison with these normative outcomes are problematic, because numeric 
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values are not typically employed by average people in corresponding real world 
problems. (e.g., people do not normally quantify the effect on their beliefs upon 
hearing that the clouds have been seeded two days, and it rained both days, and not 
seeded two days and it rained once).  
This leaves only the Bayesian conditionals selection paradigm as an 
appropriate paradigm for this research. An additional benefit of the Bayesian 
conditionals selection paradigm is that the problem of seeking conditional probability 
information is similar to that encountered in real world problems faced by ordinary 
people. The use of a real world situation instead of a purely logical framework may 
improve participants’ performance. Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi, and Legrenzi (1972) 
found a familiar real world context improved performance. However, later studies 
have found mixed support for this. See Manktelow (1999) for a review of this topic.  
 This paradigm lends itself naturally to the study of both phases of decision-
making. Both phases have actually been studied using this paradigm, though usually in 
separate studies. This paradigm thus enables a researcher to follow Lendaris’ (1986) 
advice and study properties of the entire system as well as each sub-unit 
simultaneously.  
Similarities to Doherty, et al. (1979). This study will use the same paradigm 
and cover story (with minor modifications) as Doherty, et al. (1979) and Doherty, et 
al. (1981), in order to facilitate direct comparisons with these experiments. The cover 
story used by Doherty, et al. (1979) told participants about an archeologist finding an 
urn between two islands and having to decide which island the urn came from. 
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Differences from Doherty, et al. (1979). Although, the scripts in the present 
study describe a similar hypothetical situation (determining the island of origin of an 
urn), there are ten functional differences between these scripts and Doherty’s, four of 
which have to do with four independent variables not manipulated by Doherty, et al. 
(1979). 
First, in Doherty’s scripts the focal hypothesis was measured for each subject, 
while in the present scripts, focal hypothesis will be manipulated as an independent 
variable “attention”. This variable has two levels: focused and balanced. Half of the 
participants will receive instructions that focus their attention on a single hypothesis 
and half will receive instructions that balance their attention. Doherty defined focal 
hypothesis to be the island that the participant judged to be more likely the origin of 
the urn after initial search and integration phases. In this study these initial search and 
integration phases are eliminated and replaced with an independent variable attention 
that has two levels, balanced and focused. 
Second, these scripts manipulate motivation as an independent variable 
“motivation”. This variable has two levels: motivated and not motivated. Half of the 
participants will be provided a motivation for a preferred outcome and half not. This 
variable enables the study of the effects of motivation on search and integration 
strategies.  
Third, these scripts manipulate timing as an independent variable “timing of 
feedback”. Half of the participants will seek information sequentially and half 
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simultaneously. This enables an examination of the effects of search phase 
sequencing. (E.g., does early information affect subsequent search decisions?) 
Fourth, these scripts manipulate the size of the conditional probabilities as an 
independent variable “size-of-conditionals”. Half the participants will be in the high 
conditionals condition. When these participants select probabilities conditioned on the 
island favored by the hint, they will receive probabilities greater than 50%. (See the 
next paragraph for an explanation of the hints.) The other half of the participants will 
be in the low conditionals condition. When these participants select probabilities 
conditioned on the island favored by the hint, they will receive probabilities less than 
50%. This manipulation is intended to surprise the subjects in the low condition and 
encourage them to think more carefully. This is similar to the effect found by Smith, 
Schoben and Rips (1974).  
Fifth, these scripts add hints in the form of vague non-numeric information 
about the expected diagnostic direction of each of the conditional probabilities (i.e., 
“Characterizes the current clay pits of Shell Island”). These hints provide the basis for 
any predictor selection bias. Similar to those in the dissonance theory paradigm 
(Jonas, Schulz-Hardt, Frey, & Thelen, 2001), this study’s hints accurately indicate the 
direction of diagnosticity. 
Sixth, these scripts provide participants with a choice of 4 out of 16 conditional 
probabilities, where the 16 conditional probabilities form eight diagnostic pairs. Of 
these eight pairs, four have hints that favor the focal island and four have hints that 
favor the non-focal island. The 16 conditional probabilities can be classified by 2 
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dimensions, the island they are conditioned on (the columns in Tables 7 and 8) and the 
island the relevant hint favors (the rows). Therefore, each cell has four of the 16 
conditional probabilities in it, each of which can form a diagnostic pair with a 
conditional probability in the other cell in the same row. 
Tables 7 and 8 illustrate the types of conditional probabilities that the 
participants may choose in Doherty, et al. (1979), and in the present study, 
respectively. (Note that these tables are not traditional covariation tables). 
 
Table 7  
The Types of Conditional Probabilities in Doherty, et al.’s (1979) Study 
Hints Conditional probabilities 
about focal Island 
Conditional probabilities 
about non-focal island 
There are no hints to 
distinguish the predictors  
6 6 
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Table 8 
The Types of Conditional Probabilities in the Present Study 
Hints Conditional probabilities 
about focal Island 
Conditional probabilities 
about non-focal island 
Predictors with hints 
favoring focal island 
4  
(Quadrant 1) 
4 
(Quadrant 3) 
Predictors with hints 
favoring non-focal island 
4 
(Quadrant 2) 
4 
(Quadrant 4) 
 
These changes (adding the hints and increasing the number of conditional 
probabilities to 16) enable participants to demonstrate any number of the following 
possible search phase patterns: a) cell bias, selecting all four conditional probabilities 
from the same category (which demonstrates a form of pseudodiagnosticity, 
hypothesis focus bias, and predictor selection bias); b) column bias, selecting all four 
conditional probabilities from a single column (which demonstrates a form of 
pseudodiagnosticity and hypothesis focus bias); c) pseudodiagnostic row bias, 
selecting all four conditional probabilities from a single row without forming any 
diagnostic pairs (which demonstrates a form of predictor selection bias and 
pseudodiagnosticity); d) diagnostic row bias, selecting two diagnostic pairs from a 
single row (which demonstrates a form of predictor selection bias despite being 
Bayesian), or e) unbiased Bayesian, selecting one diagnostic pair from each row.  
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Seventh, these scripts provide participants with conditional probabilities whose 
diagnosticity is held at a constant 2:1 ratio. This was done to ensure the same 
normatively correct outcome. (This is discussed further in the Methods Section). 
Eighth, conditional probabilities and the base rate are presented as frequencies 
instead of probabilities. This was done following the advice of Gigerenzer & Hoffrage 
(1995) that participants perform better with frequencies. This step was taken to make 
the problem easier for the participants, and thus to reduce random error. (Random 
responding has been a problem in other cognitive studies conducted by the author 
using the same participant pool). 
Ninth, data will be collected and analyzed on both search and integration phase 
decisions, and the interactions between these phases will be examined. 
Tenth, manipulations in the original studies of the base rate and the diagnostic 
direction of the conditional probabilities will be dropped. These changes were made to 
simplify the study and to ensure the same normatively correct outcome. The inclusion 
of both manipulations in the original study was to demonstrate base rate neglect, a 
phenomena which is now widely accepted. 
Hypotheses 
 The hypotheses are divided into research hypotheses and exploratory 
hypotheses. The research hypotheses are significant extensions of prior research and 
will be evaluated by independent statistical tests. The exploratory hypotheses are not 
significant extension of prior research and/or can not be tested by independent 
statistical tests. This distinction is made between research and exploratory hypotheses 
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to preserve the study wide alpha level. Only research hypotheses will be included in 
the study wide alpha level. Both research and exploratory hypotheses can be sub-
divided into experimental and non-experimental hypotheses, the difference being 
whether an independent variable is included in the hypothesis. 
Expected effects of independent variables. The independent variables 
involved in the experimental hypotheses (both research and exploratory) are expected 
to produce biasing and unbiasing effects on arriving at posterior probabilities. These 
effects are expected to have consistent (biasing or unbiasing) effects across dependent 
variables regarding the participants’ search strategies, integration strategies, and 
posterior probabilities.  
The independent variable attention is expected to create a focal hypothesis. 
Research across the seven paradigms has suggested that participants who have a focal 
hypothesis in mind are biased in both the search and integration phases.  
The independent variable motivation is expected to create a motive to 
determine that one of the hypotheses is more likely. Many dissonance theory studies 
support the expectation that motivated participants will select more information 
expected to support their existing beliefs. 
The independent variable size-of-conditionals presents conditionals that are 
either consistent with or violate participants’ expectations. In the low condition, 
participants are expected to be surprised by probabilities below 50%, when on the 
basis of the hint they were presumably expecting probabilities above 50%. Such an 
effect would be consistent with Ofir’s (1988) finding that participants used the false 
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alarm rate data [p(D| H2)] only if the base rate and the hit rate [p(D| H1)] were on 
different sides of .5 and therefore psychologically inconsistent. Doherty, et al. (1981) 
found a similar effect of surprise. Their study asked participants to choose two 
conditional probabilities from four (all four probabilities would form a diagnostic 
pairs). Participants who chose unmatched conditional probabilities were later given a 
third conditional probability which completed a diagnostic pair. Participants who 
received the third conditional probability changed their posterior probability estimate, 
presumably because the new information contradicted their assumed previous 
interpretation of unmatched conditional probabilities. 
The independent variable timing of feedback has two levels: sequential and 
simultaneous. The sequential condition enables participants to alter their search 
strategy after having learning the results of earlier choices of conditional probabilities. 
It is expected that the combination of low conditionals and sequential timing of 
feedback will result in an unbiasing effect. 
Thus the attention manipulation is expected to produce bias in the focused 
condition; the motivation manipulation is expected to produce bias in the motivated 
condition; and the interaction of timing of feedback and size of conditional in the 
combination of sequential and low conditions is expected to reduce bias. However, 
participants must be biased by attention and/or motivation in order to be unbiased by 
the combination of sequential feedback and low conditionals. Those participants in 
conditions expected to produce bias will be refereed to as biased participants (and the 
remaining participants will be referred to as unbiased participants). 
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Research hypotheses. The four research hypotheses are listed in Table 9 and 
discussed in the section below. In Table 9 each hypothesis is listed by number in the 
cells corresponding to the independent and dependent variables involved.  
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Table 9  
Research Hypotheses and their Associated Independent and Dependent Variables  
Research Hypotheses – Experimental 
 IV1 
Attention 
IV2 
Motivation 
IV3 Timing- 
of-Feedback 
IV4  Size-of- 
Conditionals 
IV3 * 
IV4  
Search Process DVs      
DV1 Hypothesis Focus Bias      
DV2 Predictor Selection Bias R1 R1   R1  
DV3 Pairs Selected      
DV4 Search Strategy      
DV14 Search Surprise       
Integration Process DVs      
DV8 Hypothesis-Focus 
Integration Bias 
     
DV9 Predictor-Focus 
Integration Bias 
     
DV10 Pairs Used in 
Integration 
     
DV11 Integration Strategy R2 R2   R2 
Posterior Result DVs      
DV5 Confirmation Bias R3 R3   R3 
DV6 Search Confirmation 
Bias 
     
DV12 Integration 
Confirmation Bias 
     
DV13 Sum-of-Phase-Biases       
DV15 Intuitive Conditionals      
Research Hypotheses – Non-Experimental 
R4 Use of biased search strategies (DV4) will be positively correlated with use of biased integration 
strategies (DV11). 
Note:  R1-R4 refer to the four research hypotheses and the IV DV combinations they examine.  Many 
empty cells in this table will be examined by exploratory hypotheses. See Table 10 for exploratory 
hypotheses. 
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The three experimental research hypotheses will be tested by planned 
comparisons within an ANOVA framework.  
Predictor selection bias. Participants in conditions expected to produce bias 
will demonstrate predictor selection bias by selecting more conditional probabilities 
from minerals that are hinted to favor Shell Island than minerals hinted to favor Coral 
Island (the top row of Table 8). Predictor selection bias was found in a pilot study 
(Borthwick and Anderson, 2001) using a personnel selection cover story under the 
Bayesian conditionals selection paradigm. Additionally, predictor selection bias is 
analogous to the finding in the dissonance theory research that participants choose 
information that is expected to support their existing belief or leading choice. 
However, as previously noted, the dissonance literature has not clarified whether 
predictor selection bias was caused by motivation and/or attention focus, because 
these two variables were always confounded.  
Research Hypothesis #1. Biased Participants will select more conditional 
probabilities from minerals that are hinted to favor Shell Island than minerals 
hinted to favor Coral Island. 
Biased Bayesian strategy in integration. The design of this study (specifically 
the use of hints in the Bayesian conditionals selection paradigm) creates the 
opportunity for participants who search optimally (selected one pair hinted to favor 
each hypothesis, as discussed under “Demonstration of the Optimal Search and 
Integration Strategies” in the methods section), to show bias in integration by using 
only one of the two pairs in integration (Biased Bayesians). (Biased Bayesians would 
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use their pair from the top row but not their pair from the bottom row in Table 8). 
Biased participants are expected to show this bias despite searching evenly and using 
Bayes’ Theorem. This bias will result in a confirmatory effect in their posterior 
probability, by being more likely to use information that has been hinted to favor Shell 
Island in integration than information hinted to favor Coral Island.  
This hypothesis extends the dissonance theory findings to the Bayesian 
Conditionals paradigm. Confirmation bias in integration is expected to show up 
despite unbiased search. 
Research Hypothesis #2. Biased Participants who searched optimally will be 
more likely in integration to use the selected pair favoring Shell than the pair 
favoring Coral. 
Confirmation bias. Participants will demonstrate confirmation bias by 
producing a posterior probability that favors Shell Island. This extends prior findings 
in all seven paradigms that participants can be biased in the search and integration 
phases which will cause a bias in their resulting posterior probability (confirmation 
bias as defined in this study). 
Research Hypothesis #3. Biased Participants will produce posterior 
probabilities more in favor Shell Island than Coral Island. 
Non-independence of phases. A major problem in the literature (noted above 
in Problems with Current Research) is that prior studies have examined the two phases 
of decision making separately. The two phases functioning separately is an underlying 
unstated and untested assumption. This assumption, on its face, appears false, since an 
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individual’s search strategy determines the information available to integrate and 
therefore must influence their integration. Additionally, past research has not 
compared participants’ judgments against a normative standard interval scale 
outcome. This study provides this standard and uses it to directly test the assumption 
that the phases are independent. This study assumes this assumption to be false and 
puts the assumption to a direct statistical test. If the assumption is true, an individual’s 
choice of search phase strategy should be independent of their choice of integration 
phase strategy. 
Research Hypothesis #4. Participants who use search strategies that are 
 hypothesis focused will be more likely to use integration strategies that are 
 hypothesis focused. 
Exploratory hypotheses. The exploratory hypotheses are listed in Table 10, 
and described below. The exploratory hypotheses can be sub-divided into 
experimental and non-experimental hypotheses, the difference being the inclusion of 
an independent variable in the hypothesis. 
The hypotheses are listed by number, in the cells corresponding to the 
independent and dependent variables involved. Descriptions of each hypothesis 
follow.
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Table 10 
Exploratory Hypotheses and their Associated Independent and Dependent Variables 
Exploratory Hypotheses – Experimental 
 IV1 
Attention 
IV2 
Motivation 
IV3 Timing- 
of Feedback 
IV4  Size-of-
Conditionals 
IV3 * 
IV4  
Search Process DVs      
DV1 Hypothesis Focus Bias E1, E4 E1, E4   E1 
DV2 Predictor Selection Bias R1, E5  R1, E5   R1 
DV3 Pairs Selected E2   E2     E2   
DV4 Search Strategy E3 E3   E3 
DV14 Search Surprise  E15, E16   E15, E16     E15,   
E16   
Integration Process DVs      
DV8 Hypothesis-Focus 
Integration Bias 
E6   E6     E6   
DV9 Predictor-Focus 
Integration Bias 
E7   E7     E7   
DV10 Pairs Used in Integration E8 E8   E8 
DV11 Integration Strategy R2, E9   R2, E9     R2, 
E9   
Posterior Result DVs      
DV5 Confirmation Bias R3  R3    R3  
DV6 Search Confirmation Bias E10   E10     E10   
DV12 Integration Confirmation 
Bias 
E11   E11     E11   
DV15 Intuitive Conditionals     E14  
Exploratory Hypotheses – Non-Experimental 
R4 Correlation between bias search and integration strategies  
E13a Bayesian integration predicts actual posteriors better when incorporating intuitive 
conditionals.  
E13b Bayesian integration predicts actual posteriors better than regression. 
E12 The actual posterior will not be equal to the Sum-of-Phase-Biases. 
Note:  R1-R4 refer to research hypotheses and E1-E14 refer to exploratory hypotheses and the IV DV 
combinations the hypotheses examine. See Table 9 for research hypotheses. 
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Exploratory search process hypotheses.  
Hypothesis focus bias. Research in five paradigms has shown that directed 
attention causes a focal search bias (Bayesian conditionals selection studies, Bayesian 
data sampling studies, Wason selection task studies, Wason rule discovery studies, and 
covariation and causation studies; see paragraph “Searching information that is about 
or associated with the focal hypothesis” above for details). (Hypothesis focus bias is 
the disproportionate selection from the left column of Table 8). The following 
hypothesis will replicate and extend these findings. 
Exploratory Hypothesis #1. Participants in biasing conditions will select more 
probabilities conditioned on Shell Island than will unbiased participants. 
 Pseudodiagnosticity. The effects of focal search bias (preference for selecting 
probabilities conditioned on the focal island) should appear in two other search phase 
dependent variables, pairs selected and search strategy. These hypotheses are related 
to (and not independent of) Exploratory Hypothesis #1, but use different dependent 
variables.  
Participants’ focal search bias creates a mismatch between the number of 
probabilities they chose conditioned on each island, and therefore interferes with their 
chance of selecting matched pairs. The preference for unmatched conditionals in 
biased participants has been found by research in the Bayesian conditionals paradigm 
(Doherty, et al., 1979; Doherty, et al., 1981; Mynatt, et al., 1993; Beyth-Marom & 
Fischhoff, 1983). (Participants who are pseudodiagnostic will select conditional 
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probabilities without selecting the matching probability conditioned on the other 
island. The two probabilities would be from the same row in Table 8). 
Exploratory Hypothesis #2. Participants in biasing conditions will select fewer 
diagnostic pairs than unbiased participants. 
 Focal search strategies. Similarly, the focal search bias should cause 
participants to use search strategies focused on the focal island. The difference 
between Exploratory Hypotheses 3 and 1 is the difference between participants’ search 
strategy (which classifies only the consistent participants see Search Strategy in 
methods section), rather than the just the result of that strategy (their actual search 
selections). 
Exploratory Hypothesis #3. Participants in biasing conditions would use more 
hypothesis-focused search strategies and fewer control focused search 
strategies than unbiased participants 
Comparing the size of hypothesis focus and predictor selection biases. Both 
the attention manipulation and the motivation manipulation are expected to produce 
search phase effects on the number of probabilities; (a) conditioned on the focal 
island, and, (b) on dimensions hinted to favor the focal island. However, the attention 
manipulation is expected to have a stronger effect on the number of probabilities 
conditioned on the focal island (hypothesis focus bias, disproportionately selecting 
probabilities from the left column of Table 8), while the motivation manipulation is 
expected to have a stronger effect on the number of conditionals selected on 
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dimensions hinted to favor the focal island (predictor selection bias, disproportionately 
selecting probabilities from the top row of Table 8). 
Exploratory Hypothesis #4. The hypothesis focus bias caused by the attention 
manipulation will be greater than the predictor selection bias caused by the 
attention manipulation. 
Exploratory Hypothesis #5. The predictor selection bias caused by the 
motivation manipulation will be greater than hypothesis focus bias caused by 
the motivation manipulation. 
Exploratory integration process hypotheses. 
 Hypothesis-focus integration bias. Research across paradigms has shown that 
participant use non-diagnostic information in integration. (See above paragraph 
entitled Integration of non-diagnostic information.) There are three types of findings 
that show the use of non-diagnostic information. First, Beyth-Marom and Fischhoff’s 
(1983) finding that half of their participants reported that p(D| H2) was irrelevant. 
Second, Ofir’s (1988) finding that p(D| H2) was used only when the hit rate and base 
rate were psychologically inconsistent. Third, the majority of the covariation research 
finding that participants used the either only the present-present cell (Ward &  Jenkins, 
1965; Shaklee & Tucker, 1980; Shaklee & Mims, 1982; Arkes & Harkness, 1983) or 
both predictor present cells (Shaklee & Goldston, 1989; Shaklee & Hall, 1983) in 
making their covariation judgments. 
It is hypothesized biased participants will select more probabilities conditioned 
on Shell Island (Hypotheses-Focus Bias, Exploratory Hypothesis #1), and therefore 
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they will have more available for them to use in integration. Therefore, participants 
will continue to be hypothesis-focused biased in the integration phase (Hypotheses-
Focus Integration Bias). 
Exploratory Hypothesis #6. Participants in biasing conditions will report using 
more information conditioned on Shell Island than will unbiased participants. 
Predictor-focus integration bias. As stated in Research Hypothesis #1, 
Dissonance Theory research has found that participants chose information expected to 
confirm their hypothesis (predictor selection bias). The finding is expected to continue 
into the integration phase (as predictor-focus integration bias, i.e., use of more 
information expected to confirm the focal hypothesis in their integration phase). Since 
participants will select more information expected to confirm, and therefore the 
information available to them during integration. (Predictor-focus integration bias 
would be the disproportionate use of probabilities from the left column of Table 8) 
Exploratory Hypothesis #7. Participants in biasing conditions will use in 
integration more conditional probabilities hinted to favor Shell Island than will 
unbiased participants.  
 Pairs used in integration. A similar extension of the search phase applies to the 
integration of unmatched pairs. Since biased participants will have fewer pairs 
available to use from their search (Exploratory Hypothesis #2) they will use fewer 
pairs in integration. This expected finding is extensively supported by research in the 
Bayesian conditionals paradigm (Doherty, et al., 1979; Doherty, et al., 1981; Mynatt, 
et al., 1993; Beyth-Marom & Fischhoff, 1983). This hypothesis is classified as 
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exploratory despite the fact that it has extensive support because it is not independent 
of Research Hypothesis #1. As noted before, in order for subjects to have a hypothesis 
focus bias (Research Hypothesis #1) they must also be pseudodiagnostic. 
Exploratory Hypothesis #8. Participants in biasing conditions will use in 
integration fewer diagnostic pairs than unbiased participants. 
Use of biased integration strategies. As stated in Exploratory Hypothesis #4, 
participants are expected to use search strategies that focus on the focal hypotheses. 
This pattern is expected to continue into the integration phase, where participants are 
expected to use integration strategies that focus on the focal hypothesis. This in part 
will be caused by the disproportionate amount of information available to them in the 
integration phase about the focal island. This effect is similar to (and not independent 
of) Exploratory Hypothesis #6 (hypothesis-focus integration bias). However, this 
hypothesis uses a different dependent variable, (integration strategy), which uses 
information in addition to the conditionals participants stated they used (which is the 
sole basis of hypothesis-focus integration bias).  
Exploratory Hypothesis #9. Participants in biasing conditions will use more 
integration strategies that focus on the focal island than unbiased participants. 
Phase biases. As stated in Research Hypothesis #4, participants are expected to 
produce confirmation bias in posterior probabilities. The confirmatory effect of 
participants’ strategies (in terms of posterior probability) can be measured for both 
phases separately (by combining their actual strategies in one phase with optimal 
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strategies in the other phase). It is expected that biased participants’ will produce 
greater confirmatory bias in both their search strategies and their integration strategies. 
Exploratory Hypothesis #10. Participants in biasing conditions will have a 
higher posterior probability produced from optimal integration and their actual 
search than unbiased participants. 
Exploratory Hypothesis #11. Participants in biasing conditions will have a 
higher posterior probability produced from optimal search and their actual 
integration than unbiased participants.   
A major problem in the literature (noted above in Problems with Current 
Research) is that prior studies have examined the two phases of decision making 
separately. The two phases functioning separately is an underlying unstated and 
untested assumption. This study assumes this assumption to be false and puts the 
assumption to two direct statistical tests. First, if the assumption is true, an 
individual’s choice of a search phase strategy should be independent of that 
individuals’ choice of integration phase strategy. This was tested as research 
hypothesis #4. Second, if the assumption were true, then the total confirmatory effect 
of the two phases should be equal to the sum of the individual phase confirmatory 
effects. However, Edwards (1968) found that people under adjust (conservatism) and 
therefore it is expected that participants will show less bias in their posteriors than the 
sum of their phase biases.  
Method 57 
 
  
M
ethod 57 
Exploratory Hypothesis #12. Participants’ actual confirmation bias will be less 
than the sum of their search confirmation bias and their integration 
confirmation bias. 
Intuitive conditionals. Gigerenzer engaged in a debate with the research team 
of Kahneman and Tversky for over a decade over the extent and cause of cognitive 
biases (Kahneman & Tversky, 1996, Gigerenzer, 1996). An ongoing issue between 
them was why participants perform better in some situations than others (including the 
use of frequencies rather than conditional probabilities, and in familiar situations as 
opposed to abstract ones) (Gigerenzer, 1991). One possible explanation for the 
conflicting findings is that participants make assumptions about the problems, and 
these unexamined assumptions affect their decisions (Cosmides & Tooby, 1996, 
Nickerson, 1996).  
One of the assumption participants could make about a problem is the size of 
the unknown (in this study unchosen) conditional probabilities (intuitive conditionals). 
Intuitive conditional probabilities could have an impact on participants’ posterior 
probabilities. If intuitive conditional probabilities are used by participants, they could 
offer a partial explanation as to why participants sometimes perform better in 
situations they are familiar. In familiar situations participants might have more 
accurate intuitive conditionals or use them in different ways. Different models will be 
explored examining whether participants used intuitive conditionals in the integration 
phase, and whether participants’ intuitive conditionals are affected by the size of the 
actual conditionals. 
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Exploratory Hypothesis #13a. Models using intuitive conditionals predict 
participants’ posterior probabilities better than models that exclude them.  
Exploratory Hypothesis #13b. Models using intuitive conditionals predict 
participants’ posterior probabilities better when combined by Bayes’ Theorem 
than when combined by regression. 
Exploratory Hypothesis #14. The size of intuitive conditionals will be affected 
by the size of the actual conditionals. 
Surprise hypotheses. These two hypotheses continue the logic of the previous 
hypotheses, that surprise will induce deeper and less biased thinking. For participants 
who are in the sequential condition, if are surprised by the feedback they have an 
opportunity to use a less biased search strategy. Therefore, participants who 
experience some form of surprise will exhibit less hypothesis focus bias and predictor 
selection bias. 
Exploratory Hypothesis #15. For participants searching sequentially and in the 
focused and/or motivated conditions, and if they reported being surprised it is 
expected that they would select less information conditioned on Shell Island 
than those not surprised.  
Exploratory Hypothesis #16. For participants searching sequentially and in the 
focused and/or motivated conditions, and if they reported being surprised it is 
expected that they would select less information hinted to favor Shell Island 
than those not surprised. 
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Method 
Study Overview 
Task overview. All participants were presented with the problem of estimating 
the probability as to which of two islands an urn was made. Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of two levels of each of four independent variables: 
attention, motivation, timing-of-feedback and size-of-conditionals. Attention had two 
levels: balanced, where the two islands were treated equally, and focused, where one 
island was mentioned more frequently and earlier. Motivation had two levels: 
motivated, where participants were provided a motivation reason for preferring Shell 
Island, and not motivated, where there was no motivational reason for preferring either 
island. Timing-of-feedback had two levels: sequential, where participants received the 
results of each of their conditional probabilities before selecting later conditional 
probabilities, and simultaneous, where participants received all four conditional 
probabilities at the same time. Size-of-conditionals had two levels: low, where the 
conditional probabilities all were below 50%, and high, where some of the conditional 
probabilities were above 50%. 
Participants were given an even base rate (the two islands were initially 
equally likely) and they were offered their choice of four (out of sixteen) conditional 
probabilities to assist them in estimating the probability that the urn originated on each 
island. These sixteen conditional probabilities formed eight matching pairs (two 
conditional probabilities on the same dimension each conditioned on one of the two 
islands). Half of the eight matching pairs were hinted to favor each island as the 
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source of the urn. Participants were asked to make an estimate of the probability the 
urn came from each island. Lastly participants were asked about the conditional 
probabilities they did not choose, about their integration methods, and demographic 
information. 
Measures overview. Measurements primarily targeted participants’ decision 
making processes. They included examining their search choices, their integration 
method (both information used and combination strategy) and decision results. These 
measures can be sub-divided into those taken during the decision process (concurrent) 
and those taken after the fact (retrospective and demographic). The retrospective 
measures were taken after the fact, because if taken during the process they might 
have altered participant behavior. Those measures taken during the decision process 
(concurrent measures) can be further subdivided in search phase and integration phase 
measurements. (See Appendix A for a copy of the script). 
Concurrent search phase measurements. Participants were asked to choose 
any four of 16 conditional probabilities. These 16 conditional probabilities formed 
eight matching pairs (two conditional probabilities on the same dimension each 
conditioned on one of the two islands). Of the eight dimensions four were hinted to 
favor each island as the source of the urn. 
Concurrent integration phase measurements. Participants were asked to 
estimate the probability that the urn came from each island.  
Retrospective measurements. Participants were also asked about which 
information they used in making their decision and the mathematical processes (if 
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any) they used in combining the information. Participants were asked if they were 
surprised by any of the conditional probabilities they received in the search phase, and 
to estimate the value of the 12 conditional probabilities that they did not choose.  
Demographic measurements. Demographic questions were asked at the end of 
the script. 
Participants 
Demographics. A total of 324 undergraduate psychology students enrolled at 
an urban university in the Portland metropolitan area were recruited to participate in 
this study. Participants were recruited primarily through their undergraduate classes, 
and most received extra credit for their participation. Participants approximated 
Portland’s racial makeup with 3.4% African American, 69.1% Caucasian, 3.7% Latino 
/ Hispanic, 13.0% Asian / Pacific Islander and 7.7% other. A small number of 
participants refused to state their race (3.1%).  Participants approximated the gender 
balance of the psychology classes from which participants were recruited from with 
68.8% female. A small number of participants refused to state their gender (2.8%). 
This sample was chosen largely for convenience, although it may roughly represent 
the general population of all people who attend college. 
Missing data. All participants completed the study. However, some 
participants did not follow some of the instructions correctly, and were therefore 
dropped from all analyses that involved data collected at or after their deviation. On 
this basis, nine participants (out of the original 324) were dropped from all analyses, 
because they chose more than the four requested conditional probabilities. Similarly, 
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one additional participant was dropped from the integration-phase analyses, because 
that participant did not provide a posterior probability. Similarly, 72 participants were 
dropped from the intuitive conditionals analyses, because they did not provide all 12 
requested intuitive conditionals.  
Experimental Design 
Structural design. This study employed a 2*2*2*2 (attention, motivation, 
timing of feedback, size-of-conditionals) factorial between-subjects design. The 
between subjects design was used because order effects would have been a severe 
problem using a within-subject design. 
Design features used to ensure a single optimal search and integration 
strategy. This study had four design features to create a situation where there is both a 
single optimal search strategy and, assuming Bayesian revision, a single optimal 
posterior probability for all 16 conditions.  There are four such design features. (1) 
The base rate was in all cases even (.50). (2) All participants were instructed to choose 
four conditional probabilities. (3) An equal number of dimensions were hinted to favor 
each island. (4) All matched pairs had the same diagnostic ratios. 
Given (1), (2), and (3), the optimal search strategy is to select one diagnostic 
pair hinted to favor each island. A demonstration of the optimal of the search strategy 
is given in the section entitled “Demonstration of the Optimal Search and Integration 
Strategies”. 
Theoretical definitions of independent variables. There are four independent 
variables in this study (attention, motivation, timing-of-feedback and size-of-
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conditionals). Additionally, different conditions of these four independent variables 
are expected to produce various confirmatory biases in participants while other 
conditions are expected to have no biasing impact. 
The first independent variable attention is defined as whether the situation 
focuses participants’ attention on one hypothesis or balances participants’ attention 
between the two hypotheses. 
The second independent variable motivation is defined as whether the situation 
provides the participants with a reason to prefer one hypothesis over the other or 
provides the participants no reason to prefer either hypothesis. 
The third independent variable timing-of-feedback is defined as whether 
participants receive the results of their search choices before making the remaining 
choices or not. 
 The fourth independent variable size-of-conditionals is defined as whether the 
probabilities conditioned on the hypothesis that is hinted to be favored for that 
dimension are above or below 50%. 
 Biasing conditions are conditions where the situations encourage participants 
to be biased and additionally are not conditions that both surprise the participants and 
provide them an opportunity to change their search strategies after such surprise. All 
other conditions are unbiased.  (See section entitled “Biased and Unbiased 
Conditions” for a discussion). 
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Theoretical definitions of dependent variables. Hypothesis-Focus bias 
(dependent variable 1) is the tendency to prefer evidence about the focal hypothesis to 
evidence about the alternative hypothesis. 
Predictor-Selection bias (dependent variable 2) is the tendency to prefer 
evidence expected to support the focal hypothesis to evidence expected to support the 
alternative hypothesis. 
Pairs selected (dependent variable 3) is the frequency of selecting matching 
pairs of conditional probabilities as opposed to unmatched conditional probabilities 
(pseudodiagnostic search). 
Search strategy (dependent variable 4) is a classification of participants’ search 
strategies. Search strategies are categorized by their use of matched pairs and from 
which of the four quadrants a participant selects conditional probabilities. 
Confirmation bias (dependent variable 5) is the size and direction of 
participants’ probability estimates’ deviation from the normatively correct probability 
estimate. 
Search confirmation bias (dependent variable 6) is the size of the confirmation 
bias (dependent variable 5) caused by the participants’ search. 
Biased usage of hints (dependent variable 7) is the preference to use hints that 
favor the focal hypothesis as opposed to hints that favor the alternative hypothesis. 
Hypothesis-Focus integration bias (dependent variable 8) is the preference to 
use in the integration phase evidence about the focal hypothesis to evidence about the 
alternative hypothesis. 
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Predictor-Focus integration bias (dependent variable 9) is the preference to use 
in the integration phase evidence expected to support the focal hypothesis to evidence 
expected to support the alternative hypothesis. 
Pairs used in integration (dependent variable 10) is the tendency to use 
matched pairs of conditionals in integration (diagnostic integration) as opposed to 
unmatched pairs (pseudodiagnostic integration). 
Integration strategy (dependent variable 11) is a classification of participants’ 
integration strategies. These strategies are categorized by their use of mathematical 
operations and from which of the four quadrants conditional probabilities are used. 
Integration confirmation bias (dependent variable 12) is the size of the 
confirmation bias (dependent variable 5) caused by the participants’ integration 
method. 
Sum-of-Phase-Biases (dependent variable 13) is the sum of search 
confirmation bias (dependent variable 6) and integration confirmation bias (dependent 
variable 12). This reflects the confirmation bias caused by the two phases if they did 
not have any interactive effects. 
Search surprise (dependent variable 14) is the degree that participants are 
surprised by the size of the conditional probabilities. 
Intuitive conditionals (dependent variable 15) are participants’ estimates of the 
unchosen conditional probabilities.  
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Bayesian intuitive posterior (dependent variable 15a) is the posterior 
probability estimate a participant would have produced if they used all intuitive and 
selected conditional probabilities and combined them using Bayesian integration. 
Bayesian matching posterior (dependent variable 15b) is the posterior 
probability estimate a participant would have produced if they used all selected 
conditional probabilities and any intuitive conditionals necessary to make matching 
diagnostic pairs and combined them using Bayesian integration. 
Regression intuitive posterior (dependent variable 15c) is the posterior 
probability estimate a participant would have produced if they used all intuitive and 
selected conditional probabilities and combined them using the regression weights 
from a regression equation of all participants posteriors and conditional probabilities 
(both intuitive and selected). 
Cell sizes. The numbers of participants, both original and final, in the various 
experimental conditions are provided in Table 11.
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Table 11  
Participants Completing each Phase in each Condition. 
Condition Total  Search 
Phase  
Integration 
Phase 
Retrospective 
Measures 
1 Balanced, Not Motivated, Sequential, Low 21 20 20 13 
2 Balanced, Not Motivated, Sequential, High 20 20 20 17 
3 Balanced, Not Motivated, Simultaneous, Low 20 19 19 14 
4 Balanced, Not Motivated, Simultaneous, High 20 18 18 15 
5 Balanced, Motivated, Sequential, Low 21 21 21 18 
6 Balanced, Motivated, Sequential, High 20 20 20 18 
7 Balanced, Motivated, Simultaneous, Low 21 20 20 18 
8 Balanced, Motivated, Simultaneous, High 21 20 20 12 
9 Focused, Not Motivated, Sequential, Low 21 21 21 17 
10 Focused, Not Motivated, Sequential, High 20 20 20 16 
11 Focused, Not Motivated, Simultaneous, Low 21 21 21 16 
12 Focused, Not Motivated, Simultaneous, High 20 20 20 12 
13 Focused, Motivated, Sequential, Low 20 19 19 12 
14 Focused, Motivated, Sequential, High 19 19 19 14 
15 Focused, Motivated, Simultaneous, Low 19 18 18 15 
16 Focused, Motivated, Simultaneous, High 20 19 18 16 
Total 324 315 314 243 
Total Sequential Conditions Only 162 160 160 125 
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Operational definitions of independent variables 
 All four independent variables had two levels and were manipulated in a 
factorial design. 
IV1 Attention operational definition. The attention manipulation has two 
levels, balanced and focused. The two levels were differentiated by three sections on 
the first page of the script (See appendix A for copy of the script). The focus of 
participants’ attention was manipulated using four techniques, over the three parts of 
the attention manipulation, to restrict participants’ attention in the treatment condition. 
First, attention was restricted by delaying the first mention of Coral Island (the 
alternative not mentioned until the third part). The delay in informing the subjects of 
the existence of and the evidence favoring Coral Island made use of the primacy effect 
(Jahnke, 1965) to strengthen the impact of the pro-Shell Island information. Second, 
attention was restricted by delaying the mention of a uniform base rate. Third, 
attention was restricted by reducing the frequency with which Coral Island was 
mentioned. Fourth, attention was restricted by altering the form in which the 
information was presented, prose or table (In the balanced condition a table is 
presented in part two,  in the focal condition all the information is provided in prose in 
parts two and three). Because Ward and Jenkins (1965) had found that information 
that is presented in a table encourages participants to examine data relevant to both 
hypotheses, it is believed that use of a table will incline subjects towards diagnostic, 
instead of pseudodiagnostic, strategies and thus against the experimenter’s hypotheses. 
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In the focused condition the first two script sections were (the third section was 
omitted for the focused condition): 
Imagine you are an archeologist specializing in South Sea cultures. Your 
research has led you to believe that the legendary Urn of Zor actually existed 
and was created on either Shell Island or nearby Coral Island, two islands that 
share a unique culture. You have found this Urn of Zor, resting on the ocean 
floor between Shell and Coral Islands. 
Of the 10 urns that have previously been found at this spot on the ocean floor, 
5 have been determined to have been made on Shell Island and 5 on Coral 
Island. Since there are no other islands with the same culture as Shell and 
Coral, no other island of origin is possible. 
 
You need to make a determination as to the island on which the urn was more 
probably made. Your first step is to analyze the mineral content of the Urn of 
Zor. You find that the Urn of Zor has high content of the 8 minerals listed in 
the table below. Your second step is to determine the content of these minerals 
in the clay pits now in use on the two islands. The table below displays the 
results of the mineral content of the Urn of Zor and that of the current clay pits 
on the two islands: 
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Mineral found to be in 
abundance in the Urn of 
Zor 
Island whose current clay pits are 
characterized by an abundance of this 
mineral 
Aluminum Shell Island 
Calcium Shell Island 
Chromium Shell Island 
Copper  Shell Island 
Iron Coral Island 
Magnesium  Coral Island 
Nickel Coral Island 
Zinc  Coral Island 
 
Unfortunately, the islanders have migrated around the islands over the years 
and have changed the clay pits they use. While the mineral content of the 
current clay pits is probably similar to the mineral content of those clay pits 
used in ancient times to make the Urn of Zor, it is certainly not identical. 
Therefore you will need an additional step in your analysis. 
At this point what is the probability the urn came from: 
Shell Island  _______? 
Coral Island  _______? 
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In the focused condition the three script sections were: 
Imagine you are an archeologist specializing in South Sea cultures. Your 
research has led you to believe that the legendary Urn of Zor actually existed. 
While conducting underwater excavations, from your research facility on Shell 
Island, you have found this Urn of Zor, resting on the ocean floor. 
 
When you return to your research facility on Shell Island, your first thought is 
to analyze the mineral content of the Urn of Zor. The results indicate that the 
Urn of Zor has a high content of eight minerals (Aluminum, Calcium, 
Chromium, Copper, Iron, Magnesium, Nickel and Zinc). Four (Aluminum, 
Calcium, Chromium and Copper) of these high content minerals are 
characteristic of the clay pits in current use on Shell Island. When you tell your 
research team the results, one of your co-workers states that some of these 
minerals remind him of the current clay pit on the side of Shell Island he has 
been working on. A second co-worker states that some of these minerals 
remind her of the current clay pit on another side of Shell Island on which she 
has been working. This sets off a furious debate among your research team as 
to the side of Shell Island on which the Urn was more probably made. 
Unfortunately, the evidence is not conclusive because, the islanders have 
migrated around the islands over the years and have changed the clay pits they 
use. While the mineral content of the current clay pits is probably similar to the 
mineral content of those clay pits used in ancient times to make the Urn of Zor, 
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it is certainly not identical. Therefore you will need an additional step in your 
analysis. 
At this point what is the probability the Urn came from anywhere on Shell 
Island ________? 
 
You announce the finding of the Urn of Zor and your intention to give it to the 
Shell Island National Museum, which you believe to be the most appropriate 
representative of the rightful owners. Coral Island, which has the same culture 
as Shell Island, quickly requests that you investigate the possibility that the 
Urn might have been made on their island, and requests that you not give the 
Urn to the Shell Island National Museum until you confirm that the Urn came 
from Shell Island. 
Coral Island argues that of the 10 urns that have previously been found at the 
spot on the ocean floor where the Urn of Zor was found, 5 have been 
determined to have been made on Shell Island and 5 on Coral Island. Since 
there are no other islands with the same culture as Shell and Coral, no other 
island of origin is possible. 
Additionally, they argue that despite the fact that four of the minerals 
(Aluminum, Calcium, Chromium and Copper) characterize the current clay 
pits of Shell Island, the other four minerals (Iron, Magnesium, Nickel and 
Zinc) characterize the current clay pits of Coral Island. 
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IV2 Motivation operational definition. The motivation manipulation has two 
levels, not motivated and motivated. The two levels were differentiated by two 
sections of the script on the first page. The primary different was the inclusion in the 
motivated condition of a mention of a career incentive to determine that the urn came 
from Shell Island. In the not motivated condition the script section was (the second 
section was omitted for the motivated condition): 
The Urn of Zor is believed to have been created soon after the first settlements 
on the islands. Finding the Urn provides new information about the early 
colonization of the islands and will trigger new interest and research 
opportunities for you and your fellow South Sea archeologists and greatly 
enhance your prestige. This is especially important to you, since you are 
coming up for promotion and tenure next year. 
 
In the motivated condition the two script sections were: 
If it could be established that this urn had come from Shell Island, this would 
dispute the legend that Shell Island was the last island in the South Sea area to 
be settled. This would provide abundant research opportunities for you and 
your fellow South Sea archeologists and greatly enhance your prestige. This is 
especially important to you, since you are coming up for promotion and tenure 
next year. 
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Would it be good for your career if the probability were higher or lower, that 
the Urn came from Shell Island? 
IV3 Timing-of-feedback operational definition. The timing-of-feedback 
manipulation has two levels, sequential and simultaneous. The two levels were 
differentiated by the instructions at the top of the third page of the script. In both 
conditions the script read: “Choose 4 of the following 16 tests to perform, as the most 
efficient way to determine the origin of the Urn of Zor, following the instructions 
below.” In the simultaneous condition, participants were instructed to choose their 
conditional probabilities all at once before receiving feedback. In the sequential 
condition, participants were instructed to choose their conditional probabilities one at 
a time with feedback after each selection, thus enabling them to choose their later 
selections on the basis of the results of earlier choices. 
Having participants in the Simultaneous Condition determine the order of 
importance of their selections, despite this not being essential to their task, was 
intended to balance the cognitive load between the two conditions of timing of 
feedback. This additionally provided a sense of relative importance of the four 
conditional probabilities. Having a measure of order in both conditions also made 
possible additional comparisons between conditions (especially for effects of IV3 
timing-of-feedback). This added task (numbering the choices) should increase 
cognitive load, which might, in turn, encourage the use of simple heuristics. Biggs, 
Bedard, Gaber and Linsmeier (1985) found an effect of cognitive load, while Payne 
(1976) did not. Such an effect, if it exists, would work in the opposite direction of the 
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possible effect from the use of tables, which is biasing towards proper use of 
diagnostic information. 
In the sequential condition the script was: 
Put the number 1 next to the first test you would like to perform, and then 
remove the corresponding sticker to reveal the test result.  
Next choose your second test, put the number 2 next to that test and then 
remove the corresponding sticker to reveal the test result.  
Next choose your third test, put the number 3 next to that test and then remove 
the corresponding sticker to reveal the test result.  
Finally, choose your fourth test, put the number 4 next to that test and then 
remove the corresponding sticker to reveal the test result. 
In the simultaneous condition the script was: 
Put a number (1 to 4) next to the four tests you would like to perform in the 
order of importance to you (1 being top priority, 4 being lowest). Then remove 
the four corresponding stickers to reveal the four test results. 
 IV4 Size-of-conditionals operational definition. The size-of-conditionals 
manipulation has two levels, low and high. The two levels were differentiated by the 
size of the conditional probabilities the participants learn on the third page. In the low 
condition the conditional probabilities were 10%, 20%, 30%, and 40% for the 
probabilities conditioned on the island favored by the hint, and the corresponding 
conditional probabilities were 5%, 10%, 15%, and 20% for the probabilities 
conditioned on the island not favored by the hint. In the high condition the conditional 
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probabilities were 60%, 70%, 80%, and 90% for the probabilities conditioned on the 
island favored by the hint, and the corresponding conditional probabilities were 30%, 
35%, 40%, and 45% for the probabilities conditioned on the island not favored by the 
hint. 
These conditional probabilities [p(D|H1) and p(D|H2)] were designed with 
three features. First, they were diagnostically consistent with the hints, to preserve the 
participants’ faith in the value of the hints (especially for those in the Sequential 
Condition). Second, all conditional probability pairs had a diagnosticity ratio of 2:1 
(discussed further below in Demonstration of the Optimal Search and Integration 
Strategies). For Bayesian participants, the 2:1 ratio would eliminate error variance due 
to random choice among the four diagnostic pairs hinted to favor the same island. 
Third, the sizes of the conditional probabilities within a category presented to any one 
subject were all either above or below 50%. For participants who use a non-Bayesian 
integration strategy, this third feature would reduce random error due to selection of 
conditional probabilities within a quadrant.  
The variation that remained among the conditional probabilities in each 
quadrant provided two benefits. First, it helped hide the fact that all the diagnostic 
pairs had the same diagnostic ratio. Because participants could pick only four 
conditional probabilities, they were not able to discover that the ratios were the same 
until they had picked their fourth and last conditional probability. Second, it limited 
the ability of non-Bayesians to accurately predict or make any assumption about the 
size of the non-chosen conditional probabilities (that is to use “intuitive conditionals”). 
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Biasing conditions operational definition. The four independent variables 
(attention, motivation, timing-of-feedback and size-of-conditionals) were expected in 
different combinations to produce both biasing and unbiasing effects (see Expected 
Effects of Independent Variables for a discussion and Table 22 for a list of research 
hypotheses). The focal condition (attention IV) and the motivated condition 
(motivation IV) were each expected to cause participants to be biased in search and 
integration. The combination of sequential (timing-of-feedback IV) and low 
conditionals (size-of-conditionals IV) was expected to undo both of these biasing 
effects of both the focal and motivated conditions. Therefore, experimental conditions 
were considered biasing if they involved one or more of the biasing conditions 
(focused or motivated) and did not involve the unbiasing combination (sequential 
feedback and low conditionals). The biasing effects were expected to be consistent 
(biasing or unbiasing) across dependent variables regarding the participants’ search 
strategies, integration strategies, and posterior probabilities. This classification of the 
16 conditions into biasing or non-biasing was treated as a dichotomous independent 
variable. 
Operational Definitions of Direct Dependent Variables 
Operational definitions of direct dependent search phase variables. Three 
search phase dependent variables (DV1-DV3) were directly based on the participants’ 
four choices of conditional probabilities selected from the sixteen available 
conditional probabilities. Each of the sixteen available conditionals was classified on 
the basis of whether it was conditioned on Shell Island or Coral Island and whether the 
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mineral was hinted to be more abundant on Shell Island or on Coral Island. These two 
dimensions produce four quadrants, each of which has four conditional probabilities in 
it. The four conditionals in each quadrant differ in the mineral they provide frequency 
information about. The four quadrants are labeled as 1 through 4 as in Table 12. 
 
Table 12  
Description of the Four Quadrants of Conditional Probabilities 
Direction of 
Hint 
p Conditioned on Shell Island p Conditioned on Coral Island 
Hint Favors 
Shell Island 
Quadrant 1 (4 conditional 
probabilities) 
Quadrant 3 (4 conditional 
probabilities) 
Hint Favors 
Coral Island 
Quadrant 2 (4 conditional 
probabilities) 
Quadrant 4 (4 conditional 
probabilities) 
 
 
Participants’ search phase choices of these four types of conditional 
probabilities were entered into two classification systems. The first system is limited 
to the four conditionals selected, while the second system includes all 16 available 
conditionals from which the four choices were made. In the first system (Quadrant 
System), each of the four choices was classified as to which of the four quadrants it 
fell into and whether or not it completed a diagnostic pair. In the second system 
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(Conditional System), what was recorded, separately for each of the possible 16 
choices, was whether that conditional was selected or, if not selected, what frequency 
the participant estimated for that unchosen conditional probability. (So as not to 
introduce any bias into the primary task of producing a posterior estimate, this 
estimated frequency was obtained only after the completion of the posterior estimate.)  
 Search phase dependent variables were derived either directly or indirectly 
from the variables of the Quadrant and Conditional systems. Many of the dependent 
variables that were created indirectly are based on frequency totals. From the Quadrant 
System data, Quadrant totals were summed over the four choices (e.g. if a participant 
choose 2 matching pairs that were hinted to favor Shell island, then these choices were 
described as 2 choices in quadrant 1 and 2 choices in quadrant 3, see Table 12). All 
coding except for integration search strategies was done by if / then logic commands 
in excel.  
DV1: Hypothesis focus bias. Hypothesis focus bias was created by summing 
the total number of conditional probabilities selected from quadrants 1 and 2. It has a 
possible range from 4, in which every choice is conditioned on the focal island (Shell), 
to 0, in which every choice is conditioned on the non-focal island (Coral). Possible 
values are 4, 3, 2, 1, and 0 (See Table 13 for Coding).  
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Table 13 
Coding for Hypothesis Focus Bias 
Direction of Hint p Conditioned on 
Shell Island 
p Conditioned on 
Coral Island 
Hint Favors Shell Island +1 0 
Hint Favors Coral Island +1 0 
 
DV2: Predictor selection bias. Predictor selection bias was created by summing 
the total number of conditional probabilities selected from quadrants 1 and 3. It has a 
possible range from 4, in which every choice was hinted to favor the focal island 
(Shell Island), to 0, in which every choice was hinted to favor the non-focal island 
(Coral Island). Possible values are 4, 3, 2, 1, and 0 (See Table 14 for Coding).  
 
Table 14 
Coding for Predictor Selection Bias. 
Direction of Hint p Conditioned 
on Shell Island 
p Conditioned 
on Coral Island 
Hint Favors Shell Island  +1 +1 
Hint Favors Coral Island 0 0 
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 DV3: Pairs selected. This variable was the total number of diagnostic pairs 
selected by each participant (A diagnostic pair is a pair of conditional probabilities 
about the same mineral, one conditioned on each island). This total was calculated 
from the pair-completed data in the Quadrant System data. The total number of pairs 
was summed (using the MS Excel if / then command), creating a range from 0 to 2 
pairs (resulting from the four conditional probability choices). Values include 0 
(completely non-diagnostic search), 1, and 2 (completely diagnostic search). (For 
reference purpose, random selection would result in an average of .4 pairs). 
Operational definitions of direct dependent integration phase variables. 
DV5: Confirmation bias. Confirmation bias was derived from participants 
responses to the three questions at the bottom of the third page designed to elicit their 
revised probability that the Urn came from Shell Island: 
Which Island do you now believe the Urn of Zor is more likely to have come 
from?  
What do you now believe is the probability that the Urn of Zor came from that 
island?  
What do you believe is the probability that the Urn of Zor came from the other 
island?” 
Confirmation bias was calculated by subtracting the normative revised 
probability estimate that the Urn had been created on Shell Island (.50 in this scenario) 
from the participants’ revised probability estimates. Because the subtraction of .50 is a 
linear transformation, it does not alter the statistical properties of the variable. 
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However, it does make it easier to interpret and to compare to the other dependent 
variables that measure bias. For example, if a participant thought that the probability 
that the Urn came from Shell Island was = .9, then his or her confirmation bias score 
would be .4 (the revised estimate of .9 - the normative probability of .5). 
The resulting variable ranges from +.50, meaning the participant’s revised 
estimate favored Shell Island .50 more than normative (maximum confirmatory bias), 
to –.50, meaning the participant’s revised estimate favored Coral Island .50 more than 
normative (maximum disconfirmatory bias). 
The participant’s answer to the first question determined which island the 
second and third questions were referring too. The participant’s answer to the question 
referring to Shell Island was accepted as the participants’ posterior estimate of the 
probability that the Urn was made on Shell Island. The revised probability data were 
obtained in three parts in order to be as non-biasing as possible. This question format 
did however make the assumption that the participants’ revised estimates of the 
probability of the Urn originating on Shell Island and originating on Coral Island add 
to 1. While probability judgments involving many categories have been commonly 
shown to violate additivity, judgments of two categories have been commonly found 
to be additive (Wright & Whalles, 1983). The third question about the probability of 
the less likely island provides a check on additivity. As long as a participant's answers 
to the two questions add up to 100% there has been no violation of additivity. If the 
departures from additivity seem to warrant it, then Departures from Additivity can be 
examined as a moderator variable. 
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 When subjects who found probability estimation difficult asked for assistance, 
the experimenter used the bi-section method to assist subjects in determining this 
probability (Torgerson, 1958; Pfanzagl, 1968; Seaver, von Winterfeldt, & Edwards, 
1978) This method asks the participant a series of questions all of the same form, do 
you think the probability is above or below X, where X is chosen to be the point 
halfway between the ends of the range of possible values. (Thus, the first question will 
be is the probability above or below .50, if they answer it is above, the second question 
will be is the probability above or below .75 etc.). 
Information usage dependent variables. The fourth page asked participants 
what information they used to make their revised probability estimates. The 
information used need not correspond to the information selected, because participants 
were free a) to ignore information they selected and b) to use information (the hints 
and base rate) they did not select but were provided. They were asked in closed ended 
format: “What information did you use in making this estimate of the probability of 
the island of origin? Put a check on the right next to all the pieces of information 
below that you used.”  
Participants were then presented with a list of possibilities that included the 
base rate, the hints, and the particular conditional probabilities that they had selected. 
Additionally, a blank space was provided, in case a participant used any additional 
information not presented in closed-ended format. The responses to the closed-ended 
questions were used directly to create four dependent variables (DV7-DV10), and 
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indirectly to assist in the classification of participants’ integration strategies. (See 
Classification of Participants Integration Strategies). 
DV7: Biased usage of hints. Each hint that participants indicated that they had 
used was coded for the island that the hint favored, +1 for focal (Shell Island) and –1 
for non-focal (Coral Island). (A hint favored an island by stating that that Island’s 
current clay pits are characterized by an abundance of this mineral). This produced the 
seventh dependent variable (DV7) biased usage of hints, with a range from +4, in 
which every hint favoring Shell Island and no hints favoring Coral Island were used to 
–4, in which every hint favoring Coral Island and no hints favoring Shell Island were 
used. Possible values are all integers between +4 and -4, because participants could 
decide to use as many or as few of these hints as they wished. This variable reflects 
solely usage in integration strategies (not selection in search), since all subjects were 
presented with all the hints (See Table 15 for Coding). 
 
Table 15  
Coding for Biased Usage of Hints 
Direction of Hint Code 
Hint Favors Shell Island +1 
Hint Favors Coral Island -1 
 
DV8: Hypothesis-focus integration bias. Each conditional probability that 
participants indicated that they had used was coded for the island on which it was 
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conditioned, +1 for focal (Shell Island) and –1 for non-focal (Coral Island). This 
produced the eighth dependent variable (DV8) hypothesis-focus integration bias, with 
a range from +4, in which every probability used in integration was conditioned on the 
focal island to –4, in which every choice was conditioned on the non-focal island. 
Possible values are all integers between +4 and -4. This variable reflects the combined 
effects of participants’ integration and search strategies, since the conditional 
probability must first be selected in the search phase prior to its use in the integration 
phase (See Table 16 for Coding). 
 
Table 16  
Coding for Hypothesis-Focus Integration Bias 
Direction of Hint p Conditioned 
on Shell Island 
p Conditioned 
on Coral Island 
Hint Favors Shell Island +1 -1 
Hint Favors Coral Island +1 -1 
 
DV9: Predictor-focus integration bias. Each conditional probability that 
participants indicated that they had used was coded for the island that the subject 
mineral was hinted to favor, +1 for focal (Shell Island) and –1 for non-focal (Coral 
Island). This produced the ninth dependent variable (DV9) predictor-focus integration 
bias, with a range from +4, in which every choice was of a conditional probability that 
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was hinted to favor the focal island to –4, in which every choice was hinted to favor 
the non-focal island. Possible values are all integers between +4 and -4. This variable 
reflects the combined effects of participants’ integration and search strategies, since 
the conditional probability must first be selected in the search phase prior to its use in 
the integration phase (See Table 17 for Coding). 
 
Table 17  
Coding for Predictor-Focus Integration Bias. 
Direction of Hint 
 
p Conditioned 
on Shell Island 
p Conditioned 
on Coral Island 
Hint Favors Shell Island +1 +1 
Hint Favors Coral Island -1 -1 
 
 DV10: Pairs used in integration. The conditional probabilities that each 
participant indicated having used (0 to 4 of the 4 conditional probabilities they 
previously selected) were recoded for the number of diagnostic pairs they constituted. 
The number of pairs used constitutes the tenth dependent variable (DV10) 
pseudodiagnostic integration, with possible values of 0, 1, and 2. This variable reflects 
the combined effects of participants’ search and integration strategies, since a 
conditional probability must first be selected in the search phase prior to its use in the 
integration phase. 
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DV14: Surprise. Surprise was based on a question on the fifth page of the 
script: “Did you find the results of any of the tests on the old urns surprising? (Yes / 
No)”. The measurement of this variable is vulnerable to hindsight bias (Fischhoff & 
Beyth-Marom, 1975). Unfortunately, it must be asked after the fact, because to ask it 
before the results of information search are revealed would bias both search and 
integration strategies. This variable additionally serves as a manipulation check on 
IV4: size-of-conditionals, since low conditional probabilities are expected to be 
surprising. 
Operational Definitions of Derived Dependent Variables 
 Several dependent measures were calculated and rated on the basis on 
participants responses. The processes used to create these variables are described 
below. 
Operational definition of DV4: search strategy. Each participant’s search 
strategy (DV4) was derived by Excel if/then statements from their conditional 
probabilities selections. Figure 1 divides the possible strategies by the number of cells 
(or quadrants) selected, then by the different patterns these strategies can have, and 
lastly by whether or not the strategy is Bayesian (includes two matching pairs). First, 
participants were divided into Bayesians and non-Bayesians (fifth row in Figure 1). 
Participants who selected two diagnostic pairs (the maximum) with their four 
selections of conditional probabilities were considered Bayesians, all other 
participants, whether they select one pair or no pairs, were considered non-Bayesians. 
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For Bayesians, there are three possible strategies for selecting two diagnostic 
pairs from two categories (here, pairs favoring Shell or pairs favoring Coral), when 
selection order and specific selection within a category are not considered: two 
favoring Shell Island (in the second strategy group from left in the bottom of Figure 
1), two favoring Coral Island (in the second strategy group from left in the bottom of 
Figure 1), or one favoring each island (in the second strategy group from right in the 
bottom of Figure 1).  
   
M
ethod 89 
Figure 1. Classification of search strategies by the number of cells used and the use of matched pairs. 
Number of  Cells 
Used by  Strategy
Distribution of  
Selections among 
Cells
Patterns of  
Distributions
Number of  
Matched Pairs
2 v s. 1 or 0
Total Possible 
Strategies
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4,0,0,0 2,2,0,03,1,0,0 2,1,1,0 1,1,1,1
Permutations 4 612 12 1
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2
2 Pair
Bay es
2
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Bay es
24 12 12
2 Pair
Bay es
1
1 or 0
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Non-
Bay es
1
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1
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4
Collumn
2
2
Diagonal
2
2
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For non-Bayesian participants, there are 35 possible strategies for selecting 
four conditional probabilities from the four quadrants with four members each, when 
selection order, specific selection within a category, and number of diagnostic pairs 
are not considered. These categories are defined in terms of the island on which the 
probability was conditioned and the island that was favored by the hint. Of these 35 
strategies, the following 11 are of interest: a) selecting all four choices from one 
category (Cell Bias, 4 strategies, the left most strategy group in the bottom of Figure 
1), b) selecting two choices each from two categories (Column, Row or Diagonal Bias, 
all 2-2 strategies, 6 strategies, the third through fifth strategy groups from the left in 
the bottom of Figure 1), and c) selecting one choice from each of the four categories 
(Table Focus, unbiased, 1 strategy, the right most strategy group in the bottom of 
Figure 1). 
The remaining 24 non-Bayesian strategies would not seem to be of interest, 
because they do not provide a clear indication about the intent of the participant. These 
are a) selecting three choices from one category and one choice from another category 
(3-1 class of strategies, 12 strategies, third from the right strategy group in the bottom 
of Figure 1), and b) selecting two choices from one category and one choice each of 
two other categories (2-1-1 class of strategies, 12 strategies, fourth from the right 
strategy group in the bottom of Figure 1). These 24 strategies would not seem to be of 
interest for two reasons: participant reliability and generalizability of strategy. First, 
these 24 strategies provide less evidence of participant reliability. A strategy is 
deemed to be one that is reliably used by the participant if either all the categories 
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involved are selected at least twice, or if diagnostic pairs are selected at least twice. 
All the strategies of interest meet this criterion, except the Table Focus, which was 
included because it represents the only unbiased non-Bayesian strategy (and it is also 
the only strategy with no redundancy). On the basis of this criterion alone, one could 
eliminate the 24 strategies deemed not of interest. Second, these same strategies would 
be eliminated by another criterion: They cannot be defined by a simple rule that can be 
easily generalized to other situations. For example, when picking eight of 32 
conditional probabilities, it is clear that a one-category strategy (4-0-0-0) would pick 
all eight conditional probabilities from the same category (8-0-0-0); however, it is 
unclear whether someone using the 2-1-1-0 strategy would choose a 3-3-2-0, 4-2-2-0, 
5-1-1-1, or a 6-1-1-0 strategy. 
There are thus 14 identified search strategies, and one default category that 
were coded. These can be grouped into five classes: Bayesian, One-Category, Two-
Category, Four-Category, and Unclassifiable (2-1-1 and 3-1). 
Bayesian strategies. 
1  Bayesian unbiased (Optimal): Two pairs, one pair hinted to be in each 
direction. 
2  Bayesian Confirmatory Predictor Bias: Two pairs, both hinted to favor Shell 
Island (a row bias pattern). 
3  Bayesian Disconfirmatory Predictor Bias: Two pairs, both hinted to favor 
Coral Island (a row bias pattern). 
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Non-Bayesian one-category strategies (cell bias). 
4 Shell Island both Focal and Motivated: Four conditional probabilities hinted to 
favor Shell Island and conditioned on Shell Island. 
5 Shell Island Focal and Coral Island Motivated: Four conditional probabilities 
hinted to favor Coral Island but conditioned on Shell Island. 
6 Coral Island Focal and Shell Island Motivated: Four conditional probabilities 
hinted to favor Shell Island but conditioned on Coral Island. 
7 Coral Island both Focal and Motivated: Four conditional probabilities hinted to 
favor Coral Island and conditioned on Coral Island. 
Non-Bayesian two-category strategies (column, row or diagonal bias). 
8 Shell Island Column Focal: Four probabilities conditioned on Shell Island, 
with two hinted to favor Shell Island and two hinted to favor Coral Island 
(Column Bias). 
9 Coral Island Column Focal: Four probabilities conditioned on Coral Island, 
with two hinted to favor Shell Island and two hinted to favor Coral Island 
(Column Bias). 
10 Shell Island Row Motivated: Four probabilities conditionals hinted to favor 
Shell Island, with two conditioned on Shell Island and two conditioned on 
Coral Island (Row Bias). 
11 Coral Island Row Motivated: Four probabilities conditionals hinted to favor 
Coral Island, with two conditioned on Shell and two conditioned on Coral 
Island (Row Bias). 
Method 93 
  
12 Consistent Diagonal: Two conditional probabilities both hinted to favor Shell 
Island and conditioned on Shell Island, and two conditional probabilities both 
hinted to favor Coral Island and conditioned on Coral Island. 
13 Inconsistent Diagonal: Two conditional probabilities hinted to favor Shell 
Island but conditioned on Coral Island, and two conditional probabilities hinted 
to favor Coral Island but conditioned on Shell Island. 
Non-Bayesian four-category strategy (table focus, unbiased). 
14 Sampling Strategy: One selected from each category. 
Unclassifiable strategies. 
15 Unclassifiable Strategies. This includes the 12 three-category strategies (2-1-
1), and the 12 uneven two-category strategies (3-1). 
Classification of search strategies as focal and predictor biased. These 
strategies can be further coded as focal, neutral or anti-focal. Strategies that include all 
four probabilities conditioned on Shell were coded as focal (+1). Strategies that 
include all four probabilities conditioned on Coral were coded as anti-focal (-1). All 
other strategies were coded as neutral (0). Similarly, these strategies can be further 
coded as and as predictor biased, neutral or anti-predictor biased. Strategies that 
include all four conditional probabilities on dimensions hinted to favor Shell were 
coded as predictor-biased (+1). Strategies that include all four conditional probabilities 
on dimensions hinted to favor Coral were coded as anti-predictor biased (-1). All other 
strategies were coded as neutral (0). These two codes were summed and trichotomized 
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(+, 0, -) into an overall bias, neutral unbiased search strategies (See Table 18 for a list 
of search strategies with their focal and predictor codes). 
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Table 18 
Coding of Search Strategies as Focal and Predictor Biased 
Strategy Class Strategy Focal 
Code 
Predictor  
Code 
Bayesian Strategies Bayesian Unbiased 0 0 
 Bayesian Confirmatory Predictor Bias 0 +1 
 Bayesian Disconfirmatory Predictor Bias 0 -1 
Non-Bayesian One-
Category Strategies 
Shell Island both Focal and Motivated +1 +1 
Shell Island Focal and Coral Island 
Motivated 
+1 -1 
Coral Island Focal and Shell Island 
Motivated 
-1 +1 
Coral Island both Focal and Motivated -1 -1 
Non-Bayesian Two-
Category Strategies 
Shell Island Column Focal +1 0 
Coral Island Column Focal -1 0 
Shell Island Row Motivated 0 +1 
Coral Island Row Motivated 0 -1 
Consistent Diagonal 0 0 
Inconsistent Diagonal 0 0 
Non-Bayesian Four-
Category Strategy 
Sampling Strategy 0 0 
Unclassifiable 
Strategies 
Unclassifiable Strategies Not 
Coded 
Not 
Coded 
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Operational definition of DV11: integration strategy. The strategies in this 
classification system were selected to achieve the goals of classifying participants by 
the conditional probabilities they used and by the identifiable mathematical formula (if 
any) they used to calculate their posterior probabilities. The strategies in the initial 
version of the classification system came from three sources: a) the integration 
strategies found in a pilot study (Borthwick & Anderson, 2001, Appendix E); b) 
strategies of participants in the current study who wrote out their strategies 
mathematically; c) several additional, non-mathematical strategies the author felt 
possible. In a test of the classification system was performed on a small sample of the 
current participants, the non-mathematical strategies were found to be difficult to 
classify reliably. Therefore, these non-mathematical strategies were collapsed into 3 
strategies, producing the final classification system of 14 strategies (11 mathematical 
and 3 non-mathematical). All strategies are defined below. 
The final classification system was used by two raters who independently 
classified each participant into one of the fourteen integration strategies (seven of 
which are subdivided by which island they focus on). In cases where the two raters 
disagreed, they discussed and determined the appropriate rating jointly. The joint 
decision of the raters then became the eleventh dependent variable (DV11) Integration 
Strategy.  
Two measures were used to assess inter-rater reliability. The first is the 
percentage of agreement, which will be measured as a percentage of all ratings that are 
in agreement (72.8%). The second is Cohen’s (1960) Kappa, which has the desirable 
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property that it takes into account the effects of chance agreement (Kappa = .687, 
Standard Error = .029). 
To classify participants’ integration strategies, the two raters used the 
following information, listed in decreasing order of importance: a) posterior 
probability, b) information search selections (both the values of the conditional 
probabilities and the availability of Bayesian matched pairs), c) mathematical 
computations (if any), d) verbal descriptions of integration strategies (question 1 on 
page 5), e) indications of information used (DV7  through DV10) in calculating the final 
probability estimate, and f) the mathematical operations indicated as having been used 
(question 2 on page 5).  
The first of these items that the raters used was whether each participant 
selected in the search phase at least one diagnostic pair (Bayesian) or no diagnostic 
pairs (Non-Bayesian). The second of these items was whether an identifiable 
mathematical formula could be specified. All the above information was used to 
determine a mathematical formula that could account for the participant’s revised 
probability estimate given the information available to him or her. 
There were two items of information that could have been used, but were 
generally not used, to classify a participant’s integration strategy. The first of these 
was which, if any, boxes a participant checked to indicate the dimensional hints (the 
abundance of each mineral in the modern clay pits of the two islands) used in 
integration. While the hints were designed to bias the selection of information, they 
were ignored here (in integration) for two reasons. First, any use of these hints should 
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have had no effect on integration, because the hints are non-numeric and balanced. 
Second, there is reason to believe that some participants who indicated that they had 
used the hints in integration actually were indicating that they had used the hints in 
selection. (The reason for the latter belief is that what each hint provides information 
about is the values of the two conditional probabilities on a single dimension. Many of 
the participants who indicated that they had used a dimensional hint in integration 
already knew the exact value of both of the dimension’s conditional probabilities. In 
this case, knowledge of the value of the conditional probabilities makes the hint 
superfluous in integration).  
The second item of information generally not used was whether participants 
indicated having used the base rate. This item of information was not usually 
considered because the base rate was even and therefore likely to be ignored by most 
participants and, if not ignored, unlikely to have had an impact on the posterior 
probability. However, if a participant provided multiple indications of having used a 
non-Bayesian integration strategy that included the base rate as a critical part, then the 
fact that a participant indicated having used the base rate was taken into account. 
There were only two such strategies: a) base rate + largest conditional, and b) base 
rate.  
The fourteen strategies are listed below (see Figure 2) and described in 
sections: Mathematical Two-Island Bayesian Strategies, Mathematical Two-Island 
Non-Bayesian Strategies, Mathematical One-Island Strategies, Mathematical Zero-
Island Strategy, and Non-Mathematical Strategies. These strategies are categorized 
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into those with an identifiable mathematical formula (11 strategies) and those with no 
identifiable mathematical formula (3 strategies). Although the distinction between 
mathematical and non-mathematical is useful in categorizing these strategies, the first 
step towards categorizing participants was determining whether their search strategies 
did or did not provide diagnostic pairs (that is, whether they searched diagnostically), 
as required by Bayes’ Theorem. The determination of Bayesian search comes first, 
because there are three integration strategies used exclusively by participants who 
searched diagnostically, two of which are mathematical (Bayesian, Biased Bayesian) 
and one non-mathematical (Diagnostic Search with Default Integration).  
To summarize, the entire classification process was as follows: First, an 
attempt was made to match participants to a Mathematical Bayesian Strategy; failing 
that, an attempt was made to match them to a Mathematical Non-Bayesian Strategy; 
failing both, participants were matched to one of the three Non-Mathematical 
Strategies. 
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Figure 2. Categorization of integration strategies by the information and math used. 
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The eleven mathematical strategies are sub-divided according to whether the 
formula uses probabilities conditioned on one or both islands or uses no conditional 
probabilities. Subjects were classified as showing one of the 11 mathematical 
strategies if they met two main criteria. The primary criterion was that participants 
must have produced a posterior probability within a range of +/- 5% of the posterior 
produced by using the conditional probabilities available to them and the formula of 
the relevant mathematical strategy. This criterion was modified in two cases. 
The first case where the primary criterion was modified was the two 
mathematical Bayesian strategies. The requirement that the posterior fall within a + / - 
5% range centered on the correct posterior was changed to the requirement that it fall 
within a rounded range (the centered range rounded to the nearest 5%). In this case, 
the change was made to facilitate rater comprehension. This change was practical for 
Bayesian strategies and only Bayesian strategies, since they are the only strategies that 
(because of the fixed 2:1 diagnostic ratio) permit only a very limited number of correct 
outcomes (three outcomes and their complements). This made it possible to calculate 
all the possible posteriors before conditional probabilities had been selected. (The 
three possible correct rounded ranges are as follows. 1) If the participant had selected 
and used in integration two pairs favoring the same island, the correct Bayesian 
posterior would be 80% (20% for the other island) and the rounded range would be 
75-85%. 2) If the participant had selected one or two pairs and used one pair in 
integration, the correct Bayesian posterior would be 66.66% (33.33% for the other 
island) and the rounded range would be 60-70%. 3) If the participant had selected two 
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pairs favoring different islands and used both, the correct Bayesian posterior would be 
50%, and the rounded range was 45-55%.]  
The second case where the primary criterion was modified was the base rate 
strategy. The primary criterion (allowing a +/- 5% range) was changed to require a 
posterior of exactly 50%, for two reasons. First, because many strategies can result in 
a revised probability of approximately 50%, the range of 45%-55% would not be very 
diagnostic. Second, because this strategy requires no calculating, there is no reason to 
allow for errors in calculation.  
The secondary criterion (for classifying integration strategies) was some verbal 
or mathematical evidence of having used the strategy. This criterion required only 
minimal mathematical or verbal indication supporting the participant’s use of the 
strategy. This criterion was modified in four cases.  
The first case where the secondary criterion was modified was when 
participants estimated a posterior of exactly 50%.  In this case the minimal standard 
was made more stringent (because a 50% posterior can result from many strategies). 
In this case, the second criterion was changed to require that the participant have either 
written out the complete mathematical formula or have made an explicit verbal 
statement of the strategy.  
The second case where the secondary criterion was modified was for the two 
Bayesian strategies. Because the formula is complex and hard to distinguish if not 
completely spelled out, the secondary criterion was changed to require the participants 
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either to spell out the formula completely or at least not to specify any computation 
inconsistent with Bayes’ formula.  
 The third case where the secondary criterion was modified was for the base 
rate strategy. The secondary criterion was tightened to require that the participants 
must not have shown any indication of having used any conditional probabilities (no 
checks on boxes corresponding to conditional probability evidence or mathematical 
writings including the values of conditional probabilities), and they must have either 
checked the box indicating that they used the base rate or mentioned using the base 
rate in their verbal description. 
 The fourth case where the secondary criterion was modified was for the double 
ratio and sum of frequencies strategies. Because these strategies were unexpected, the 
secondary criterion was tightened to require that participants must have produced 
mathematical writings calculating this formula. (These strategies were used by only 
one subject each, but they were included because those two subjects were very 
specific and clear in stating their mathematical calculations used.) 
All the modifications from the two main criteria are noted in Table 19 below as 
well as in the relevant strategy descriptions.   
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Table 19 
Exceptions to the Two Main Criteria for Classification to an Integration Strategy 
Mathematical Strategy  Exception to Primary 
Criterion (posterior 
within +/- 5%) 
Exception to Secondary 
Criterion (evidence of 
having used the strategy) 
Bayesian Rounded Range More explicit or not 
inconsistent  
Biased Bayesian Rounded Range More explicit or not 
inconsistent 
Ratio of Conditionals   
Favoring Ratio   
Double Ratio  Must show math 
Sum of One-Island's Conditionals   
Sum of One-Island's Frequencies  Must show math 
Average of One-Island’s 
Conditionals 
  
Extreme Conditional   
Base Rate + Largest Conditional   
Base Rate Exact Posterior Indicate base rate and not  
conditional probabilities 
All Strategies when participants 
estimate a posterior of 50% 
 More explicit or math 
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There are five mathematical two-island strategies. These are sub-divided into 
two Bayesian and three Non-Bayesian strategies.  
Mathematical two-island Bayesian strategies (2 strategies). The two Bayesian 
mathematical strategies (Biased Bayesian and Bayesian) will be described together. 
These both require that participants have first searched diagnostically (selecting one or 
two diagnostic pairs in the search phase) in order to be considered for classification. 
Both of the two main criteria were modified for these strategies as discussed above. 
For both participants must have produced a posterior within a rounded range of the 
correct posterior (criterion #1) using at least one diagnostic pair and must either have 
written out Bayes formula or at least made no indications contrary to Bayes formula 
(criterion #2).  
 In order to distinguish between Biased Bayesian and Bayesian it is clearer to 
describe the more specific strategy first (Biased Bayesian). There are three different 
ways to search for one or two diagnostic pairs in this scenario: one pair, two pairs 
favoring the same island, or two pairs with one hinted to favor each island (optimal 
search as demonstrated above under “Demonstration of the Optimal Search and 
Integration Strategies”). Biased Bayesian participants were those who searched 
optimally but used in integration only one of the two available pairs correctly (that is a 
posterior within a rounded range, criterion #1) and who met the requirements of the 
second criterion. Biased Bayesian participants were further distinguished by which of 
the two islands they were biased towards.  
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 Participants who did not qualify for Biased Bayesian would be classified as 
Bayesian if they fulfilled three criteria: 1) They produced one or two diagnostic pairs 
in the search phase. 2) They produced a posterior probability within the rounded range 
(criterion #1) of the correct posterior for using one or both of the pairs available to 
them. 3) They met the requirements of the second criterion. 
 There are two differences between the two Bayesian integration strategies. The 
first difference is in the search phase requirements. Bayesian integration requires that 
the participant obtain at least one pair in integration, so that they can integrate at least 
one pair using Bayes’ theorem. Biased Bayesian integration requires that participants 
have searched optimally (two pairs with one hinted to favor each island). This is the 
only way to search that enables participants both to integrate using Bayes Theorem 
and yet to show a bias through their choice of which of the two pairs to use in 
integration. Second, although both Bayesian integration strategies require the posterior 
be within a rounded range, in Biased Bayesian  integration the range is built around 
the correct use of only one pair, while in Bayesian integration the range is built around 
correctly using either one or two pairs.  
 Example used to illustrate all mathematical strategies. All remaining 
mathematical strategies will be illustrated by means of the example below. Under each 
mathematical strategy the correct mathematical formula used to compute the posterior 
probability (assuming the results of search shown in Table 20) is provided as an 
illustration. This would be the posterior that the participant would have to come within 
5% of in order to satisfy the first criterion for being classified with that strategy. In this 
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example the hypothetical participant selected one conditional probability from each 
quadrant.  
 
Table 20. 
Example used for all Mathematical Strategies 
Direction of Hint p Conditioned on Shell 
Island 
p Conditioned on Coral 
Island 
Hint Favors Shell Island 80% or 16 Frequency 40% or 8 Frequency 
Hint Favors Coral Island 30% or 6 Frequency 60% or 12 frequency 
 
This example would result in a 50% posterior using Bayesian integration if the four 
conditional probabilities formed either two or no matching pairs. 
 Mathematical Two-Island Non-Bayesian Strategies (3 Strategies). There 
were three identifiable mathematical non-Bayesian strategies that use evidence from 
both islands in the classification system. All three use all available information, are 
unbiased in their computation, and are symmetric regarding the two islands, making 
the island on which the calculation is based on irrelevant. However, while the 
computation is unbiased, bias can be introduced in the search phase. The mathematical 
formulas for the three Mathematical Two-Island Non-Bayesian Strategies follow, each 
in their own section. 
 Ratio of conditionals. The formula for ratio of conditionals is:  
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∑ (probabilities conditioned on one island) / ∑ (all conditional probabilities).  
Using the example above, the calculation would be: 
Posterior probability if calculated on Shell = (80%+30%) / (80%+30%+40%+60%) = 
52.38%. 
Posterior probability if calculated on Coral = (40%+60%) / (80%+30%+40%+60%) = 
47.62%. 
 Favoring ratio. The formula for favoring ratio is:  
∑ (conditional probabilities hinted to favor one island) / ∑ (all conditional 
probabilities). 
Using the example above, the calculation would be: 
Posterior probability if calculated on Shell = (80%+40%) / (80%+30%+40%+60%) = 
57.14% 
Posterior probability if calculated on Coral = (30%+60%) / (80%+30%+40%+60%) = 
42.86%. 
 Double ratio. The formula for double ratio is:  
[∑ (probabilities conditioned on Shell) / ∑ (all conditional probabilities)] +  
[∑ (probabilities hinted to favor Shell) / ∑ (all conditional probabilities)]/2.   
Using the example above, the calculation would be:  
Posterior probability if calculated on Shell = [(80%+30%) / (80%+30%+40%+60%) + 
(80%+40%) / (80%+30%+40%+60%)] / 2 = 54.76% 
Posterior probability if calculated on Coral = [(40%+60%) / (80%+30%+40%+60%) + 
(30%+60%) / (80%+30%+40%+60%)] / 2 = 45.23% 
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 This strategy can be thought of as the average of the other two mathematical 
two-island non-Bayesian strategies. The secondary criterion was tightened for this 
strategy as noted above. 
 Mathematical one-island strategies (5 strategies).  There were five 
identifiable mathematical strategies using evidence from only one island in the 
classification system. These strategies are not symmetric, in that it matters which 
island the participant focuses the computation on. Therefore, all five of these strategies 
were further subdivided into whether the computation used probabilities conditioned 
on Shell or Coral. The mathematical formulas for the five Mathematical One-Island 
Strategies follow, each in their own section. 
 Sum of one-island's conditionals. The formula for sum of one-island's 
conditionals is: 
 ∑ (probabilities conditioned on one of the islands) 
Using the example above, the calculation would be: 
Posterior probability if calculated on Shell = (80%+40%) = 120%. 
Posterior probability if calculated on Coral = (30%+60%) = 90%. 
 Sum of one-island's frequencies. The formula for sum of one-island's 
frequencies is: 
 ∑ (frequencies about one of the islands). This number is then treated as a 
probability. 
Using the example above, the calculation would be:  
Posterior probability if calculated on Shell = (16+8) = 24, which was treated as 24%.   
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Posterior probability if calculated on Coral = (6+12) = 18, which was treated as 18%. 
 The secondary criterion was tightened for this strategy as noted above.  
 Average of one-island’s conditionals. The formula for average of one-island’s 
conditionals is:  
 ∑ (probabilities conditioned on one of the islands) / n 
Using the example above, the calculation would be:  
Posterior probability if calculated on Shell = (80% + 30%) / 2 = 55%.   
Posterior probability if calculated on Coral = (40% + 60%) / 2 = 50%.   
 Extreme conditional. The formula for extreme conditional is: The value of the 
single most extreme conditional.   
Using the example above, the calculation would be:  
Posterior probability if calculated on Shell = 80%  
Posterior probability if calculated on Coral = not possible in the example case because 
the most extreme probability is conditioned on Shell. 
 Base rate + largest conditional. The formula for base rate plus largest 
conditional is:   
 Base Rate + Largest Conditional Probability 
Using the example above, the calculation would be:  
Posterior probability if calculated on Shell = (80% + 50%) = 130%. This was treated 
as 100%. 
Posterior probability if calculated on Coral = not possible in the example case because 
the largest probability is conditioned on Shell. 
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 Mathematical zero-island strategy (1 strategy). There was only one 
integration strategy that used an identifiable mathematical formula in the classification 
system. It used just the base rate, but no conditional probability evidence. 
 Base rate. The formula for base rate is: The base rate (50% in this study). 
 For example, if the available conditional probabilities were: 80% conditioned 
and hinted to favor Shell, 60% conditioned on Shell and hinted to favor Coral, 40% 
conditioned on Coral but hinted to favor Shell, and 30% conditioned on and hinted to 
favor Coral. Then the calculation would be: 
 Base Rate = 50% 
 Because a 50% posterior can be produced in many ways, the criteria for the 
base rate strategy were more stringent than the others. The primary criterion was 
tightened to require that the posterior equal the base rate (50%) exactly (as discussed 
above under Mathematical Strategies). The secondary criterion was tightened to 
require that the participants must not have shown any indication of having used any 
conditional probabilities (no checks on boxes corresponding to conditional probability 
evidence or mathematical writings including the values of conditional probabilities), 
and they must have either checked the box indicating that they used the base rate or 
mentioned using the base rate in their verbal description. 
 Non-mathematical strategies (3 strategies).  All participants who did not have 
an identifiable mathematical strategy were classified as having one of three non-
mathematical strategies (described below). Where possible, the conditional 
probabilities the participant used in integration were identified. Any minimal 
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indication as to the island on which probabilities they used were conditioned was 
taken as a basis to classify them as using information from that island. Acceptable 
indications included: a) any checkmark indicating a conditional probability used; b) 
any written number corresponding (in either probability or frequency form) to any 
conditional probability they received; and / or, c) any verbal description implying the 
use of a conditional probability. This minimal standard was used for all non-
mathematical strategies. 
 Non-mathematical one-island. If a non-diagnostic participant did not have a 
mathematical strategy but did produce an indication (see above) of having used one or 
more probabilities all conditioned on the same island, then they were classified as non-
mathematical one-island. This strategy was subdivided according to which of the two 
islands the data used was conditioned on (identical to the one-island mathematical 
strategies). 
 Non-diagnostic search with unknown integration. This was the default 
category for all participants who searched non-diagnostically. These participants did 
not have a mathematical strategy, and did not clearly indicate having used 
probabilities all conditioned on the same island. 
 Diagnostic search with unknown integration. This was the default category for 
all participants who searched diagnostically. Because these participants were 
diagnostic in their search, it was assumed in the absence of any clear indication to the 
contrary, that they at least used probabilities conditioned on both islands in their 
integration. 
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Classification of integration strategies as focal and predictor biased. These 
integration strategies can be further coded as focal, neutral or anti-focal. Strategies that 
include probabilities conditioned only on Shell were coded as focal (+1). Strategies 
that include only probabilities conditioned only on Coral were coded as anti-focal (-1). 
All other strategies were coded as neutral (0). Similarly, these strategies can be further 
coded as and as predictor biased, neutral or anti-predictor biased. Strategies that 
include conditional probabilities only on dimensions hinted to favor Shell were coded 
as predictor-biased (+1). Strategies that include conditional probabilities only on 
dimensions hinted to favor Coral were coded as anti-predictor biased (-1). All other 
strategies were coded as neutral (0).  These two codes were summed and 
trichotomized (+, 0, -) into an overall bias, neutral unbiased integration strategies (See 
Table 21 for a list of integration strategies with their focal and predictor codes). 
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Table 21 
Coding of Integration Strategies as Focal and Predictor Biased 
Strategy Class Strategy Focal Code 
(Shell / 
Coral) * 
Predictor 
Code (Shell 
/ Coral) * 
Mathematical 
2-Island 
Biased Bayesian  (0/0) (+1/-1) 
Bayesian 0 0 
Ratio of Conditionals  0 0 
Favoring Ratio  0 0 
Double Ratio  0 0 
Mathematical 
1-Island 
Sum of One-Island's Conditionals (1/-1) (0/0) 
Sum of One-Island's Frequencies  (1/-1) (0/0) 
Average of One-Island’s Conditionals  (1/-1) (0/0) 
Extreme Conditional  (1/-1) (1/-1) 
Base Rate + Largest Conditional  (1/-1) (1/-1) 
Mathematical 
0-Island 
Base Rate 0 0 
Non-
Mathematical 
Non-Mathematical One-Island (1/-1) (1/-1) 
Non-Diagnostic Search with Unknown 
Integration  
Not Coded Not Coded 
Diagnostic Search with Unknown 
Integration  
Not Coded Not Coded 
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* Note: Six strategies were defined by whether the probabilities used were conditioned on Shell or 
Coral and the Biased Bayesian Strategy was defined by whether the bias favored Shell or Coral. For 
these seven strategies the coding is split into the codes for the Shell or Coral version of that strategy. 
 
Operational definition of DV6: search confirmation bias. Search 
confirmation bias was calculated by subtracting the normative revised probability 
estimate that the Urn had been created on Shell Island (.50 in this scenario) from the 
revised probability applying Bayes’ Theorem to the conditional probabilities actually 
selected by each participant.  This compares two normative posteriors, one based on a 
normative search and one based on the actual pairs (if any) selected by the participant. 
Each pair chosen was coded +1 if it favored Shell Island (that is, the corresponding 
hint stated that the current clay pits on Shell Island are characterized by an abundance 
of this mineral), and –1 if it favored Coral Island, producing a sum with the possible 
values of +2, +1, 0, -1, and –2. For each of these five sums, the application of Bayes’ 
Theorem produces the corresponding following five posterior probabilities .8, .667, .5, 
.333, and .2, respectively. Since all pairs have the same diagnostic ratio (2:1) it does 
not matter which of the four pairs in a particular direction a participant chose. If 
participants chose one in each direction the net effect would cancel out. 
Next, the optimal revised probability estimate (.50) was subtracted from the 
five posterior probabilities listed above, producing the five possible values for search 
confirmation bias (+.3, +.167, 0, -.167, -.3).  For example, if Bayes’ Theorem were 
applied to the conditional probabilities selected by a participant and this produced a 
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revised estimate of.8, then his or her search confirmation bias score would be .3 (.8 - 
.5 = .3). These values are the bias caused by the participant’s search phase when 
integration is unbiased. 
For most participants, the revised probability created from each participant’s 
actual search using Bayes’ theorem was the same as the base rate, because most 
(n=219) people searched pseudodiagnostically (as first demonstrated by Doherty, et 
al., 1979).  (If the search phase is pseudodiagnostic, then there will be no pairs for use 
in Bayes theorem, and therefore no revision). Therefore, search confirmation bias is 
the difference between the base rate and the normative revised probability, except 
when participants do not select one or more pairs. In this specific situation participants 
with non-Bayesian searches will have no search confirmation bias. 
Once again the subtraction of .50 (the normative revised probability) is a linear 
transformation, that does not alter the statistical properties of the variable, but does 
make it easier to interpret and compare to the other bias dependent variables.  
 Operational definition of DV12: integration confirmation bias. Integration 
confirmation bias was calculated by subtracting a) the optimal revised probability (.50 
in this scenario) from b) the revised probability that would result from combining the 
optimal search strategy with the participant’s integration strategy as classified by 
DV11: integration strategy. This compares two posteriors, both of which are based on 
optimal search (one diagnostic pair in each diagnostic direction), where one of the 
posteriors is based on Bayesian integration and the other posterior is based on the 
participant’s inferred integration strategy (DV11 integration strategy).  
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Calculating integration confirmation bias involved three steps. First, the results 
of an optimal search had to be determined. Because the optimal search produces two 
diagnostic pairs (one in each diagnostic direction), it yields four conditional 
probabilities, one from each of the four categories. Thus, any of the four conditional 
probabilities in each category has an equal chance of being selected. For this reason, 
the average conditional probability in each category was used to represent the result of 
the optimal search. This both preserves the diagnostic ratio (2:1) for Bayesians, while 
providing a value for use by non-Bayesians. This average conditional probability 
depended on the level of IV4 size-of-conditionals. In the high condition, the average 
value was .75 for probabilities conditioned on the island favored by the hint and .375 
for probabilities conditioned on the island not favored by the hint, and in the Low 
Condition the averages were .25 and .125, respectively. 
Second, each integration strategy as classified by DV11: integration strategy 
was applied to these average conditional probabilities to yield a posterior. This 
posterior is a continuous variable with a range of possible values from 0 to 1.0. Any 
resulting posterior outside this possible range was treated as a 0 or 1.0 (See Table 22 
for a list of these calculated posteriors). DV12: integration confirmation bias is the 
posterior resulting from combining the optimal search strategy with the participant’s 
actual integration strategy. 
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Table 22 
Posterior Produced by Optimal Search and Each Integration Strategy 
Integration Strategy High Conditionals Low Conditionals 
Biased Bayes 66.67% 66.67% 
Bayes 50% 50% 
Ratio of Conditionals 50% 50% 
Favoring Ratio 50% 50% 
Double Ratio 50% 50% 
Sum of Conditionals 100% 37.5% 
Sum of Frequencies 22.5% 7.5% 
Average of Conditionals 56.25% 18.75% 
Extreme Conditional 75% 87.5% 
Base Rate + Conditional 100% 75% 
Base Rate 50% 50% 
Non-Mathematical n/a n/a 
 
Finally, a difference score was computed by subtracting the optimal revised 
probability estimate (.50) from the posterior calculated above, producing DV12: 
Integration Confirmation Bias. This dependent variable has a range from +.50, 
meaning the participant’s integration strategy favored Shell Island .50 more than 
optimal (confirmatory bias), to –.50, meaning the participant’s integration strategy 
favored Coral Island .50 more than optimal (disconfirmatory bias). 
Method 119 
 
  
Integration confirmation bias represents the bias caused by the participant’s 
integration strategy alone. However, this dependent variable is not completely 
independent of the participant’s prior search strategy. This prior search strategy is 
expected to limit the choice of integration strategies in two ways, a) by ruling out 
integration strategies that require information that is not available, and b) by possibly 
leading to the rejection of strategies that yield posterior probabilities that are outside 
the range (0-1.0) or otherwise not believable. (For example, subjects who selected all 
four conditionals favoring and conditioned on the same island, would receive 
conditional probabilities of 10%, 20%, 30% and 40% if they were in the low 
conditionals level of IV4 size-of-conditionals. If these subjects then chose to add the 
four conditionals together in integration they would produce a believable result 100%. 
However, if subjects with the same search strategy and integration strategy were in the 
high conditionals level of IV4 size-of-conditionals, then they would have received 
conditional probabilities of 60%, 70%, 80% and 90% which if added together would 
be 300%, presumably forcing the subject to use a different integration strategy). 
Operational definition of DV13: sum-of-phase-biases. 
Sum-of-Phase-Biases is calculated as the sum of the two specific phase biases 
(DV6 search confirmation bias and DV12 integration confirmation bias). This produces 
a continuous variable with a range of +.8 to -.8. Where +.8 is interpreted to mean the 
participant’s actual search phase integrated by Bayes’ Theorem (DV6 search 
confirmation bias) and their actual integration strategy applied to the results of optimal 
search (DV12 integration confirmation bias) sum to a +.8 bias towards making Shell 
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Island more likely as the island of origin of the Urn. If the two phase biases are 
additive, then this variable should equal DV4: Confirmation Bias. This would lead to 
the conclusion that search and integration are separate systems, completely 
independent of each other (system defined by Lendaris, 1986). Significant departures 
from additivity are expected and will be discussed. 
Operational definition of DV15: intuitive conditionals. Participants were 
asked on the fifth page “Please go back to page three again and, without removing any 
more stickers, write down on the stickers what you think the value of the tests would 
be that you did not choose to perform.” These values were recorded as their intuitive 
conditionals (DV15), and were taken to examine if and how they would be used by 
participants in their integration process and posterior calculation. Similar to Surprise 
(DV14), the measurement of this variable was vulnerable to hindsight bias (Fischhoff 
& Beyth-Marom, 1975). Unfortunately, it must be asked after the fact, because to ask 
it before the results of information search are revealed would bias both search and 
integration strategies.  
These intuitive conditionals were also used to derived Bayesian intuitive 
posterior (DV15a), Bayesian matching posterior (DV15b), and regression intuitive 
posterior (DV15c). These three dependent variables represent posterior probabilities 
that would be produced using integration strategies that take into account the intuitive 
conditionals in various ways. Because intuitive conditionals could be used in an 
infinite number of ways, in order to simplify the analysis, the number of possible 
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participant strategies for which combination of intuitive conditionals that they could 
use was limited to three levels.  
First, participants may not use intuitive conditionals at all. (In this case, 
participants would use only the four selected conditional probabilities, which could 
form between 0 and 2 pairs. These chosen conditional probabilities were combined 
using Bayesian integration produce DV6 search phase confirmation bias plus .50 (DV6 
was expressed as the bias from the normative posterior .50). Second, participants may 
use intuitive conditionals only to complete diagnostic pairs with selected conditional 
probabilities. (In this case, participants would use the four selected conditional 
probabilities and between 0 and 4 intuitive conditionals, which could form between 2 
and 4 diagnostic pairs). This set of conditional probabilities combined using Bayesian 
integration produces Bayesian matching posterior (DV15b). Third, participants may use 
intuitive conditionals for every non-selected conditional probability. (In this case, 
participants would use the four selected conditional probabilities and 12 intuitive 
conditionals, to form 8 diagnostic pairs). This set of conditional probabilities 
combined using Bayesian integration produces Bayesian intuitive posterior (DV15a).  
Additionally, linear regression was used to produce regression weights for the 
importance participants placed on the conditional probabilities in each of the four 
quadrants.  
The linear regression was performed on the participants who had all 16 
probabilities (the four selected and all twelve of the intuitive conditional probabilities) 
and predicted the participants’ actual posteriors. The conditional probabilities (chosen 
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and intuitive were treated as equivalent) were averaged in each quadrant (to reduce the 
effects of random fluctuations within each quadrant).  The four quadrant averages 
were used to predict the participants’ actual posteriors. The resulting regression 
weights were then applied to each participant’s average conditional probability in each 
quadrant to produce regression intuitive posterior (DV15c). This represents the 
posterior produces given the participants’ chosen and intuitive conditional 
probabilities and combined using the regression weights. 
Because regression is applied across participants, while Bayes’ Theorem is 
applied by subject, regression requires that all participants have the same information 
(while Bayes’ Theorem does not). This requirement is met when all 16 selected and 
intuitive conditionals are used, but is not met with the other two sets of intuitive 
probabilities. This prevents similar regression dependent variables from being created 
using only chosen conditional probabilities or for chosen conditional probabilities and 
matching intuitive conditionals.  
Procedure 
Recruitment and experimental setting. Student participants were recruited 
from psychology classed and at that time they either signed up for appointments or did 
the experiment in class. Student participants who came to appointments were run in 
groups that ranged from 1 to approximately 20, with the majority of participants run in 
groups of approximately 8. Participants who performed the experiment in class were 
run in a group of 69. The procedure for both the in-class and the appointment subjects 
was the same, and no differences were detected between administration settings.  
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Instructions to the participants. Participants initially received brief oral 
instructions as follows (Appendix B): to read and sign the informed consent form 
(Appendix D), what to do to receive extra credit in their psychology class, to remain 
silent, not to look at their neighbors’ papers, and to raise their hands if they had any 
questions or problems. No participant chose to withdraw from the experiment at his 
time.  
The task itself took approximately 20 minutes to complete. Participants were 
told to raise their hands when done, at which time they were told individually that they 
could leave. 
Assignment to conditions. Once they had completed the informed consent 
form they were given one of sixteen scripts (Appendix A) that varied according to the 
respective levels on the four independent variables (attention, motivation, timing of 
feedback, size-of-conditionals). The sixteen scripts were each assigned a random 
number. The rank order of these random numbers determined the order in which each 
set of 16 scripts was assigned to 16 participants. This process was repeated until all 
participants were assigned a script.  
Experimental control: double blind. This study utilized a double-blind 
design; both the participant and the experimenter were unaware of which condition the 
participant received. The only exception to this was in the rare cases of a participant 
question that required the experimenter to read their script in order to answer their 
question. 
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Materials 
There were 16 scripts, one for each (2*2*2*2 = 16) experimental condition. 
All the scripts present the participants with the goal of determining the island of origin 
of an urn that has been found in the sea between two islands. The cover story was 
similar to that in Doherty’s groundbreaking work (Doherty et al., 1979). The names of 
the two islands were not counterbalanced, because Doherty et al. (1979) found that 
counterbalancing had no effect. 
The story presented participants with a probability revision problem, asking 
them to estimate, after they have learned four relevant conditional probabilities, the 
probability that the urn had been created on one of the islands rather than the other 
(Table 23 presents the independent variables and their levels. Table 8 presents the 
types of conditional probabilities participants can select.)  
Table 23 
Levels of the Four Independent Variables 
Independent Variables Level 1 (Control: 
Expected to decrease 
biases) 
Level 2 (Treatment: 
Expected to increase 
biases) 
IV1 Attention Balanced Focused 
IV2 Motivation Not Motivated Motivated 
IV3 Timing-of-feedback Sequential Simultaneous 
IV4 Size-of-conditionals Low p(D|H) High p(D|H) 
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Decision problem introduction. The first two pages of the script included the 
beginning of the cover story, the hints about the direction and diagnosticy of the 
conditional probabilities, and the manipulation of the first two independent variables, 
attention and motivation.  
The attention and motivation manipulations structure. The attention (A) 
manipulation consisted of three parts and the motivation (M) manipulation consisted 
of two parts. These five parts occur in an AMAMA order. (See IV Operations 
definitions for more details of these sections.)  (Table 24 presents the order of the five 
parts of these two manipulations, not the full factorial design.)  
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Table 24 
Order of Parts of Manipulation of Attention and Motivation Independent Variables 
Order  Independent 
Variables 
Level 1 (control) Level 2 (treatment)  
1 IV1 Attention Both hypotheses equal 
and base rate provided 
Alternate not mentioned 
2 IV2 
Motivation 
No motivation Career motivation 
3 IV1 Attention Table, all hints, data, 
and manipulation 
check that asks for the 
probability for both 
islands 
Sequential presentation,  hints 
favoring focal island, data, and 
manipulation check that asks 
for the probability for focal 
island 
4 IV2 
Motivation 
Nothing Manipulation Check 
5 IV1 Attention Nothing Hints favoring alternative and 
base rate 
 
The attention manipulation. The attention (IV1) manipulation consistent 
primarily of delaying information about Coral Island. The material was the same for 
all conditions, though presented in different orders and forms. This material included: 
the information that the urn had high content in each of eight minerals, hints stating 
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the island whose current clay pits are characterized by an abundance of each of these 
eight minerals, and a paragraph calling into question the value of these hints. (See IV1 
Attention operational definition for more details and script quotes.) 
The motivation manipulation. The Motivation (IV2) manipulation consisted 
primarily of changes in the second paragraph of the first page of the script. The not 
motivated condition used island-neutral language, while in contrast, the motivated 
condition consists of the additional mention of a career incentive to determine that the 
urn came from Shell Island and a manipulation check and reinforcement question 
later. (See IV2 Motivation operational definition for more details and script quotes.) 
Use of frequency form of data. The base rate information and the later 
conditional probability information are presented in the form of frequencies instead of 
probabilities, because Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995) found that people understand 
and use frequency information better. 
Direction and diagnosticity of hints. The second half of the first page 
introduced eight dimensions of potentially diagnostic information (the eight minerals 
found to be in abundance in the Urn), and a hint for each dimension as to the island 
that that dimension would favor (specifically, the island whose current clay pits are 
characterized by an abundance of this mineral). The hints were deliberately ambiguous 
as to their strength as evidence and as to whether the “evidence” was diagnostic or 
pseudodiagnostic. Their purpose was to provide a basis for biased information search 
without introducing any integration bias when using a Bayesian strategy. The hints 
were balanced, four favoring each island. Because of this balance, they would have no 
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effect on a Bayesian probability revision at this point. Additionally, these hints 
provide pseudodiagnostic participants with a basis for expectations regarding the non-
chosen conditional probability, by providing them a basis for an expected value for the 
diagnostically complementary conditional probability (“intuitive conditionals”) (Alloy 
& Tabachnik, 1984). (The participant assumes the probability conditioned on the 
island the hint favors is greater than the probability conditioned on the island the hint 
does not favor). 
However, for non-Bayesians, balanced information has been found to have a 
dilution effect in integration, the presence of non-diagnostic information having been 
found to diminish the impact of diagnostic information (Nisbett, Zucker & Lemley, 
1981; Troutman & Shanteau 1977). In this case, the dilution effect would bias the 
participants against confirmation of their hypothesis, and would thus bias the 
experiment against several of the experimenter’s hypotheses.  
Information search phase structure. The third page of the script presented 
the information search phase. On the third page all participants received the same 
cover story indicating that they could learn any four out of the 16 conditional 
probabilities. Each conditional probability was specific to one of the two hypotheses 
(islands) and to one of the eight minerals. Each mineral had been hinted in page one of 
the scripts as favoring Shell Island or favoring Coral Island. Participants numbered 
their top four requests for conditional probabilities and then removed opaque stickers 
to reveal the probabilities they had chosen.  
Method 129 
 
  
The change to four out of 16 conditional probabilities from the Doherty, et al. 
(1979) original study, which used six out of 12, was deliberate. The number of 
conditional probabilities chosen had to be a multiple of four in order to provide 
participants the opportunity to choose optimally (two matching pairs, with one pair in 
each diagnostic direction, as inferred from the hints). (This will be demonstrated to be 
the optimal search strategy later, in the section on Demonstration of the Optimal 
Search and Integration Strategies). Additionally, the number of possible conditional 
probabilities had to be four times the number chosen so that participants had the 
ability to choose all four of their conditional probabilities from any one of the four 
categories created by the following two independent dimensions: a) probabilities 
conditioned on the focal or alternate island, and b) probabilities about minerals 
favoring the focal or alternate island according to the hints.  
The first paragraph on the third page of the script suggested that participants 
pursue, “the most efficient way to determine the origin”, in order to encourage the 
thought that some of this information was not relevant or less relevant. At this point 
the last two independent variables were manipulated. 
Timing-of-feedback manipulation. The second paragraph on the third page 
created the third independent variable (timing-of-feedback). In the simultaneous 
condition, participants were instructed to choose their conditional probabilities all at 
once before receiving feedback. In the sequential condition, participants were 
instructed to choose their conditional probabilities one at a time with feedback after 
each selection, thus enabling them to choose their later selections on the basis of the 
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results of earlier choices. (See IV3 Timing-of-feedback operational definition for more 
details and script quotes.) 
Size-of-conditionals manipulation. All participants received the feedback (the 
size of the conditional probabilities) that they had requested as described above (under 
IV3: timing-of-feedback). The size of the conditional probabilities was the fourth 
independent variable. (See IV4 Size-of-conditionals operational definition for more 
details and script quotes.) 
Information search data collection.  In the middle of the third page of the 
script participants were provided with 16 conditional probabilities from which to 
choose four. (As described in IV3 Timing-of-feedback operational definition for more 
details and script quotes.) Three search phase dependent variables DV1: hypothesis-
focus bias, DV2: predictor-selection bias and DV3: pairs selected were derived from 
participants’ responses to: “Choose 4 of the following 16 tests to perform, as the most 
efficient way to determine the origin of the Urn of Zor, following the instructions 
below.” 
Integration phase. At the bottom of the third page participants were asked 
three questions designed to elicit their revised probability that the Urn came from 
Shell Island and determine the size of their confirmation bias:  
Which Island do you now believe the Urn of Zor is more likely to have come from?  
What do you now believe is the probability that the Urn of Zor came from that island?  
What do you believe is the probability that the Urn of Zor came from the other 
island?” 
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Post hoc questions. 
Information usage dependent variables. The fourth page asked participants 
what information they used to make their revised probability estimates. They were 
asked in closed ended format: “What information did you use in making this estimate 
of the probability of the island of origin? Put a check on the right next to all the pieces 
of information below that you used.”  
Participants were then presented with a list of possibilities that included the 
base rate, the hints, and the particular conditional probabilities that they had selected. 
Additionally, a blank space was provided, in case a participant used any additional 
information not presented in closed-ended format. The responses to the closed-ended 
questions were used directly to create four dependent variables (DV7-DV10), and 
indirectly to assist in the classification of participants’ integration strategies. (See 
Classification of Participants Integration Strategies). 
Questions for inferring integration strategy. The fifth page asked the 
following questions designed to help classify participants on the basis of their 
integration strategies (See discussion of classification of integration strategies in 
Operational definition of DV11: integration strategy). 
1) Tell me how you went about making your estimate of the probability that 
the Urn came from the island you chose. You can use a verbal description or a 
formula to describe the method you used. 
 2) Place a check next to all the mathematical processes you used? (Check all 
 that apply) 
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Type of Method  Mathematical Example using two pieces of evidence 
_____ Addition  (evidence #1 + evidence #2) 
_____ Subtraction (evidence #1 - evidence #2) 
_____ Multiplication  (evidence #1 * evidence #2) 
_____ Division (evidence #1 / evidence #2) 
_____ Averaging  (evidence #1 + evidence #2)/ 2 
_____ Other 
Surprise questions. The fifth page asked the following closed-ended questions 
designed to determine whether participants were surprised by the values of the 
conditional probabilities:  
3) Did you find the results of any of the tests on the old urns surprising?  
(Yes / No) 
4) If yes, indicate which ones and whether they were higher or lower than 
expected. (Please look back to see your four selections and then circle higher 
or lower below). 
First Choice Surprising  higher   lower 
Second Choice Surprising  higher   lower 
Third Choice Surprising  higher   lower 
Fourth Choice Surprising  higher   lower 
These questions were designed to explore the effects of expectations on search 
and integration.  
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Intuitive conditionals question. The fifth question on page 5 asked 
participants to: “Please go back to page three again and, without removing any more 
stickers, write down on the stickers what you think the value of the tests would be that 
you did not choose to perform.”  
Demographic variables. Four demographic questions were asked on page 6 of 
the script (Race, Gender, Number of College Statistics Classes Taken and G.P.A.). 
There are no hypotheses for these variables but they will be explored on a post hoc 
basis, and for the purpose of describing the sample. 
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Results 
Preliminary Analyses 
Before proceeding with the testing of research and exploratory hypothesis, 
several preliminary analyses had to be conducted. These include examination of the 
demographics, manipulation checks, participants’ coherence in their posterior 
probability estimates, the adequacy of the random assignment, and the nature of the 
interaction effect between the independent variables attention and motivation. In 
addition, the results of the classification of participants’ search and integration 
strategies were examined, since this information is required for the analysis of one of 
the research hypotheses. 
Demographics. In order to determine how to proceed with the analysis, the 
data were examined for demographic effects (school of participant, gender, race, GPA, 
and number of college statistics classes taken). Since no significant zero order 
correlations were found between any of the demographic variables and any of the 
dependent variables, the data were collapsed across the demographic variables.  
Manipulation checks. Participants who failed the manipulation checks, in the 
motivated condition of the motivation IV (n = 13) and the balanced condition of the 
attention IV (n = 12) were not dropped. They were not dropped because not all 
participants received the same number of manipulation checks. Participants whose 
complementary posterior probabilities failed to sum to one (n = 23) were also not 
dropped because failure of additivity has been found in many situations. Their 
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responses were rescaled to sum to one. The rescaling was examined in post hoc tests 
and found to have no impact on the results. 
Coherence checks. Participants’ complementary posterior probabilities (the 
probability the urn came from Shell and the probability the urn came from Coral) that 
failed to sum to one (23/324 = 7.1%) were rescaled to sum to one. These participants 
were not dropped, because lack of coherence in posterior probability judgments has 
been found in many situations. The rescaling was examined in post hoc tests and 
found to have no impact on the results. 
Problem with random assignment. In the simultaneous conditions, there was 
no possibility of size-of-conditionals affecting search phase selections, since the 
conditionals were not presented until after the search-phase selections had been made.  
Nevertheless, significant differences were found between the two levels of 
size-of-conditionals for simultaneous participants’ use of motivated search strategies, 
t(143) = 2.12, p = .04, d = .35. Because search-phase selections preceded the receipt of 
size-of-conditionals information, such a difference cannot be causal and can be 
attributed only to a problem with random assignment. For this reason, all participants 
in the simultaneous conditions were dropped. This prevents examination of the timing 
of feedback independent variable (since the remaining subjects are all in the sequential 
feedback condition). 
Over-biasing. This study predicted a specific monotonic interaction (sub-
additive) between the attention and motivation manipulations, whereby focal condition 
and the motivated condition would not be additive (non-additive effect). Specifically, 
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it was expected that either biasing condition would be sufficient to cause bias and that 
the combinations of biasing conditions would result in no more and no less bias than 
either biasing condition alone (see Expected Effects of Independent Variables for a 
discussion). 
However, for some dependent variables, non-monotonic interactions (often 
crossover effects) were found (called here an over-biasing effect). Specifically this 
over-biasing effect was that participants who received either biasing condition alone 
demonstrated bias, but participant who received both biasing conditions demonstrated 
less bias or no bias. This result is similar to research conducted by Gaeth and Shanteau 
(1984) where drawing attention to the biasing information reduce the effect of the 
bias. Therefore, all analyses involving attention and motivation were modified to 
examine the over-biasing interaction as three post-hoc orthogonal t-tests whenever the 
interaction between attention and motivation or either main effect was significant or 
nearly significant. These t-tests compared the control condition (balanced and not 
motivated) against the other three conditions (balanced and motivated, focus and not 
motivated, focus and motivated), in order to determine whether the effects of attention 
and motivation were additive, non-additive (as originally hypotheses) or over-biasing. 
Search and integration strategy classification results. All participants’ search 
and integration strategies were classified into categories (as described in DV4: search 
strategy and DV11: integration strategy). A large number of participants chose at least 
one pair (115 out of 324 participants) in the search phase. Similarly, a large number of 
participants used a Bayesian integration strategy (88 participants) or the ratio of 
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conditionals strategy which is the most similar non-Bayesian strategy (35 
participants). Unfortunately many of the non-Bayesian participants ended up classified 
as default search (53 participants) or integration strategy (100 participants). This 
clearly demonstrates how hard it is understand and classify non-Bayesian participants’ 
processes (See Tables 25 and 26). 
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Table 25 
Frequency of Search Strategies 
Strategy Class Strategy n 
Bayesian Strategies Bayesian Unbiased 84 
 Bayesian Confirmatory Predictor Bias 15 
 Bayesian Disconfirmatory Predictor Bias 6 
Non-Bayesian One-
Category Strategies 
Shell Island both Focal and Motivated 21 
Shell Island Focal and Coral Island Motivated 6 
Coral Island Focal and Shell Island Motivated 5 
Coral Island both Focal and Motivated 1 
Non-Bayesian Two-
Category Strategies 
Shell Island Column Focal 30 
Coral Island Column Focal 0 
Shell Island Row Motivated 0 
Coral Island Row Motivated 2 
Consistent Diagonal 38 
Inconsistent Diagonal 10 
Non-Bayesian Four-
Category Strategy 
Sampling Strategy 53 
Unclassifiable Strategies Unclassifiable Strategies 53 
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Table 26 
Frequency of Integration Strategies 
Strategy Class Strategy n (Shell / Coral) * 
Mathematical 2-Island Biased Bayesian  32 (18/14) 
Bayesian 56 
Ratio of Conditionals  35 
Favoring Ratio  3 
Double Ratio  1 
Mathematical 1-Island Sum of One-Island's Conditionals 9 (5/4) 
Sum of One-Island's Frequencies  1 (0/1) 
Average of One-Island’s 
Conditionals  
13 (8/5) 
Extreme Conditional  12 (8/4) 
Base Rate + Largest Conditional  1 (1/0) 
Mathematical 0-Island Base Rate 6 
Non-Mathematical Non-Mathematical One-Island 55 (44/11) 
 Non-Diagnostic Search with 
Unknown Integration  
67 
 Diagnostic Search with Unknown 
Integration  
33 
Results 140 
 
  
* Note: Seven strategies were defined by whether the information used was focused on Shell or Coral. 
For these seven strategies the sample was broken down into the number of participants classified as the 
Shell or Coral version of that strategy. 
Research Hypotheses 
Overall testing strategy for research hypotheses. The experimental research 
hypotheses were tested by independent sample t-tests comparing the participants in 
biasing vs. non-biasing conditions. The research hypotheses were tested using one-
tailed t-tests, because they were directional hypotheses consistent with prior research. 
These t-test were followed up with three-way ANOVAs (Attention * Motivation * 
Size-of-Conditionals), to test for any interactions among the three remaining 
independent variables, (the timing of feedback independent variable was lost to 
selection effects). Because many dependent variables in this study did not satisfy 
parametric assumptions (especially, normality), the Mann-Whitney U-test was also 
performed as a backup. However, the results of the Mann-Whitney U-tests did not 
differ from parametric tests. The process for the exploratory experimental hypotheses 
will be the same as described above except that the initial t-tests were omitted, because 
of the exploratory nature of the hypotheses. 
Bonferroni adjustment. In order to provide Bonferroni control for the 
experiment-wide .05 alpha level, this alpha level was divided into four .0125 alpha 
levels for the four research hypotheses. For the exploratory hypotheses and post hoc 
tests, no Bonferroni adjustment was made, and therefore the conclusions drawn from 
such tests should be considered preliminary. For all these other tests a .05 alpha level 
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was set. In the tables that follow, significant and nearly significant findings are 
indicated by the following symbols: *** p<.001, **p<.01, * p<.05, ^ p<.10. 
Research hypotheses results. The research hypotheses are tabulated in Table 
27. (Note: Table 27 differs from Table 9, in adding the results for each of the 
hypotheses, and the simplification of the design because of the selection differences.) 
The hypotheses are listed by number, in the row and column corresponding to the IV 
and DV involved. The choice of these hypotheses has been described in the methods 
section, the descriptions of each hypothesis and the results of the tests follow. 
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Table 27 
Research Hypotheses Results: Independent and Dependent Variables Involved 
Research Hypotheses – Experimental 
 IV1 
Attention 
IV2 
Motivation 
IV4 Size-of-
Conditionals  
p 
Search Process DVs     
DV1 Hypothesis Focus Bias     
DV2 Predictor Selection Bias R1  R1 R1  Ns, p = .67 
DV3 Pairs Selected     
DV4 Search Strategy     
DV14 Search Surprise      
Integration Process DVs     
DV8 Hypothesis-Focus Integration Bias     
DV9 Predictor-Focus Integration Bias     
DV10 Pairs Used in Integration     
DV11 Integration Strategy R2  R2 R2 Ns, p = .48 
Posterior Result DVs     
DV5 Confirmation Bias R3  R3 R3 Ns, p = .41 
DV6 Search Confirmation Bias     
DV12 Integration Confirmation Bias     
DV15 Intuitive Conditionals     
Research Hypotheses – Non-Experimental 
R4 Use of focal search strategies (DV4) was positively correlated (r = .81) with use 
of focal integration strategies (DV11)  
p<.001, 
*** 
Note: R refers to research hypotheses for that IV DV combination. Due to selection difference 
participants in the simultaneous conditions were dropped. This resulted in dropping IV3 and the IV3 * 
IV4 Interaction. The hypothesized unbiasing effects of this interaction are now tested as a main effect of 
IV4. Many empty cells will be examined by exploratory hypotheses.  
(*** p<.001, **p<.01, * p<.05, ^ p<.10 ) 
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Predictor selection bias. Research Hypothesis #1 was that participants in 
biased conditions would select more conditional probabilities from minerals that are 
hinted to favor Shell Island than from minerals hinted to favor Coral Island than would 
participants in unbiased conditions.  
The difference between conditions can be seen as the effect of the biasing 
conditions of the independent variables. This difference was assessed using an 
independent samples t-test. The results indicates that the biased conditions 
participants’ mean number of conditional probabilities selected about minerals that are 
hinted to favor Shell Island (M = 2.17, SD = .75 ) were not significantly different than 
the participants in unbiased conditions (M = 2.30, SD = .89 ), t(158) = .93, p = .67. 
The standardized effect size index was d = .15, indicating a small difference in the 
opposite direction from that expected.  
The follow-up three-way ANOVA (Attention * Motivation * Size-of-
Conditionals) was not significant, F(7, 152) = .38, p = .91, partial η2 = .02. 
Inconsistent with Research Hypothesis #1 all three main effects and the Attention * 
Motivation interaction were non-significant (see Table 28). Interestingly, the planned 
curative low conditionals (M = 2.33, SD = .91) instead non-significantly increased bias 
compared to high conditionals (M = 2.16, SD = .76). 
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Table 28 
The Effects of the Independent Variables on Predictor Selection Bias 
Effect F(1, 152) P partial η2 
Attention .05 .83 <.01 
Motivation <.01 .96 <.01 
Size-of-Conditionals  1.62 .21  = .01 
Attention*Motivation .20 .65 <.01 
 
Biased Bayesian strategy in integration. In order to avoid non-independence 
of hypotheses, Hypotheses #2 and #3 were tested on different participants. Research 
Hypothesis #2 was that participants in biasing conditions who searched optimally 
(chose two pairs, with one pair expected to favor each island) would be more likely in 
integration to use the selected pair favoring shell than the pair favoring coral (Biased 
Bayesian Integration Strategy) than would participants in the non-biasing conditions. 
The difference between conditions can be seen as the effect of the biasing conditions 
of the independent variables. This difference was assessed using an independent 
samples t-test. The results indicates that participants in biased conditions were more 
likely to use the biased Bayesian strategy favoring Shell Island (M = .21, SD = .59), 
but not significantly more than the participants in unbiased conditions (M = .20, SD = 
.41), t(37) = .05, p = .48. The standardized effect size index was d = .02, indicating a 
very small effect that was in the expected direction.  
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The follow-up three-way ANOVA (Attention * Motivation * Size-of-
Conditionals) was not significant, F(7, 31) = 1.87, p = .11, partial η2 = .30. 
Inconsistent with Research Hypothesis #2, all three main effects and the Attention * 
Motivation Interaction were non-significant (see Table 28).  
 
Table 29 
The Effects of the Independent Variables on Biased Bayesian Strategy 
Effect F(1, 31) P partial η2 
Attention .04 .84 <.01 
Motivation .46 .50  = .02 
Size-of-Conditionals  .68 .41  = .02 
Attention*Motivation 3.58 .07  = .10 
Attention*Size 3.04 .09  = .09 
 
However, two two-way interactions were nearly significant: Attention* 
Motivation, and Attention* Size-of-Conditionals. The first interaction was the over-
biasing effect discussed earlier and was explored by the three post hoc orthogonal t-
tests (see Figure 3). The three post-hoc comparisons were all non-significant but the 
simple main effect of motivation when attention was balanced was nearly significant 
(with a very small sample size and a large effect size, see Table 30). The second 
interaction was low conditionals causing bias towards the focal hypothesis when 
people were not focused (see Figure 4).
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Table 30 
Post Hoc Orthogonal Contrasts Exploring Over-Biasing Effect on use of Biased 
Bayesian Strategies 
Contrast Balanced and Not 
Motivated to: 
t P d 
Balanced and motivated t(16) = 1.60  = .13 .90 
Focused and not motivated t(21) = .97  = .34 .72 
Focused and motivated t(14) = .18  = .86 .50 
 
Figure 3. Attention by motivation interaction on use of biased Bayesian integration 
strategies. 
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Figure 4. Attention by size-of-conditionals interaction on use of biased Bayesian 
integration strategies. 
 
Confirmation bias. In order to avoid non-independence of hypotheses, 
Hypotheses 2 and 3 were tested on different participants. Research Hypothesis #3 was 
that participants in biasing conditions who did not search optimally (chose two pairs, 
with one pair expected to favor each island) would produce posterior probabilities 
more in favor of Shell Island than Coral Island than would participants in unbiased 
conditions. The difference between conditions can be seen as the effect of the biasing 
conditions of the independent variables. This difference was assessed using an 
independent samples t-test.  
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The results indicates that participants in biased conditions were more likely to 
use the biased Bayesian strategy favoring Shell Island (M = 5.87, SD = 16.34) but this 
was not significantly more than the participants in unbiased conditions (M = 3.96, SD 
= 19.36), t(119) = .58, p = .28. The standardized effect size index was d = .10, 
indicating a small effect which was in the expected direction.  
The follow-up three-way ANOVA (Attention * Motivation * Size-of-
Conditionals) was not significant, F(7, 113) = .54, p = .81, partial η2 = .03. 
Inconsistent with Research Hypothesis #3, all three main effects and the Attention * 
Motivation Interaction were non-significant (see Table 31).  
 
Table 31 
The Effects of the Independent Variables on Confirmation Bias 
Effect F(1, 31) P partial η2 
Attention .15 .70 <.01 
Motivation .81 .37  = .01 
Size-of-Conditionals  .55 .46  = .01 
Attention*Motivation 1.22 .27  = .01 
 
Non-independence of search and integration strategies. Research Hypothesis 
#4 was that participants who use search strategies that are hypothesis focused will be 
more likely to use integration strategies that are hypothesis focused. Consistent with 
Research Hypothesis #4 the Pearson’s r coefficient was significant, indicating that the 
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use of focal search strategies predicted the use of focal integration strategies, r(125) = 
.81, p>.001. (See Table 32 for cross-tabulation). 
 
Table 32 
Cross Tabulation of Search and Integration Strategies by Focal Island 
 Shell Focused 
Search 
Balanced 
Search 
Coral Focused 
Search 
Total 
Shell Focused Integration 26 19 Not Possible 45 
Balanced Integration 0 103 0 103 
Coral Focused Integration Not Possible 9 3 12 
Total 3 131 26 160 
 
An alternative way to examine this hypothesis would be to exclude the 29 
participants who choose four probabilities focused on a single island (because they are 
restricted from integrating in the opposite focal direction), and instead focus on the 
other participants who were not prevented from integrating in either focal way. In 
order to do this, participants who chose either three or one probabilities conditioned on 
the Shell Island would be treated as Shell focused and Coral focused respectively. (In 
the prior analysis such participants were dropped since their search strategy was 
considered unclassifiable because they were not consistent). For these participants, the 
Pearson’s r coefficient was not significant r(128) = .02, p = .83. This indicates no 
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relationship between the focus of search selections and focal integration strategies for 
participants who did not choose all four probabilities conditioned on the same island. 
 
Table 33 
Cross Tabulation of Search and Integration Strategies by Conditionals Selected 
 3 probabilities 
conditioned on 
Shell  
2 probabilities 
conditioned on 
Shell 
1 probabilities 
conditioned on 
Shell 
Total 
Shell Focused 
Integration 
0 5 1 6 
Balanced 
Integration 
12 100 3 115 
Coral Focused 
Integration 
0 6 1 7 
Total 12 111 5 128 
 
These analyses indicate that participants who searched for information 
conditioned exclusively one hypothesis chose to use focal integration strategies 
despite non-focal ones being available to them (base rate or non-mathematical). 
However, for participants who are focal but not exclusive (one or three probabilities 
conditioned on Shell) or participants who use a balanced search strategy their choice 
of focal or non-focal integration strategies appears random. This supports the idea that 
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the two phases are primarily (but not completely) independent, because even the 
participants who used the most biased search strategy (four probabilities conditioned 
on the same island) utilized different focal integration strategies. For example, among 
the 16 participants who used the most common Shell focal search strategy (Shell 
island column focal) and a focal integration strategy, there were four different focal 
integration strategies employed: Sum of one islands conditionals (n = 1), extreme 
conditional (n = 2), average of one-island conditionals (n = 1), and non-mathematical 
one-island (n = 12). These integration strategies produce very different posteriors (in 
fact the last strategy is a catch-all for participants who mention using conditionals 
from only one-island but do not specify how they use them), resulting in a wide range 
of posteriors. The 16 participants had posteriors ranging from 20% to 100% (M = 
16.5, SD = 22.15). 
Exploratory Hypotheses 
These hypotheses are less central to the study and therefore were not included 
in the Bonferroni adjustment. Therefore, conclusions drawn from them should be 
considered preliminary. As with the experimental research hypotheses, the overbiasing 
effect will be examined any time Attention or Motivation or their interaction is at least 
nearly significant. 
The hypotheses are tabulated below. The hypotheses are listed by number 
(research hypotheses R1, R2 … and exploratory hypotheses H1, H2 …). Significant 
and nearly significant results appear in the column corresponding to the IV, and in the 
row corresponding to the DV involved. Descriptions of each exploratory hypothesis 
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follow. (Note: Table 34 is a slight refinement of Table 10, adding the results of the test 
and showing the changes described in Exploratory Follow-Up to the Research 
Hypotheses.) 
 
Table 34 
Exploratory Hypotheses Results: Independent and Dependent Variables Involved 
Exploratory Hypotheses – Experimental 
 Hypo-
theses 
IV1 
Attention 
IV2 
Motivation 
IV4 Size-of-
Conditionals  
Post-hoc 
 
Search Process DVs      
DV1 Hypothesis Focus Bias E1  
E4 
p = .07 ^ 
p = .09 ^ 
p = .07 ^  Additive 
DV2 Predictor Selection 
Bias 
R1 ns 
E5 ns 
 
 
   
DV3 Pairs Selected E2 ns      
DV4 Search Strategy E3  p = .04 * p = .04 * p = .05 * Additive 
DV14 Search Surprise  E15 ns 
E16 ns 
    
Integration Process 
DVs 
     
DV8 Hypothesis-Focus 
Integration Bias 
E6 ns      
DV9 Predictor-Focus 
Integration Bias 
E7 ns      
DV10 Pairs Used in 
Integration 
E8 ns      
DV11 Integration Strategy R2 
E9  
p = .09 ^  
p = .08 ^ 
p = .07 ^  Overbias 
Sub-
Additive 
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Posterior Result DVs      
DV5 Confirmation Bias R3 ns     
DV6 Search Confirmation 
Bias 
E10 ns     
DV12 Integration 
Confirmation Bias 
E11  p = .03 * p = .08 ^  Sub-
Additive 
DV15 Intuitive Conditionals E14   P<.001 ***  
Exploratory Hypotheses – Non-Experimental 
R4 Correlation between bias search and integration strategies (r = .81, p>.001) *** 
E13a Model with intuitive conditionals approximates posterior not significantly better than 
model without intuitive conditionals, but had the strongest correlation r(120) = .37, p<.001 *** 
E13b Bayesian Integration approximates posterior better than regression (ns) 
E12 Difference between posterior and Sum-of-Phase-Biases (ns) 
Note: The Rs represent the research hypotheses and Es represent exploratory hypotheses.  
(*** p<.001, **p<.01, * p<.05, ^ p<.10 ) 
 
Exploratory search process hypotheses. All these hypotheses involve 
dependent variables about participants’ search phase selection decisions. 
Hypothesis focus bias. Exploratory Hypothesis #1, as has been demonstrated 
elsewhere, was that participants in biasing conditions would select more probabilities 
conditioned on Shell Island than conditioned on Coral Island than would participants 
in unbiased conditions. A three-way (Attention * Motivation * Size-of-Conditionals) 
ANOVA was performed and was not significant, F(7, 152) = 1.486, p = .176, partial 
η2 = .06. Partially supportive of Exploratory Hypothesis #1 the main effects of both 
attention and motivation were nearly significant (see Table 35).  
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Table 35 
The Effects of the Independent Variables on Hypothesis Focus Bias 
Effect F(1, 152) p partial η2 
Attention 3.35 .07 .02 
Motivation 3.41 .07 .02 
Size-of-Conditionals  .32 .57 <.01 
Attention*Motivation .01 .91 <.01 
 
Because attention and motivation were nearly significant, the over-biasing 
effect was explored by the three post hoc orthogonal t-tests. The two simple main 
effects post-hoc comparisons were both non-significant. In contrast the comparison 
balanced and not motivated versus focused and motivated was significant. This 
provides mixed evidence that attention and motivation have weak and additive effects 
on predictor selection bias (see Tables 36 and 37 and Figure 5). 
 
Table 36  
Orthogonal Contrasts on Over-Biasing Effect on Hypothesis Focus Bias 
Contrast Balanced and Not Motivated to: t p d 
Balanced and motivated t(79) = 1.33  = .19 .29 
Focused and not motivated t(79) = 1.26  = .21 .28 
Focused and motivated t(76) = 2.28  = .03 .50 
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Table 37 
Descriptive Statistics on Over-Biasing Effect on Hypothesis Focus Bias 
Attention and Motivation Conditions: M SD 
Balanced and not motivated 2.13 .91 
Balanced and motivated 2.37 .70 
Focused and not motivated 2.37 .80 
Focused and motivated 2.63 1.05 
 
 
Figure 5. Attention by motivation interaction on hypothesis focus bias. 
 
Pseudodiagnosticity. Exploratory Hypothesis #2, as demonstrated elsewhere, 
was that participants in biasing conditions would select fewer diagnostic pairs than 
would participants in unbiased conditions. The three-way (Attention * Motivation * 
2
2.2
2.4
2.6
2.8
Balanced Focused
Attention
P
ro
b
a
b
il
it
ie
s
 
C
o
n
d
it
io
n
e
d
 o
n
 S
h
e
ll
Not Motivated
Motivated
Results 156 
 
  
Size-of-Conditionals) ANOVA was not significant, F(7, 152) = .86, p = .54 partial η2 
= .04. Inconsistent with Exploratory Hypothesis #2 all main effects and interactions 
were not significant (see Table 38). In contrast to Doherty et al. (1979), it should be 
noted that participants performance (.75 pairs selected on average) was statistically 
[t(159) = 5.03, p<.001] better than chance (.40 pairs). 
 
Table 38 
The Effects of the Independent Variables on Pseudodiagnosticity 
Effect F(1, 152) p partial η2 
Attention .126 .72 <.01 
Motivation 1.44 .23 .01 
Size-of-Conditionals  .66 .42 <.01 
Attention*Motivation .79 .37 <.01 
 
Focal search strategies. Exploratory Hypothesis #3 was that participants in 
biasing conditions would use more hypothesis-focused search strategies and fewer 
control focused search strategies than would participants in unbiased conditions. Due 
to their lack of a consistent search strategy, 35 participants were dropped from this 
analysis. A three-way (Attention * Motivation * Size-of-Conditionals) ANOVA was 
performed and was nearly significant, F(7, 117) = 1.97, p = .07 partial η2 = .11 (see 
Table 39).  
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Table 39 
The Effects of the Independent Variables on Focal Search Strategies 
Effect F(1, 152) p partial η2 
Attention 4.38 .04 .04 
Motivation 4.29 .04 .04 
Size-of-Conditionals .70 .40 .01 
Attention*Motivation .03 .70 <.01 
Attention*Size 3.96 .05 .03 
 
Consistent with Exploratory Hypothesis #3, both the attention and motivation 
variables led to significant differences. Because attention and motivation were 
significant, the over-biasing effect was explored by three post hoc orthogonal t-tests. 
The two simple main effects post-hoc comparisons were both non-significant. In 
contrast, the comparison of balanced and not motivated versus focused and motivated 
was significant. These post hoc tests provide evidence that in the case of predictor 
selection bias attention and motivation have additive effects. (See Tables 40 and 41 
and Figure 6). 
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Table 40 
Orthogonal Contrasts on Over-Biasing Effect on Focal Search Strategies 
Contrast Balanced and Not Motivated to: t p d 
Balanced and motivated t(79) = 1.33  = .25 .30 
Focused and not motivated t(79) = 1.26  = .21 .32 
Focused and motivated t(76) = 2.41  = .02 .59 
 
Table 41 
Descriptive Statistics on Over-Biasing Effect on Focal Search Strategies 
Attention and Motivation Conditions: M SD 
Balanced and not motivated .04 .44 
Balanced and motivated .16 .37 
Focused and not motivated .17 .38 
Focused and motivated .35 .55 
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Figure 6. Attention by motivation interaction on use of focal search strategies. 
 
 
Additionally, the two-way interaction between attention and size-of-
conditionals was significant, where the biasing affect of attention only works with low 
conditional probabilities. This provides further evidence that the expected curative 
effect of surprise did not work (see Figure 7). 
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Figure 7. Attention by size-of-conditionals interaction on use of focal search 
strategies. 
 
Comparing the size of hypothesis focus and predictor selection biases. 
Exploratory Hypotheses #4 and #5 compared the effects of attention and motivation, 
respectively, on hypothesis focus bias and predictor selection bias. This is possible 
because these two dependent variables are on the same scale 0-4 selections made on 
the 8 possible selections favoring one island.  
Exploratory Hypothesis #4 was that the focal condition would have a bigger 
impact on hypothesis focus bias than on predictor selection bias. This difference was 
assessed using a paired samples t-test. The results indicates that the focused conditions 
caused greater hypothesis focus bias (M = 2.49, SD = .93) than predictor selection bias 
(M = 2.27, SD = .82). This difference was found to be nearly significant, T(78) = 
1.706, p = .09, d = .19. 
Exploratory Hypothesis #5 was that the motivated condition would have a 
bigger impact on predictor selection bias than on hypothesis focus bias. This 
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difference was assessed using a paired samples t-test. However, the results indicates 
that the motivated conditions caused greater hypothesis focus bias (M = 2.49, SD = 
.89) than predictor selection bias (M = 2.25, SD = .82). This difference was found to 
be nearly significant, T(78) = 1.706, p = .09, d = .20. 
Exploratory integration process hypotheses. These hypotheses test the 
participants’ use in integration of the information they selected. Because the 
information available to each participant at this point is different, these results are a 
reflection of the combination of both the participants’ search phase and integration 
phase. Additionally, because participants do not have to use all the conditional 
probabilities made available to them, these hypotheses are tested against difference 
scores (e.g. focal - non-focal). 
Hypothesis-focus integration bias. Exploratory Hypothesis #6 was that 
participants in biasing conditions would report a greater difference in the usage of 
information conditioned on Shell Island and Coral Island than would participants in 
non-biasing conditions. A three-way (Attention * Motivation * Size-of-Conditionals) 
ANOVA was performed and was not significant, F(7, 152) = .88, p = .52, partial η2 = 
.04. Inconsistent with Exploratory Hypothesis #6 both attention, motivation and their 
interaction were not significant (see Table 42).  
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Table 42 
The Effects of the Independent Variables on Hypothesis-Focus Integration Bias 
Effect F(1, 152) p partial η2 
Attention 1.23 .27 .01 
Motivation .41 .52 <.01 
Size-of-Conditionals .94 .33 .01 
Attention*Motivation .91 .34 .01 
 
Predictor-focus integration bias. Exploratory Hypothesis #7 was that 
participants in biasing conditions would report a greater difference in the usage of 
information hinted to favor Shell Island and Coral Island than would participants in 
unbiased conditions. A three-way (Attention * Motivation * Size-of-Conditionals) 
ANOVA was performed and was not significant, F(7, 152) = .67, p = .70, partial η2 = 
.03. Inconsistent with Exploratory Hypothesis #7 both attention, motivation and their 
interaction were not significant (see Table 43). 
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Table 43 
The Effects of the Independent Variables on Predictor-Focus Integration Bias 
Effect F(1, 152) p partial η2 
Attention .07 .79 <.01 
Motivation .19 .66 <.01 
Size-of-Conditionals  1.50 .22 .01 
Attention*Motivation .722 .40 .01 
 
Pairs used in integration. Exploratory Hypothesis #8 was that participants in 
biasing conditions report lesser usage of diagnostic pairs than would participants in 
unbiased conditions. A three-way (Attention * Motivation * Size-of-Conditionals) 
ANOVA was performed and was not significant, F(7, 152) = .71, p = .66, partial η2 = 
.03. Inconsistent with Exploratory Hypothesis #7 both attention, motivation and their 
interaction were not significant (see Table 44). 
Table 44 
The Effects of the Independent Variables on Pairs Used in Integration 
Effect F(1, 152) p partial η2 
Attention .02 .90 <.01 
Motivation .08 .77 <.01 
Size-of-Conditionals  <.01 .98 <.01 
Attention*Motivation .60 .44 <.01 
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Use of biased integration strategies. Exploratory Hypothesis #9 was that 
participants in biasing conditions would be more likely to be classified as using biased 
integration strategies than would participants in unbiased conditions. The three-way 
ANOVA was not significant, F(7, 152) = .92, p = .50, partial η2 = .03. Inconsistent 
with Exploratory Hypothesis #9 attention was nearly significant [F(1, 152) = 3.080, p 
= .081], while motivation [F(1, 152) = .836, p = .362] and their interaction [F(1, 152) 
= .935, p = .335] were not significant (see Table 45). 
 
Table 45 
The Effects of the Independent Variables on Use of Biased Integration Strategies 
Effect F(1, 152) p partial η2 
Attention 3.08 .08 .02 
Motivation .84 .36 .01 
Size-of-Conditionals  .03 .85 <.01 
Attention*Motivation .94 .33 .01 
 
Because attention was nearly significant, the over-biasing effect was explored 
by the three post hoc orthogonal t-tests. The simple main effect comparison for 
attention was significant while the comparison for motivation was not. The 
comparison of balanced and not motivated versus focused and motivated was nearly 
significant. These post hoc tests provide weak evidence that in the case of the use of 
biased integration strategies attention and motivation have sub-additive effects 
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(attention and motivation in combination produce approximately the same bias as each 
alone). (See Tables 46 and 47). 
 
Tables 46 
Orthogonal Contrasts on Over-Biasing Effect on Use of Biased Integration Strategies 
Contrast Balanced and Not Motivated to: T p d 
Balanced and motivated t(79) = 1.41  = .16 .31 
Focused and not motivated t(79) = 2.03  = .05 .44 
Focused and motivated t(76) = 1.72  = .09 .37 
 
Table 47 
Descriptive Statistics on Over-Biasing Effect on Use of Biased Integration Strategies 
Attention and Motivation Conditions: M SD 
Balanced and not motivated .03 .58 
Balanced and motivated .20 .51 
Focused and not motivated .27 .50 
Focused and motivated .26 .64 
 
Phase biases. Exploratory Hypotheses #10 and #11 examine the effects of the 
independent variables on the search and integration strategies confirmatory effects 
(confirmation bias as defined by this study). These effects were measured in terms of 
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the bias of the posterior probability that was caused by their biased strategies in each 
phase individually. 
Search confirmation bias. Exploratory Hypothesis #10 was that participants in 
biasing conditions would have a higher posterior probability produced from optimal 
integration and their actual search than would participants in balanced conditions. A 
three-way (Attention * Motivation * Size-of-Conditionals) ANOVA was performed 
and was not significant, F(7, 152) = .44, p = .88 partial η2 = .02. Inconsistent with 
Exploratory Hypothesis #10, attention, motivation and their interaction were not 
significant (see Table 48).  
 
Table 48 
The Effects of the Independent Variables on Search Confirmation Bias 
Effect F(1, 152) P partial η2 
Attention 1.28 .26 .01 
Motivation .03 .86 <.01 
Size-of-Conditionals  .02 .88 <.01 
Attention*Motivation 1.11 .29 .01 
 
Integration confirmation bias. Exploratory Hypothesis #11 was that 
participants in biasing conditions would have a higher posterior probability produced 
from optimal search and their actual integration strategy than would participants in 
Results 167 
 
  
balanced conditions. A three-way (Attention * Motivation * Size-of-Conditionals) 
ANOVA was performed and was not significant, F(7, 152) = 1.51, p = .17, partial η2 = 
.07. The main effect of attention was significant and the interaction of motivation and 
attention was nearly significant. In contrast, motivation was not significant (see Table 
49).  
 
Table 49 
The Effects of the Independent Variables on Integration Confirmation Bias 
Effect F(1, 152) P partial η2 
Attention 4.66 .03 .03 
Motivation .69 .41 <.01 
Size-of-Conditionals  .19 .66 <.01 
Attention*Motivation 3.11 .08 .02 
 
Because attention was a significant factor and the Attention * Motivation 
interaction was nearly significant, the over-biasing effect was explored by three post 
hoc orthogonal t-tests. All three comparisons were significant (balanced and not 
motivated versus balanced and motivated, balanced and not motivated versus focused 
and not motivated and balanced and not motivated versus focused and motivated). The 
relative equality of the effects provides evidence that attention and motivation have 
sub-additive effects on integration confirmation bias (See Tables 50 and 51 and Figure 
8). 
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Table 50 
Orthogonal Contrasts on Over-Biasing Effect on Integration Confirmation Bias 
Contrast Balanced and Not Motivated to T p d 
Balanced and motivated t(79) = 2.06  = .04 .45 
Focus and not motivated t(79) = 2.55  = .01 .55 
Focus and motivated t(76) = 2.26  = .03 .50 
 
Table 51 
Descriptive Statistics on Over-Biasing Effect on Integration Confirmation Bias 
Contrast Balanced and Not Motivated to M SD 
Balanced and not motivated -1.35 7.45 
Balanced and motivated 1.93 6.88 
Focus and not motivated 3.58 9.75 
Focus and motivated 2.41 7.23 
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Figure 8. Motivation by attention on integration confirmation bias. 
 
 
Additivity of phase biases. Exploratory Hypothesis #12 was that participants 
confirmation bias (DV5) would be less than their Sum-of-Phase-Biases (DV13). 
Inconsistent with Hypothesis #12, the paired samples t-test (pairing the confirmation 
bias of each participant with the sum of their phase biases) was not significant, t(159) 
= .028, p = .978. 
Intuitive conditionals. 
 Intuitive conditionals are the estimates participants have of the unchosen 
conditional probabilities. These hypotheses examine how participants estimate these 
values and if and how they use intuitive conditional probabilities in their posterior 
calculations. These analyses were limited to the 120 participants in the sequential 
conditions who provided every intuitive conditional. 
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Estimating the use of intuitive conditionals. Exploratory Hypothesis #13a 
examined the probabilities used in calculating posteriors. This hypothesis was that 
Bayesian integration using the selected conditionals and intuitive conditionals would 
be better at predicting participants’ posterior probabilities than Bayesian integration 
using only the selected conditionals. The model using the selected conditionals and the 
intuitive conditionals that completed a diagnostic pair of the selected conditionals 
predicted the actual posteriors the best, r(120) = .37, p<.001. The model using all 
selected and intuitive conditionals predicted the actual posteriors second best, r(120) = 
.26, p = .005. The model using only the selected pairs predicted the actual posteriors 
the worst, r(120) = .19, p = .04 (see Table 52).  
To compare the accuracy of these three models in predicting participants’ 
posterior probabilities, the absolute value of the differences between the posteriors 
computed using each model and the participants’ actual posteriors were calculated. 
These difference scores were compared using the Wilcoxan signed ranks test where 
the assumption of symmetry appeared to be satisfied, and the sign test where that 
assumption appeared to be violated. The model using only matching intuitive 
conditionals was better than the model using all intuitive conditionals (sign test), 
Z(120) = 4.69, p<.001. Inconsistent with Hypothesis 13a, the model using only the real 
conditionals was significantly better than the model using the matching conditionals 
(signed ranks test), Z(120) = 2.36, p = .02. 
 There is an apparent contradiction between these two sets of results, that use of 
intuitive conditionals and Bayesian Integration produces stronger correlations with, 
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and yet greater mean error from, the actual posterior. This contradiction can be 
resolved by examining the standard deviations of the models’ posteriors. Models using 
intuitive conditionals have more diagnostic pairs to integrate, and therefore produce 
greater variation from the midpoint. This can be seen in their higher standard 
deviations. In this study’s situation, where most participants (77 out of these 120) 
provided a posterior between 40% and 60%, a model that adjusts less will be more 
accurate in terms of difference between the model’s posterior and the actual posterior. 
The model using all the intuitive conditionals and Bayesian integration had the 
strongest correlation, indicating that it predicts the correct order of the participants’ 
posteriors well. 
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Table 52 
Comparison Accuracy of Models in Predicting Actual Posterior Estimates  
Intuitive 
Probabilities Used 
by Model 
(Integration 
Method) 
Model’s Posteriors 
Correlation to 
Actual Posteriors 
Absolute Value of the 
Difference between the 
Model’s Posterior and the 
Actual Posterior 
Model 
Posterior 
 r(120) P M SD SD 
All (Bayesian) .26 .005 22.44 20.12 29.81 
Forming Matching 
Pairs (Bayesian) 
.37 <.001 16.4 18.29 25.11 
None (Bayesian) .19 .04 12.14 12.19 10.09 
All (Regression) .29 .001 11.82 9.68 4.64 
 
  Estimating the combining rule. Exploratory Hypothesis #13b examined the 
combining rule used in calculating posteriors. In order to determine which integration 
strategy is a better overall predictor of actual posteriors, a regression using the average 
conditional (all intuitive and all selected) in each quadrant was used to predict the 
actual posterior. This regression equation was significant, F(4,115) = 2.68, p = .04, 
and was used to estimate the posterior probabilities.  
Exploratory Hypothesis #13b was that the regression equation would predict 
participants’ actual posterior probabilities better than Bayesian integration. Similar to 
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13a, the regression equation created posterior was compared to the Bayesian created 
posterior (both used all selected and intuitive conditionals). Consistent with hypothesis 
13b the regression equation predicted the actual posteriors significantly better (sign 
test), Z(120) = 2.83, p = .005, than did the model using Bayesian integration.  
Interesting to note, that the posteriors made by regression did not correlate as 
strongly as to the actual posterior, r(120) = .290, p = .001, as did the model using 
Bayesian integration applied to the matched conditionals (see Table 46). 
Unfortunately, a direct comparison between these two models is not possible due to 
their use of different numbers of conditionals. 
Predicting the size of intuitive conditionals. Exploratory Hypothesis #14 was 
that the size of intuitive conditionals will be larger for participants in the high 
conditionals conditions than the low conditionals conditions. Consistent with 
Exploratory Hypothesis #14 participants in the high conditionals conditions (M = 
49.68, SD = 14.34) estimated higher intuitive conditionals than participants in the low 
conditionals condition (M = 26.73, SD = 19.14), t(120) = 7.51, p<.001, d = 1.13. This 
strongly indicates that participants use the size of actual conditionals in estimating 
intuitive conditionals. 
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Surprise hypotheses. These hypotheses examined the idea that surprise leads 
to deeper and less biased thinking. This was a critical component of the assumption 
that the combination of low conditional (the surprise) combined with sequential 
feedback (an opportunity to change search strategies) would result in lower bias. 
  Exploratory Hypothesis #15. Exploratory Hypothesis #15 was that participants 
who were in the focused and/or motivated conditions and reported being surprised 
would select less information conditioned on Shell Island than those not surprised. 
Inconsistent with Exploratory Hypothesis #15 the t-test was not significant, t(118) = 
.40, p = .69, d = .08 (see Table 53). 
Exploratory Hypothesis #16. Exploratory Hypothesis #16 was that participants 
who were in the focused and/or motivated conditions and reported being surprised 
would select less information hinted to favor Shell Island than those not surprised. 
Inconsistent with Exploratory Hypothesis #16 the t-test was not significant, t(118) = 
.35, p = .73, d = .06 (see Table 53). 
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Table 53 
Descriptive Statistics for Surprised and Not-Surprised Participants in Motivated and / 
or Focused Conditions 
Surprised (n) Hypothesis Focus Bias Predictor Selection Bias 
 M SD M SD 
Surprised (47) 2.49 .80 2.30 .78 
Not Surprised (73) 2.42 .90 2.25 .80 
 
 The failure of these surprise hypotheses to predict search biases, demonstrates 
why the low conditionals condition failed to “cure” biases. The low conditionals were 
supposed to reduce bias by surprising participants, but surprise did not reduce bias. 
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Discussion 
Primary Goals 
 The primary goals of this study were to address four problems in the literature: 
the imprecise and multiple definitions of terms relating to confirmation bias, the lack 
of any quantification of the confirmatory effect against a normative interval scale 
outcome, the absence of studies that examine phase interactions, and the absence of 
research on predictor selection bias (outside dissonance theory research). 
 In reviewing the literature, a series of definitions was proposed to increase the 
precision of the terms used in this area, in order to achieve the first goal. This study 
has taken the first small step towards its second goal, measuring the size of 
confirmation bias with reference to a normative interval scale outcome. This goal was 
hindered by the way in which the study was designed, in which efforts to establish 
controls rendered the manipulations less effective. (See below Limitations of internal 
validity from manipulation problems). Nevertheless, if the proposed terms are 
accepted by the research community and research follows this example of using a 
normative interval scale outcome, then results will, in the future be more comparable 
across studies. This in turn should increase communication among researchers 
working across the seven related paradigms. Additionally, achievement of the first two 
goals in combination would assist in determining the relative importance of the 
various forms of confirmation bias, which, in turn, would inform the prescriptive 
research as to which biases are the most important to be on guard for. 
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 This study has also taken the first steps towards its third goal, examining phase 
interactions by studying both search and integration phases in the same experiment. 
First, this study directly tested the common unstated assumption in the literature that 
the phases are either completely independent or completely dependent, and therefore 
can be examined separately. The strong correlation (r=.81) between the use of focal 
search and focal integration strategies is powerful evidence that these two processes 
are interrelated and eliminates the possibility of complete phase independence. Despite 
this extremely high correlation, the phases are not completely dependent, either, for 
five reasons. First, because this correlation was between categories of strategies (focal, 
unbiased, and anti-focal), there was a lot of variation within these categories. For 
example, there were three different search strategies that were classified as focal and 
six different integration strategies that were classified as focal. The 18 combinations of 
these strategies produce vastly different posteriors. Second, the correlation between 
focal search and focal integration approaches randomness (r=.02) when participants 
who selected probabilities conditioned exclusively on one island (and therefore cannot 
be focal in integration on the other island) were excluded. Third, the change in the 
attention-by-motivation interaction between phases (see over-biasing effect below) 
indicates a reduction in participants’ focus in the integration phase. Fourth, the finding 
of hypothesis-focus bias in the search phase but not finding the parallel hypothesis-
focus integration bias in the integration phase again indicates a reduction in 
participants’ focus in the integration phase. Fifth, many of the participants searched 
optimally but used the Biased Bayesian integration strategy. Since the phases are not 
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completely independent or dependent, then prior research examining only one of the 
two phases while making claims about confirmation bias results needs to be critically 
re-examined.  
 The fourth goal, that of examining predictor selection bias, was both less 
ambitious than the others and yet turned out to be more difficult. Although dissonance 
theory research has extensively examined predictor selection bias, conditional 
selection paradigm research has never attempted to examine it in the integration phase. 
This oversight may be due to lack of interest, or due to the difficulty in establishing 
hints as to the direction of the diagnosticity of the dimensions without making these 
hints normatively relevant in the integration phase.  
 This study attempted to overcome this difficulty by creating a situation where 
the hints were clear as to their direction but were not a normative factor in integration. 
There are three reasons why they are not normative factors. First, the hints were 
balanced (four favoring each of the two hypotheses) and therefore, as a set, non-
diagnostic. Second, anyone following a normative search strategy would select 
conditionals evenly from those hinted to favor each hypothesis thus preserving this 
balance. Third the hints were deliberatively vague as to whether they were diagnostic 
or pseudodiagnostic (“…characterizes the current clay pits of…”). 
 No results met the .05 level on predictor selection bias or related biases. 
However, since previously found biases were not replicated, it is concluded that this 
was due to a weak manipulation, we therefore, cannot rule predictor selection bias out. 
There was one new finding in this area of predictor preference: the use of the Biased 
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Bayesian integration strategy (the use of only the pair favoring the focal island in 
integration by participants who had searched optimally). Both attention and motivation 
had nearly significant effects on the use of this Biased Bayesian strategy. This form of 
predictor-focus integration bias has never been considered before, and if established in 
subsequent research, would show a new way that participants who are unbiased in one 
phase (search) can be powerfully biased in another (integration).  
Results Summary 
 The results indicate that the attention manipulation had both focal and 
motivational effects in both the search and integration processes, but these did not 
produce an effect on the resulting posterior probability. In contrast, the motivation 
manipulation had only focal search effects. Additionally attention and motivation 
manipulations appear to interact, but only in the integration phase.  
This study’s unique design of providing hints as to the direction of 
diagnosticity of a dimension and of examining both search and integration phases 
provided the ability to examine more combinations of search and integration 
strategies. This study surprisingly found that participants were rarely using single-
quadrant search strategies (33) and were frequently using information about both 
islands in integration (127). Additionally, there was some evidence for the use of the 
Biased Bayesian integration strategy. 
Finally, this study is the first to examined participants’ intuitive conditionals. 
Strong evidence was found that participants estimate of the size of the unchosen 
conditional probabilities was affected by the size of the chosen conditionals (positive 
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relationship). Additionally, it appears that participants’ intuitive conditionals affect 
their estimate of the posterior probability.  
Results Categorized by Independent Variable 
 The following six sections discuss the results by focusing in turn on each of the 
four independent variables, the interaction between attention and motivation, and a 
comparison of the size of the effects of the attention and motivation manipulations. 
For ease of understanding main effects will be presented before interaction effects. 
 Attention main effects. The attention manipulation was found to increase 
significantly the use of focal search strategies (p=.04; exploratory hypothesis #3) and 
integration confirmation bias (p=.03; exploratory hypothesis #11). Attention was 
found to nearly significantly increase hypothesis focus bias (p=.07; exploratory 
hypothesis #1), focal integration strategies (p=.08; exploratory hypothesis #9), and the 
use of the Bias Bayesian integration strategy (p=.09; research hypothesis #2).  
However, attention was found to be not significant in affecting predictor 
selection bias (research hypothesis #1) or its integration phase equivalent, predictor-
focus integration bias (exploratory hypothesis #7). These findings were smaller in size 
and narrower in scope than expected (see Interval Validity Section for a discussion).   
Additionally, this study failed to replicate prior findings of pseudodiagnosticity 
(exploratory hypothesis #2), as well corresponding integration phase biases of 
Hypothesis-Focus Integration Bias and pseudodiagnostic integration (exploratory 
hypotheses #6 and 8) (Doherty, et al., 1979; Doherty, et al., 1981; Beyth-Marom & 
Fischhoff, 1983; Fischhoff & Bar-Hillel, 1984; Ofir, 1988; Mynatt, et al., 1993). 
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 Motivation main effects. The motivated manipulation was found to increase 
significantly the use of focal search strategies (p=.04; exploratory hypothesis #3) and 
nearly significantly increase hypothesis focus bias (p=.07; exploratory hypothesis #1) 
and the use of the Bias Bayesian integration strategy (p=.07; research hypothesis #2). 
Motivation was found to be non-significant in affecting most search phase variables, 
including: predictor selection bias (research hypothesis #1), pseudodiagnosticity 
(exploratory hypothesis #2), and search confirmation bias (exploratory hypothesis 
#10). Similarly, motivation was found to be non-significant in affecting most 
integration phase variables, including hypothesis-focus integration bias (exploratory 
hypothesis #6), predictor-focus integration bias (exploratory hypothesis #7), and pairs 
used in integration (exploratory hypothesis #8). 
These findings were smaller in size and narrower in scope than expected (see 
Limitations of internal validity from manipulation problems for a discussion) as the 
consistent effects found in the dissonance theory paradigm (Frey, 1981, 1986; Ditto & 
Lopez, 1992; Pinkley, et al., 1995; Frey, et al., 1996; Johnston, 1996; Russo, et al., 
1996; Luce, et al., 1997; Lundgren & Prislin, 1998; Schulz-Hardt, et al., 2000; Simon, 
et al., 2001), despite the parallel situations. This failed to extend dissonance theory 
paradigm to the Bayesian conditionals selection paradigm.   
 Motivation and attention interaction. The attention and motivation 
manipulations were expected to be sub-additive by producing similar levels of bias 
regardless of whether a participant was assigned a focal condition, a motivated 
condition, or both (see Expected effects of independent variables). However, this sub-
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additive interaction was not consistently found in this study. Interestingly, a pattern 
was found for this interaction. In the two search phase dependent variables where 
significant or nearly significant results were obtained (hypothesis focus bias and 
search strategy), these independent variables appeared to have additive effects. In 
contrast, in the two integration phase dependent variables where significant or nearly 
significant results were obtained (integration confirmation bias and integration 
strategy), these independent variables appeared to have sub-additive or even 
overbiasing effects. Participants appear to grow more cautious or less biased (perhaps 
because they become aware of the manipulations) as they reached the integration 
phase of this study. 
Motivation and attention comparison. The study compared the sizes of the 
effects of these two sources of bias (attention focus and motivation bias). Despite the 
weak manipulations (and the inherent problems in comparing the strength of 
manipulations of different variables), this study found the effect of attention to be 
greater than the effect of motivation on hypothesis focus bias (p=.09; exploratory 
hypothesis #4). In contrast, motivation was no found to be significantly greater in 
effect on predictor selection bias than attention (exploratory hypothesis #5). 
 Timing of feedback. Due to the failure of random assignment, all sequential 
participants were dropped from analyses, and therefore it was not possible to examine 
the effects of this variable (see the Interval Validity Section for a discussion). 
 Size-of-conditionals.  This independent variable was included to examine two 
possibilities. The first possibility was that a combination of low size-of-conditionals 
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and sequential search would be unbiasing. Because of the selection differences in the 
timing of feedback variable this possibility could not be examined. The second 
possibility was that size-of-conditionals affected participants’ intuitive conditionals. 
This relationship was highly significant (p<.001; exploratory hypothesis #14) and in 
the expected positive direction. 
Results Categorized By Dependent Variable  
 The following five sections discuss the results, each focusing on one of five 
categories of dependent variables in turn: search phase, integration phase, surprise, 
intuitive conditionals, and search and integration strategies. 
 Search phase. Focal attention and the motivated conditioned produced their 
expected increase in hypothesis focus bias and the use of focal search strategies (as 
discussed under main effects). Additionally, the small conditionals condition 
surprisingly increased the biasing effect of focal attention. Unfortunately, the study 
failed to replicate many prior findings of the effect of attention on pseudodiagnosticity 
(Doherty, et al., 1979; Doherty, et al., 1981; Beyth-Marom & Fischhoff, 1983; 
Fischhoff & Bar-Hillel, 1984; Ofir, 1988; Mynatt, et al., 1993). 
One notable finding was that a surprisingly large proportion of the participants 
searched for at least one diagnostic pair (133 out of 324) and approximated the use of 
Bayes’ theorem in integration (88 of 324). These participants selected significantly 
more pairs than chance, while in contrast, Doherty, et al. found participants selecting 
significantly fewer pairs than chance. It is impossible to know whether this is a cohort 
effect, a sampling effect, or an effect of the difference in the scripts. 
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 Integration phase. Fewer significant results were found in the integration 
phase than the search phase. Attention was found to increase significantly integration 
phase confirmation bias (p=.03). Additionally, attention and motivation had a nearly 
significant overbiasing interaction on the use of the Biased Bayesian integration 
strategy. (The overbiasing interaction was participants both focal attention and 
motivated conditions demonstrating less bias to those participants in either one biasing 
condition alone). In contrast attention and motivation had a sub-additive affect on 
integration confirmation bias. (The sub-additive interaction was participants both focal 
attention and motivated conditions demonstrating equal bias to those participants in 
either one biasing condition alone).  
 Surprise. Similarly, two critical assumptions of this study were that the low 
conditionals would prove surprising, and that surprised participants would be “cured” 
of the biasing effects of the focal and motivated conditions. Unfortunately, both of 
these assumptions were not supported in this study. First, low conditionals did not 
prove to be very surprising. Only 39% of participants in the low conditional 
probabilities condition reported being surprised by the size of the conditional 
probabilities (in contrast to 33% of the high conditionals participants). Second, those 
who reported being surprised were more, rather than less, biased (although not 
significantly), in terms of both hypothesis focus bias and predictor selection bias 
(exploratory hypotheses #15 and16). These two unexpected findings regarding 
surprise combined to virtually eliminate any significant finding regarding size-of-
conditionals. This failed to extend Doherty’s (Doherty, et al., 1979) and Ofir’s (1988) 
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findings that providing disconfirming diagnostic feedback helped participants search 
diagnostically. This goal was not achieved since there was only one significant 
interaction between the size-of-conditionals and attention or motivation. 
 Intuitive conditionals. One of this study’s strongest findings was that the size 
of the selected conditional probabilities had a positive relationship with the size of the 
participants’ intuitive conditionals. This demonstrates that participants are estimating 
these values and are influenced by what they do know about the situation.  
Another interesting finding was that the model using the actual conditionals 
plus their complementary paired intuitive conditionals (given Bayesian integration) 
provided the strongest correlation to the actual posteriors (r=.37). In contrast, the non-
parametric tests indicated the opposite, that regression was better than Bayes’ 
Theorem. These conflicting results between the correlation method (which indicated 
that the intuitive conditionals combined with Bayes’ theorem was the best) and the 
non-parametric methods (which indicated that regression was better than Bayes’ 
theorem and that using no intuitive conditional probabilities was better than using any) 
may be explained by the difference in the criteria. The regression model had lower 
variation (than the Bayesian models) and therefore resulted in more posteriors close to 
50%. In this situation, anything close to 50% predicted well, since most participants 
stayed near 50%. However, the models using Bayesian integration and including some 
or all intuitive conditionals had higher correlation coefficients to the actual posteriors, 
indicating that they better captured the variation of participants’ posteriors. The 
regression model may reflect participants using the anchoring and adjusting heuristic 
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proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1974) (anchoring on the 50% base rate and 
adjusting from there) and the small size of the adjustment. The Bayesian model 
(Bayesian integration applied to all the intuitive conditionals) may better reflect how 
people adjust from the anchor, but may overstate the size of the adjustment. In 
situations where the anchor is not so fixed (due to non-50% base rate and consistent 
diagnosticity of the conditional probabilities) the intuitive conditionals model with 
Bayesian integration might predict even better. 
This provides additional evidence for participants using Bayesian or Quasi-
Bayesian thinking. This support is limited due to the contrasting findings (as to 
whether regression or Bayes predicted posteriors better), and the fact that these are 
between-subjects group-level findings, and therefore it is hard to draw individual-level 
conclusions from them. 
Additionally, these results provide mixed evidence that the intuitive 
conditionals were somehow involved in the integration process and that people are 
semi-Bayesian in their integration. Unfortunately, these intuitive conditional results 
need to be taken cautiously, since the data were collected after the posterior judgments 
had been made and may reflect some hindsight bias.  
Participants’ use of intuitive conditionals could provide an explanation for 
participants’ poor performance in many decision making tasks.  When making real 
decisions, people often are familiar with the situation. This familiarity could help them 
in at least three ways. First, familiarity would provide a hint to the direction of the 
diagnostic effect of each datum (i.e. the hints in this study that this mineral would 
Discussion 187 
 
  
favor Shell or Coral). Second, familiarity would help people to estimate the size of 
conditional probabilities that they do not have exact figures for (i.e. the diagnostic 
ratio of unchosen conditionals in this study). Third, familiarity would guide them to 
the importance and diagnostic direction of the value of each conditional probability 
(i.e. the diagnostic impact of a high or low conditional probability would have on their 
posterior probability).  The artificial and abstract tasks of most laboratory studies in 
this field may cause some of the participants’ poor performance, by denying them 
their usual familiarity with the task and situation. 
Search and integration strategies. This study created a taxonomy of all 
possible search strategies and measured their relative frequency of use. Of interest is 
the rarity (only 33 participants) of participants who choose information all from the 
same quadrant (all probabilities conditioned on a single island and hinted to favor a 
single island) indicating that for the vast majority of participants information from 
more than one quadrant was relevant. Similarly, this study created a list of integration 
strategies and a classification system that proved acceptably reliable. Of great interest 
among the integration strategies was the large number of participants who used the 
Biased Bayesian (32), Bayesian (56), and ratio of conditionals strategies (35). These 
three strategies all use information from both islands in ways that are at least close to 
Bayes' Theorem. This study found a larger proportion of Bayesian participants than 
did Doherty, et al. (1979) although direct comparisons are difficult due to differences 
in the task and script. 
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Limitations 
 This study suffers from several limitations that limit the scope and both the 
internal and external validity of the study. 
Limitations from the scope of the study. Several potential research questions 
were left outside the scope of this study. Most importantly, despite being the first 
study to examine the interactions between the search and integration phases, this study 
avoided examining interactions between this and other parts of the decision making 
process. Hall (1989) outlined eight steps in the systems methodology for decision 
making (problem definition, value system design, systems synthesis, systems analysis, 
optimization, decision making, planning for action, and building and maintenance 
functions). In the decision making literature these same steps are commonly referred 
to as problem definition, identification of values, identification of alternatives, 
evaluation of impacts, maximizing individual alternatives, choice among alternatives, 
and implementation (merging the last two systems methodology steps).  
Of these, only two were involved in this study, systems analysis (the search 
and integration of information) and to a lesser extent decision making (the final 
decision). The first four of Hall’s steps were not examined, because participants were 
simply provided at the outset what would have been the results of Hall’s first four 
steps (problem definition, value system design, systems synthesis, and optimization). 
Similarly, Hall’s last two steps (planning for action and maintenance functions) were 
ignored completely. An obvious limitation of this research (and an area for future 
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research) was any interaction between the excluded six phases of Hall’s decision 
making process and the two phases studied. 
Limitations of internal validity from manipulation problems. The failure of 
the attention and motivation manipulations to produce their expected effects interfered 
with several of this study’s goals (with the notable exceptions of significant results on 
search strategies and integration confirmation bias). There are eleven possible 
explanations to this failure to replicate both the pilot study and many prior research 
findings.  
First, the length and complexity of the script and the number of process 
questions could have deceased participants’ interest, motivation, and effort, leading to 
random responses and/or 50% posterior estimates. (93 participants gave exactly 50% 
as their posterior and 15 more were within 1%). 
Second, two features of this study encouraged balanced attention and may have 
undermined the attention manipulation (the pilot study and most other studies used 
non-equal base rates). The even base rate (required for the unique optimal search 
strategy) encourages participants to treat both islands equally. Similarly, use of the 
table format when making search selections, again, treats both islands equally and has 
been found to promote balanced thinking (Ward & Jenkins, 1965). 
Third, the balanced conditionals (again required for the unique optimal search 
strategy) could have led many non-Bayesian integration strategies to result close to 
50%. In fact, in the situation presented in this study both the participants who use the 
normative search and integration strategies (balanced Bayesian search and Bayesian 
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integration) and the most unmotivated (“I don’t know”, therefore 50%) might be 
expected to produce the same posterior. The balanced conditionals themselves may 
cause an expectancy effect, where participants realize that the experimenter is looking 
for bias and that 50% is the fair or even or correct answer. 
Fourth, the lack of conflict among the base rate, the conditional probabilities, 
and the hints may encourage less deep thinking and a 50% posterior (which is the 
exact posterior chosen by 93 of the 324 of the participants). Ofir’s (1988) found that 
conflicting information encouraged the use of false alarm rate information (deeper 
thinking). 
Fifth, the existence of an over-biasing effect would reduce the effect of the 
attention and motivation manipulations by eliminating the biasing effects of these 
manipulations for the 25% of participants who receive the combined conditions of 
focal attention and motivated conditions. This lowered the power of all analyses 
involving these two manipulations using the original testing design (combining the 
IVs into one dichotomous variable, biasing and non-biasing conditions). 
Sixth, some dependent measures such as hypothesis focus bias and predictor 
selection bias were not very sensitive (since there were only five possibilities of 
numbers of conditionals selected in a category 0-4) and with most participants 
selecting two probabilities conditioned on each island (71.6%) and most participants 
selecting two probabilities hinted to favor each island (69.4%). In contrast Doherty in 
his original study (Doherty, et al. 1979) used a situation that produced a 0-6 scale. 
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Seventh, the power of the study was reduced by the pre-manipulation selection 
differences that caused the eight simultaneous conditions (and half the participants) to 
be dropped. These subjects demonstrated differences in their search phase behavior. 
These differences appear to be caused by the size of the conditional variable, which 
the participants should not have yet seen. This indicates that many of these subjects 
might have misunderstood the instructions and chosen their conditional probabilities 
sequentially or cheated and changed their selections after the fact. This resulted in half 
the participants being dropped. 
Eighth, the increase in the proportion of Bayesian participants may make 
research in this area less statistically sensitive. It appears to be a safe assumption that 
Bayesian participants are more aware of the need to examine probabilities conditioned 
on both hypotheses, and by extensions that they would be more aware of the need to 
be fair in selection information hinted to favor both hypotheses. Therefore, they would 
be less vulnerable to manipulations of their attention and motivation.  
Ninth, the minimal effect of the low conditionals to generate surprise, and the 
minimal effect of surprise on participants’ actions appears to have interfered with the 
original testing design (combining the IVs into one dichotomous variable, biasing and 
non-biasing conditions). Additionally, the low conditionals may have generated 
apathy, anger or confusion rather than the intended surprise in participants when they 
did not receive the feedback they were expecting. For example 12 low conditionals 
participants failed to answer the surprise question while only 7 high conditionals 
participants failed to answer the surprise question (p=.13, df =322). 
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Tenth, the script for the pilot study (Borthwick & Anderson, 2001) was in a 
setting that participants would be familiar with (hiring a new employee) as opposed to 
the current script that focused on a more abstract problem (but is more similar to the 
one used by Doherty, et al., 1979). The intuitive conditional results support the idea 
that familiarity with the context could affect performance. 
Eleventh, the pilot study (Borthwick & Anderson, 2001) was conducted over 
the summer, whereas the current study was conducted during the academic school 
year. Summer students may be more motivated participants and / or more vulnerable 
to biases (they chose diagnostic pairs at a rate less than chance in contrast to these 
participants who chose diagnostic pairs at a rate more than chance). 
Technical limitations. This study additionally has three technical limitations. 
First, the hints were all accurate and all of the hints, the probabilities, and the base rate 
were perfectly balanced between alternatives (as was required for creating a single 
normatively correct answer). If participants identify any of these characteristics, their 
identification may reinforce their tendency to respond with a 50%-50% final estimate 
(which in this case happens to be correct). This problem would work against rejection 
of the null hypotheses.  
Second, the definition of predictor selection integration bias, while not a 
limitation in this study because the hints were all accurate, could be a limitation in the 
general case when hints might not be accurate.  If the hints were not accurate then the 
hints and the data would disagree as to which predictors would support the focal 
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hypothesis. Then it would no longer be clear which dimensions should be considered 
indicative of predictor selection integration bias.  
Third, several dependent variables were not continuous and had as few as five 
values. This restriction of range would work against rejection of the null hypotheses.  
Limitations of external validity due to the laboratory setting. Finally, there 
were at least five possible limitations of this study that stem from its laboratory 
experimental design.  
 First, the artificial situation may have made participants less biased by making 
them more cautious in order to avoid looking “bad”. This caution may have led them 
to minimize the distance by which they would revise their probability estimates, 
resulting in more posterior probabilities around 50%. This problem would generally 
bias this research against rejecting the null hypotheses. This effect is unlikely or small 
because prior published lab studies commonly achieved significant results. 
 Second, the fact that participants were isolated from other people may have 
distorted the results, although research on group decision making has demonstrated 
some of the same biases as individual decision making (Schulz-Hardt, Frey, Luthgens, 
& Moscovici, 2000). Consulting others who may have a different attention focus and 
different motivations could reduce these biases. This problem would generally bias 
this research towards rejecting the null hypotheses, and might also create an external 
validity problem. Again, this effect is unlikely or small because prior published lab 
studies did commonly achieve significant results. 
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 Third, other reactivity effects were possible since participants knew their 
decision making process was being studied. One possible effect of reactivity would be 
to encourage participants to use in integration all the information they selected in the 
search phase. Because if participants did not use all their selected information, it 
would be admitting that they made a mistake in their search selections and had chosen 
useless information. A second example would be participants changing their non-
numeric strategies to a numeric strategy in an attempt to use the “correct” integration 
method.  
 Fourth, participants may have responded randomly due to low motivation and 
a desire to avoid cognitive effort on this difficult task (the 97 participants who chose 
exact 50% may be an indication of this).  
 Fifth, any results are limited to the research paradigm employed (Bayesian 
conditionals selection paradigm), the situation, and the parameters employed. As just 
one example, this study asked participants to choose 4 of 16 conditional probabilities, 
the fact that participants then had 4 conditional probabilities in addition to the base 
rate, made it likely that participants who would have used an additive strategy with 
fewer numbers to work with, would switch to another strategy when they realize that 
adding four or five probabilities together would result in a probability above 100% and 
therefore cannot be the correct integration strategy. No other researcher has tried to 
categorize individual participant’s integration strategies. 
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Implications  
 Multi-phase research. Eventually, future research could address some of 
these limitations, most notably by including all eight of Hall’s (1989) system 
methodology steps. This research would require a less structured problem, which 
would entail a more difficult statistical analysis. Such research would probably focus 
on defining and/or classifying patterns or styles of decision making in individuals 
rather than averaging across individuals. Similarly, moving the study out of a 
laboratory environment would resolve the five potential limitations listed above for 
this study due to its laboratory setting. However, the use of field studies is largely 
prevented by the logistical difficulties of observing decision making in a field study. 
Some of the limitations of a laboratory study can be addressed while still in the 
laboratory environment, such as having married couples perform both joint and 
individual decision making. 
 Once studies are expanded to all eight of Hall’s (1989) system methodology 
steps, other biases that have sometimes been labeled confirmation bias (and were 
excluded from this study) could be included. These include biases in the interpretation 
of (Kelley, 1950) and memory for information (Perkins, et al., 1991). These two biases 
could interact with the biases explored in this study. For example, when memory is 
involved, participants may use information from dimensions that are normatively anti-
confirmatory (e.g. predictor-focus integration anti-bias) but they misremember the 
information to be confirmatory. 
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Technical improvements for future laboratory research. There are at least 
five ways to make technical improvements to laboratory research in this area. 
The first way would be to strengthen the manipulations. One critical failing of 
this study was the weakness of the manipulations. In order to overcome this problem 
several options are available. For the attention manipulation, the use of an uneven base 
rate and/or the presentation of the search choices in a form other than a table would 
strengthen the attention manipulation. For the motivation manipulation, more real 
world motivations could be stronger. These could include a promise of a real life 
reward for the desired outcome (e.g. getting out of the study earlier, small cash 
reward, more extra credit points) or the use of a decision involving a topic participants 
have an existing strong opinion on (e.g. Iraq War or Abortion). Another technique to 
maximize the size of the bias would be to ask participants to deliberately be biased. 
This technique has been used extensively in personality testing for employment 
purposes (see Viswesvaran & Ones, 1999 for a meta-analysis and review). 
The second way to improve the study would be to automate the study through 
computer programming. The use of an automated script could prevent some of the 
more common participant mistakes, such as selecting more than 4 conditional 
probabilities and providing less than all 12 of the intuitive conditional probabilities. 
The third way to improve the study would be change it to a within-subjects 
design. The most interesting participants for this topic are the least numerically 
oriented. Unfortunately, these participants’ integration strategies proved very difficult 
to classify without any mathematical notations to guide our understanding of their 
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thinking. In a within-subjects design, individual integration strategies can be inferred 
more accurately from their repeated judgments. 
The fourth way to improve the design would be to cut up the study into a series 
of smaller experiments. While we need to understand the whole system, the length and 
complexity of this study may have contributed to some of its failing and therefore, 
simplifying the study may improve the quality of the resulting data. This could be 
done by running an initial experiment limited to the search phase with just the 
attention manipulation. Each succeeding experiment could build on the prior study by 
adding or changing one feature (i.e. changing how attention is manipulated or by 
adding a motivation manipulation). This research plan would have avoided some of 
the problems experienced by this study (e.g. failure of attention and motivation to 
consistently cause biases, and failure of surprise to reduce biases). 
The fifth way to improve the study would be to improve the hints. The hints in 
this study may have been both artificial and weak. The pilot study used an employee 
selection cover story, in which the hints were whether or not the job applicant passed 
each test. This form of a diagnostic hint is simultaneously understandable (pass is 
good, failed is bad), familiar, and subtle (no need for a long explanation as to what 
passed means). Additionally, these hints could easily be modified to be strong or weak 
in their diagnosticity. 
Future research topics. The results of this study suggest at least seven 
implications for future laboratory research in this area. 
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 Phase interactions. The most important implication of this study is that future 
research must be careful about making conclusions about effects in phases that are not 
examined. The search and integration phases were shown to be both partly-dependent 
on each other, and partly-independent (see Primary Goals for a discussion of the 
evidence of partial dependence). Thus, cross-phase generalizations need to be made 
cautiously, if at all.  
Intuitive conditionals. The finding that intuitive conditionals are used in 
Bayesian integration has three important research implications. First, research should 
not be conducted in this area without gathering intuitive conditionals. Second support 
is provided for Gigerenzer’s arguments that the degree to which cognitive errors found 
in laboratory experiments can be a product of the artificial environment. If participants 
use intuitive controls then it is not automatically a cognitive error for people to search 
pseudodiagnostically. Third, this raises questions regarding other findings of cognitive 
errors from laboratory experiments. Future research could further investigate this 
phenomenon, and the related issue of the participants’ familiarity with the context.  
Studies could ask participants about intuitive controls after actual conditional 
probabilities are provided but before their posterior probability is collected. Similarly, 
intuitive conditionals could be gathered before the search phase selections are made or 
after the selection are made but before feedback is provided. Another way to gauge 
their impact would be to vary the number of dimensions while keeping the number of 
selections constant. This would determine whether the number of unexamined 
dimensions of intuitive conditionals (diagnostic pairs of intuitive conditionals) affects 
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the decision process. If participants can be accurately classified according to their 
integration strategies, then their use of intuitive conditional probabilities could be 
more effectively examined. 
Relative size of biases from attention and motivation. This study found weak 
support that attentional biases are greater than motivational ones. (Exploratory 
Hypotheses 4 and 5 found that for both attention and motivation the effects were 
greater on focal search bias than predictor selection bias. Additionally, attention 
produced more and stronger effects than did motivation.) Therefore, research should 
focus on attentional processes more than on motivational ones. 
 Surprise. This study’s failure to replicate prior findings regarding surprise 
indicates that surprise may not be inherently debiasing, or that what other researchers 
labeled as surprise was something else. Future research employing surprise as a 
variable should use a manipulation check to ensure that they are actually surprising the 
participants.  
Overbiasing. This study’s finding of an overbiasing effect between attention 
and motivation could either indicate a demand characteristic or some other 
mechanism. One possibility is that what was here found and labeled as overbiasing, 
may in fact be related to conservatism, which is the tendency to under-adjust for new 
information. The participants’ initial positions are assumed to be the base rate. 
Therefore any adjustment from it, whether caused by attentional or motivational 
processes, would have to work against an inherent resistance to change. Future 
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research should determine the extent of overbiasing, and the degree it is related to 
broader decision making concepts.  
Predictor selection bias and the Biased Bayesian Integration Strategy. The 
findings regarding predictor selection bias and the biased Bayesian integration strategy 
call for a re-examination and interpretation of prior findings. Even in situations where 
the research did not intentionally include hints as to the diagnostic direction of 
information, participants may have their own ideas / prejudices.  The use of cover 
stories with familiar situations (e.g. the color of a cab) in prior studies may have 
activated participants’ biases as to the diagnosticity of a dimension. This possibility 
should be investigated.   
Increase in frequency of Bayesian participants. The finding of a greater 
number of Bayesian participants raises a caution for future research. Since Bayesian 
participants (133 participants selected at least 1 diagnostic pair) are presumably more 
resistant to biases, an increase in the proportion of Bayesian participants will lower the 
effect size of any biasing manipulation in a between-subjects design. Research may 
have to compensate through increasing the strength of their manipulations, or running 
more participants. 
Specific future studies. Three specific studies are suggested by this research. 
A first study could systematically manipulate the base rate in order to examine the 
base rate’s attentional impact on predictor selection bias, hypothesis focus bias and 
pseudodiagnosticity. This would help determine why the results of this study differ 
from its pilot study. 
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A second study could examine the interaction between attention and 
motivation. This study found evidence for additive, sub-additive (when the effect of 
two variables together is less than the combination of the two effects separately) and 
over-biasing (when the effects of two variables together is less than either of the 
effects separately) effects of attention and motivation. The interaction appears sub-
additive or over-biasing in the integration phase while additive in the search phase. 
Determining why this interaction effect changes would be useful. 
 A third study could examine the possibility of mediator relationships among 
the variables. The current study’s definition of confirmation bias (as a confirmatory 
effect on the posterior) implies that the effects of the independent variables on 
confirmation bias are mediated through the three search phase biases: 
pseudodiagnosticity, hypothesis focus bias and predictor selection bias. Similarly, 
these three search phase biases may (also) mediate the relationship between the 
independent variables and their corresponding integration phase biases 
(pseudodiagnostic integration, Hypothesis-Focus Integration Bias, and predictor 
selection integration bias). The current study did not find consistent patterns of search 
phase biases causing parallel integration phase biases.  
Researchers have always assumed that search phase biases produced a 
confirmatory effect, but they now need to not only demonstrate the confirming effect, 
but also the process of how a search phase bias becomes transmitted across phases. 
 Implications for practice. Implications for practice can be divided into those 
for decision analysts and those for untrained decision makers. Decision analysts’ use 
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of software for computational purposes ensures that appropriate probabilities will be 
obtained and that they will be integrated optimally. However, decision analysts and 
their software are still vulnerable to errors in identifying diagnostic information and in 
judging probabilities. This study has two findings that can impact these areas of 
vulnerability. First, this study showed that the judgment of a conditional probability 
can be affected by the size of other conditional probabilities. Second, this study also 
highlighted the possibility that the diagnostic information considered might be 
vulnerable to predictor selection bias. 
 For decision makers unaided by decision analysts and decision analysis 
software, this study provides three issues to be aware of in addition to those for 
decision analysts. First, attention may be a more important bias to be aware of than 
motivation, so tables or trees should be used to equalize attention. Second, they should 
be aware that they need to find and use diagnostic pairs of conditional probabilities. 
Third, despite the use of an optimal search strategy and integration with Bayes’ 
Theorem, bias is still possible (the Biased Bayesian integration strategy). Therefore, 
decision makers should ensure that all diagnostic pairs are integrated. Fourth, they 
should be aware that the size of intuitive conditionals may affect their judgment of the 
posterior probability, and therefore should be careful about any intuitive conditional 
probabilities excluded from the analysis. 
 
References 203 
 
  
References 
Allan, L. G. (1993). Human contingency judgments: Rule based or 
associative? Psychological Bulletin, 114, 435-448. 
Alloy, L. B., & Tabachnik, N. (1984). Assessment of covariation by humans 
and animals: The joint influence of prior expectations and current situational 
information. Psychological Review, 91, 112-149. 
Anderson, B. F., Deane, Donald H., Hammond, K. R., McClelland, G. H., & 
Shanteau, J. C. (1981). Concepts in judgement and decision research. New York: 
Praeger Publishers. 
Anderson, B. F., Gaffuri, A. & Mooris, R. K. Treatment-condition bias in the 
judgment of covariation. Unpublished Manuscript. 
Arkes H. R., & Harkness A. R. (1983). Establishing contingency between two 
dichotomous variables. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 112, 117-135. 
Bar-Hillel, M., & Fischhoff, B. (1981). When do base rates affect predictions? 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 41, 671-680. 
Baron, J., & Ritov, I. (2004). Omission bias, individual differences, and 
normality. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 94, 74-85. 
Baron, J., Beattie, J., Hershey, J. C. (1988). Heuristics and biases in diagnostic 
reasoning: II. Congruence, information, and certainty. Organizational Behavior and 
Human Decision Processes, 42, 88-110. 
References 204 
 
  
Baron, J., & Hershey, J. C. (1988). Heuristics and biases in diagnostic 
reasoning: I. Priors, error costs, and test accuracy. Organizational Behavior and 
Human Decision Processes, 41, 259-279. 
Baron, J., & Hershey, J. C. (1988). Outcome bias in decision evaluation. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 54, 569-579. 
Bassok, M., Trope, Y. (1983). People's strategies for testing hypotheses about 
another's personality: Confirmatory or diagnostic? Social Cognition, 2, 199-216. 
Beattie, J., & Baron, J. (1988). Confirmation and matching biases in 
hypothesis testing, The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 40, 269-297. 
 Beyth-Marom, R., & Fischhoff, B. (1983). Diagnosticity and 
pseudodianosticity, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 45, 1185-1195. 
Borthwick, G. L., & Anderson, B. F. (2001, August). Pseudodiagnosticity and 
confirmation bias. Poster session presented at the 109th American Psychological 
Association Conference, San Francisco, CA. 
 Broadbent, D. E. (1975). The magic number seven after fifteen years. In A. 
Kennedy & A. Wilkes (Eds.), Studies in long term memory, (pp. 3-18), NY: John 
Wiley. 
 Brownstein, A. L. (2003). Biased predecision processing. Psychological 
Bulletin, 129, 545-568. 
Bruner, J. S., Goodnow, J. J., & Austin, G. A. (1956). A study in thinking. New 
York: Wiley. 
References 205 
 
  
Dawson, E., Gilovich, T., & Regan, D. T. (2002). Motivated reasoning and 
performance on the Wason Selection Task, Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 28, 1379-1387. 
Ditto, P. H., & Lopez, D. F. (1992). Motivated skepticism: Use of differential 
decision criteria for preferred and nonpreferred conclusions. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 63, 568–584. 
Doherty, M. E., Mynatt, C. R., Tweney, R. D., & Schiavo, M. D. (1979). 
Pseudodiagnosticity. Acta Psychologica, 43, 111-121. 
Doherty, M. E., Schiavo, M. D., Tweney, R. D., & Mynatt, C. R. (1981). The 
influence of feedback and diagnostic data on pseudodiagnositicity. Bulletin of the 
Psychonomic Society, 18, 191-194. 
Edwards, W. (1968). Conservatism in human information processing. In B. 
Kleinmuntz (Ed.), Formal representation of human judgment. NewYork: Wiley. 
Evans, J. St. B. T.  (1993). The cognitive psychology of reasoning: An 
introduction. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology Human Experimental 
Psychology, 46A, 561-567. 
Evans, J. St. B. T.  (1972). Interpretation and matching bias in a reasoning task. 
Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 24, 193-199. 
Fairley, N., Manktelow, K., & Over, D. (1999) Necessity, sufficiency, and 
perspective effects in causal conditional reasoning. Quarterly Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Human Experimental Psychology, 52A, 771-790. 
References 206 
 
  
Fiedler, K. (2000). Beware of samples! A cognitive-ecological sampling 
approach to judgment biases. Psychological Review, 107, 659-676. 
Fischhoff, B., & Beyth-Marom, R. (1983). Hypothesis evaluation from a 
Bayesian Perspective. Psychological Review, 90, 239-260. 
Fischhoff, B, Bar-Hillel, M. (1984). Diagnosticity and the base-rate effect.  
Memory and Cognition, 12, 402-410. 
Fitts, P.M., & Posner, M. I. (1967). Human performance. Oxford, England: 
Brooks/Cole. 
Frey, D., Schulz-Hardt, S., & Stahlberg, D. (1996). Information seeking among 
individuals and groups and possible consequences for decision-making in business and 
politics. In E. Witte & J. Davis (Eds.), Understanding group behavior: Vol. II. Small 
group processes and interpersonal relations (pp. 211–225). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. 
 Frey, D. (1986). Recent research on selective exposure to information. In L. 
Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 19, pp. 41–80). 
New York: Academic Press. 
Galotti, K., M., Baron, J., & Sabini, J. P. (1986). Individual differences in 
syllogistic reasoning: Deduction rules or mental models? Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: General, 115, 16-25. 
Gaeth, G. J., & Shanteau, J. (1984). Reducing the influence of irrelevant 
information on experienced decision makers. Organizational Behavior and Human 
Performance, 33, 263-282. 
References 207 
 
  
Gigerenzer, G., Hell, W., & Blank, H. (1988). Presentation and content: The 
use of base rates as a continuous variable. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Human Perception and Performance, 14, 513-525. 
Gigerenzer, G. (1996).  On narrow norms and vague heuristics: A reply to 
Kahneman and Tversky. Psychological Review. 103, 592-596. 
Hilton, D. J., & Slugoski, B. R. (1986). Knowledge-based causal attributions: 
The abnormal conditions focus model. Psychological Review, 93, 75-88. 
Hoch, S. J. (1985) Counterfactual reasoning and accuracy in predicting 
personal events. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 11, 719-731. 
Jenkins, H. M., & Ward, W. C. (1965) Judgment of contingency between 
responses and outcomes. Psychological Monographs: General & Applied. 79 (1, 
Whole No. 594), 17. 
Johnston, L. (1996). Resisting change: Information-seeking and stereotype 
change. European Journal of Social Psychology, 26, 799–825. 
 Johnson-Laird, P. N., Legrenzi, P., & Legrenzi, M. S. (1972). Reasoning and a 
sense of reality. British Journal of Psychology. 6, 395-400. 
Jonas, E., Schulz-Hardt, S., Frey, D., & Thelen, N. (2001). Confirmation bias 
in sequential information search after preliminary decisions: An expansion of 
dissonance theoretical research on selective exposure to information. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 80, 557-571. 
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1996). On the reality of cognitive illusions: 
A reply to Gigerenzer's critique. Psychological Review, 103, 582-591. 
References 208 
 
  
Kareev, Y., & Halberstadt, N. (1993). Evaluating negative tests and refutation 
in a rule discovery task. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology Human 
Experimental Psychology, 46A, 715-727. 
Kelley, H. H. (1950). The warm-cold variable in first impressions of persons. 
Journal of Personality, 18, 431-439. 
Kemmelmeier, M. (2004). Separating the wheat from the chaff: Does 
discriminating between diagnostic and nondiagnostic information eliminate the 
dilution effect? Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 17, 231-243. 
Klar, Y. (1990). Linking structures and sensitivity to judgment-relevant 
information in statistical and logical reasoning tasks. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 59, 841-858. 
Klayman, J. & Ha, Y., (1989). Hypothesis testing in rule discovery: Strategy, 
structure, and content. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, memory, and 
Cognition, 15, 596-604. 
Klayman, J., & Ha, Y. (1987). Confirmation, disconfirmation, and information 
in hypothesis testing. Psychological Review, 94, 211-228. 
 Lendaris, G. G., (1986). On systemness and the problem solver: tutorial 
comments. Systems, Man, and Cybernetics. IEEE, Vol. SMC-16, No.4. 
Lord, C. G., Lepper, M. R., & Preston, E. (1984). Considering the opposite: A 
corrective strategy for social judgment. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
47, 1231-1243. 
References 209 
 
  
Lord, C. G., Ross, L., & Lepper, M. R. (1979). Biased assimilation and attitude 
polarization: The effects of prior theories on subsequently considered evidence. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37, 2098-2109. 
 Luce, M. F., Bettman, J. R., & Payne, J. W. (1997). Choice processing in 
emotionally difficult decisions. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, 
Memory, and Cognition, 23, 384-405. 
Lundgren, S. R., & Prislin, R. (1998). Motivated cognitive processing and 
attitude change. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 24, 715–726. 
Maggi, J., Butera, F., Leggrenzi, P., & Mugny, G. (1998). Relevance of 
information and social influence in the Pseudodiagnosticity bias. Swiss Journal of 
Psychology, 57, 188-199. 
Manktelow, K. I. (1999). Reasoning and thinking. Hove, UK: Psychology 
Press. 
Manktelow, K. I., & Over, D. E. (1991). Social roles and utilities in reasoning 
with deontic conditionals. Cognition, 39, 85-105. 
Manktelow, K. I., & Over, D. E. (1992). Utility and deontic reasoning: Some 
comments on Johnson-Laird and Byrne. Cognition, 43, 183-188. 
 Murphy, K. R., & Myors, B. (2004). Statistical Power Analysis: A simple and 
general model for traditional and modern hypothesis tests. 2nd Ed, Mahwah, New 
Jersey: Lawerence Earlbaum Associates. 
Mynatt, C. R., Doherty, M. E., & Sullivan, J. A. (1991). Data selection in a 
minimal hypothesis testing task. Acta Psychologica, 76, 293-305. 
References 210 
 
  
Ofir, C. (1988). Pseudodiagnosticity in judgment under uncertainty. 
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Process, 42, 343-363. 
Ormerod, T. C., Manktelow, K. I., & Jones, G. V. (1993). Reasoning with 
three types of conditional: Biases and mental models. Quarterly Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Human Experimental Psychology, 46A, 561-567. 
Over, D. E., Manktelow, K.I., & Hadjichristidis, C. (2004). Conditions for the 
Acceptance of Deontic Conditionals. Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology, 
58, 96-105. 
Nickerson, R. S. (1998). Confirmation Bias: A ubiquitous phenomenon in 
many guises. Review of General Psychology, 2, 175-220. 
Pennington, N., & Hastie, R. (1993). A theory of explanation–based decision 
making. In G. A. Klein, J. Orasanu, R. Calderwood, & C. E. Zsambok  (Eds.), 
Decision making in action: Models and methods (pp. 188-201). Norwood, NJ: Ablex 
Publishing Corp.   
Perkins, D. N., Farady, M. & Bushey, B. (1991) Everyday reasoning and the 
roots of intelligence. In J F. Voss, D. N. Perkins, & J. W. Segal (Eds.), Informal 
reasoning and education (pp.83-106). Hillsdale, NJ: Earlbaum. 
Peterson, C. R., & Beach, L. R. (1967). Man as an intuitive statistician, 
Psychological Bulletin, 68, 29-46. 
 Phillips L.D., Edwards, W. (1966). Conservatism in simple probability 
inference task. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 72, 346-354. 
References 211 
 
  
Pinkley, R. L., Griffith, T. L., & Northcraft, G. B. (1995). “Fixed pie” a la 
mode: Information availability, information processing, and the negotiation of 
suboptimal agreements. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 62, 
101–112. 
Platt, R. D., & Griggs, R. A. (1993) Facilitation in the Abstract selection task: 
The effects of attention and instructional factors. Quarterly Journal of Experimental 
Psychology Human Experimental Psychology, 46A, 591-613. 
Poletiek, F. H. (1996). Paradoxes of falsification. Quarterly Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Human Experimental Psychology. 49A, 447-462. 
Rudksi, J. M. (2002). Hindsight and confirmation biases in an exercise in 
telepathy. Psychological Reports, 91, 899-906. 
 Russo, E. J., Medvec, V. H., & Meloy, M. G., (1996). The distortion of 
information during decisions. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision 
Processes, 66, 102-110. 
Schulz-Hardt, S., Frey, D., Lüthgens, C., & Moscovici, S. (2000). Biased 
information search in group decision making. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 78, 655–669. 
 Simon, D., Pham, L. B., Le, Q. A., & Holyoak, K. J. (2001). The emergence of 
coherence over the course of decision making. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 27, 1250-1260. 
 Simon, H. (1997). The sciences of the artificial, 3rd ed., MIT Press, Cambridge, 
Ma. 
References 212 
 
  
Shaklee, H., & Goldston, D. (1989). Development in causal reasoning: 
Information sampling and judgment rule. Cognitive Development, 4, 269-281. 
Shaklee, H., & Hall, L. (1983). Methods of assessing strategies for judging 
covariation between events. Journal of Educational Psychology, 75, 583-594. 
Shaklee H., & Tucker, D. (1980). A rule analysis of judgments of covariation 
between events. Memory and Cognition, 8, 459-467. 
Shaklee H., & Mims, M. (1982). Sources of error in judging events 
covariations. Journal of Experiment Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 
8, 208-224. 
Shanteau, J. (1975). Averaging versus multiplying combination rules of 
inference judgment. Acta Psychologica, 39, 83-89. 
Skov, R. B., & Sherman, S. J. (1986). Information-Gathering processes: 
Diagnosticity, hypothesis-confirmatory strategies, and perceived hypothesis 
confirmation. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 22, 93-121. 
Smedslund, J. (1963). The concept of correlation in adults. Scandinavian 
Journal of Psychology, 4, 544-551. 
 Smith, E.E., Shoben, E.J., & Rips, L.J. (1974). Structure and process in 
semantic memory. Psychological Review, 81, 214-241. 
Spellman, B. A., & Mandel, D. R. (1999). When possibility informs reality: 
Counterfactual thinking as a cue to causality. Current Directions in Psychological 
Science, 8, 120-123. 
References 213 
 
  
Tierney, J. (1991, July 21). Behind Monty Hall's Doors: Puzzle, Debate and 
Answer? The New York Times, p. A1. 
Trautman, C. M., & Shanteau, J. (1997). Inferences based on nondiagnostic 
information. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Performance, 19, 43-55. 
Trope, Y., & Bassok, M. (1982). Confirmatory and diagnosing strategies in 
social information gathering. Journal of personality and social psychology, 43, 22-34. 
Viswesvaran, C., & Ones, D. S. (1999). Meta-Analyses of Fakability 
Estimates: Implications for Personality Measurement. Educational and Psychological 
Measurement, 59, 197-210. 
 Ward, W. C., & Jenkins, H. M. (1965). The display of information and the 
judgment of contingency. Canadian Journal of Psychology. 19, 231-241.  
Wason, P. C. (1966). Reasoning. In B. M. Foss (Ed.), New horizons in 
psychology I, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin. 
 Wason, P. C., & Johnson-Laird, P.N. (1972). Psychology of reasoning, 
structure and content. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 
Wason, P. C., & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1970). A conflict between selecting and 
evaluating information on an inferential task. British Journal of Psychology, 61, 509-
515. 
  
Appendices 214 
 
  
Appendix A 
Experimental Script. 
 
IV1 Attention 
1 Balanced 
Imagine you are an archeologist specializing in South Sea cultures. Your research has 
led you to believe that the legendary Urn of Zor actually existed and was created on 
either Shell Island or nearby Coral Island, two islands that share a unique culture. You 
have found this Urn of Zor, resting on the ocean floor between Shell and Coral 
Islands.  
 
Of the 10 urns that have previously been found at this spot on the ocean floor, 5 have 
been determined to have been made on Shell Island and 5 on Coral Island. Since there 
are no other islands with the same culture as Shell and Coral, no other island of origin 
is possible. 
 
2 Focused 
Imagine you are an archeologist specializing in South Sea cultures. Your research has 
led you to believe that the legendary Urn of Zor actually existed. While conducting 
underwater excavations, from your research facility on Shell Island, you have found 
this Urn of Zor, resting on the ocean floor.  
 
IV2 Motivation 
 1 Not Motivated 
The Urn of Zor is believed to have been created soon after the first settlements on the 
islands. Finding the Urn provides new information about the early colonization of the 
islands and will trigger new interest and research opportunities for you and your 
fellow South Sea archeologists and greatly enhance your prestige. This is especially 
important to you, since you are coming up for promotion and tenure next year. 
 
 2 Motivated 
If it could be established that this urn had come from Shell Island, this would dispute 
the legend that Shell Island was the last island in the South Sea area to be settled. This 
would provide abundant research opportunities for you and your fellow South Sea 
archeologists and greatly enhance your prestige. This is especially important to you, 
since you are coming up for promotion and tenure next year.  
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IV1 Attention 
1 Balanced 
You need to make a determination as to the island on which the urn was more 
probably made. Your first step is to analyze the mineral content of the Urn of Zor. 
You find that the Urn of Zor has high content of the 8 minerals listed in the table 
below. Your second step is to determine the content of these minerals in the clay pits 
now in use on the two islands. The table below displays the results of the mineral 
content of the Urn of Zor and that of the current clay pits on the two islands: 
 
Mineral found to be in 
abundance in the Urn of 
Zor 
Island whose current clay pits are 
characterized by an abundance of this mineral 
Aluminum Shell Island 
Calcium Shell Island 
Chromium Shell Island 
Copper  Shell Island 
Iron Coral Island 
Magnesium  Coral Island 
Nickel Coral Island 
Zinc  Coral Island 
Unfortunately, the islanders have migrated around the islands over the years and have 
changed the clay pits they use. While the mineral content of the current clay pits is 
probably similar to the mineral content of those clay pits used in ancient times to make 
the Urn of Zor, it is certainly not identical. Therefore you will need an additional step 
in your analysis. 
 
At this point what is the probability the urn came from: 
Shell Island  _______? 
Coral Island  _______? 
 
2 Focused 
When you return to your research facility on Shell Island, your first thought is to 
analyze the mineral content of the Urn of Zor. The results indicate that the Urn of Zor 
has a high content of eight minerals (Aluminum, Calcium, Chromium, Copper, Iron, 
Magnesium, Nickel and Zinc). Four (Aluminum, Calcium, Chromium and Copper) of 
these high content minerals are characteristic of the clay pits in current use on Shell 
Island. When you tell your research team the results, one of your co-workers states 
that some of these minerals remind him of the current clay pit on the side of Shell 
Island he has been working on. A second co-worker states that some of these minerals 
remind her of the current clay pit on another side of Shell Island on which she has 
been working. This sets off a furious debate among your research team as to the side 
of Shell Island on which the Urn was more probably made. Unfortunately, the 
evidence is not conclusive because, the islanders have migrated around the islands 
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over the years and have changed the clay pits they use. While the mineral content of 
the current clay pits is probably similar to the mineral content of those clay pits used 
in ancient times to make the Urn of Zor, it is certainly not identical. Therefore you will 
need an additional step in your analysis. 
 
At this point what is the probability the Urn came from anywhere on Shell Island 
________? 
 
IV2 Motivation 
1 Not Motivated 
(No manipulation check) 
 
2 Motivated 
Would it be good for your career if the probability were higher or lower that the Urn 
came from Shell Island?  _______ 
 
IV1 Attention 
 1 Balanced 
(Nothing) 
 
 2 Focused 
You announce the finding of the Urn of Zor and your intention to give it to the Shell 
Island National Museum, which you believe to be the most appropriate representative 
of the rightful owners. Coral Island, which has the same culture as Shell Island, 
quickly requests that you investigate the possibility that the Urn might have been made 
on their island, and requests that you not give the Urn to the Shell Island National 
Museum until you confirm that the Urn came from Shell Island. 
 
Coral Island argues that of the 10 urns that have previously been found at the spot on 
the ocean floor where the Urn of Zor was found, 5 have been determined to have been 
made on Shell Island and 5 on Coral Island. Since there are no other islands with the 
same culture as Shell and Coral, no other island of origin is possible.  
 
Additionally, they argue that despite the fact that four of the minerals (Aluminum, 
Calcium, Chromium and Copper) characterize the current clay pits of Shell Island, the 
other four minerals (Iron, Magnesium, Nickel and Zinc) characterize the current clay 
pits of Coral Island. 
 
(These two pages are page 2)  
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All Conditions 
Since the evidence you have collected so far is not definitive as to which island the 
Urn of Zor was made on, you decide to take the additional step of comparing the 
mineral content of the Urn of Zor with the mineral content of urns made at the same 
time as the Urn of Zor. A private collector owns all the urns from that era whose 
island of origin has been clearly established (20 urns known to have been made on 
Shell Island and 20 known to have been made on Coral Island). 
 
This private collector, in order to limit damage to his urns, requires you to remove 
only enough material from his urns to perform 4 of the 16 possible mineral tests. Each 
test is specific to a mineral and an island. Each test would tell you the number of the 
20 urns from the specified island that have the same high content of the specified 
mineral as that in the Urn of Zor. 
 
Choose 4 of the following 16 tests to perform, as the most efficient way to determine 
the origin of the Urn of Zor, following the instructions below. 
 
IV3 Timing  
 1 Sequential 
Put the number 1 next to the first test you would like to perform, and then remove the 
corresponding sticker to reveal the test result.  
Next choose your second test, put the number 2 next to that test and then remove the 
corresponding sticker to reveal the test result.   
Next choose your third test, put the number 3 next to that test and then remove the 
corresponding sticker to reveal the test result.   
Finally, choose your fourth test, put the number 4 next to that test and then remove the 
corresponding sticker to reveal the test result.   
 
 2 Simultaneous 
Put a number (1 to 4) next to the four tests you would like to perform in the order of 
importance to you (1 being top priority, 4 being lowest). Then remove the four 
corresponding stickers to reveal the four test results. 
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Analysis of the urns made at the same time as the Urn of Zor 
Mineral found 
to be in 
abundance in 
the Urn of Zor 
Characterizes 
the current 
clay pits of 
Number of the 20 old urns 
from Shell Island that 
have an abundance of this 
mineral 
Number of the 20 old urns 
from Coral Island that 
have an abundance of this 
mineral 
Aluminum Shell Island 2 or 12         Choice #_____ 1 or 6           Choice #_____ 
Calcium Shell Island 8 or 18         Choice #_____ 4 or 9           Choice #_____ 
Chromium Shell Island 6 or 16         Choice #_____ 3 or 8           Choice #_____ 
Copper  Shell Island 4 or 14         Choice #_____ 2 or 7           Choice #_____ 
Iron Coral Island 2 or 7           Choice #_____ 4 or 14         Choice #_____ 
Magnesium  Coral Island 3 or 8           Choice #_____ 6 or 16         Choice #_____ 
Nickel Coral Island 4 or 9           Choice #_____ 8 or 18         Choice #_____ 
Zinc  Coral  Island 1 or 6           Choice #_____ 2 or 12         Choice #_____ 
 The actual #s are covered by stickers the numbers are IV 4 (see below) 
 
IV4 Conditionals:  
1 Low 
p (d|h2) 20% - 10% (2-1, 4-2, 6-3, 8-4) 
 2 High 
p (d|h1) 80% - 40% (18-9, 16-8, 14-7, 12-6) 
 
 
All Conditions 
Which Island do you now believe the Urn of Zor is more likely to have come from? 
__________ 
 
What do you now believe is the probability that the Urn of Zor came from that island? 
______% 
 
What do you believe is the probability that the Urn of Zor came from the other island?  
_______________% 
 
(These two pages will be page 3 of the script) 
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All Conditions 
What information did you use in making this estimate of the probability of the island 
of origin? Put a check on the right next to all the pieces of information below that you 
used. 
  
 
Location the Urn was Found 
Of the 10 urns that have previously been found at this spot of the ocean floor 5 have 
been determined to have been made on Shell Island and the other 5 on Coral Island. 
  _____ 
 
 Current Clay Pit Information 
Mineral Tested that the   This mineral content characterizes the  
Urn of Zor had High content current clay pits of 
Aluminum Shell Island     _____ 
Calcium Shell Island     _____ 
Chromium Shell Island     _____ 
Copper  Shell Island     _____ 
Iron Coral Island    _____ 
Magnesium  Coral Island    _____ 
Nickel Coral Island    _____ 
Zinc  Coral Island    _____ 
 
Old Urns Information 
Your first choice of the mineral tests on the old urns.   _____ 
Your second choice of the mineral tests on the old urns.    _____ 
Your third choice of the mineral tests on the old urns.    _____ 
Your fourth choice of the mineral tests on the old urns.    _____ 
 
Other Information 
Please describe _______________________________________________ _____ 
 
(This would be page 4 of the script)
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All Conditions 
If you used indicated on the previous page that you used one piece of evidence, then 
go to question 3 below. 
 
If you used indicated on the previous page that you used more than one piece of 
evidence, then go to question 1 below. 
 
1) Tell me how you went about making your estimate of the probability that the Urn 
came from the island you chose. You can use a verbal description or a formula to 
describe the method you used. 
 
 
 
 
2) Place a check next to all the mathematical processes you used? (Check all that 
apply) 
Type of Method   Mathematical Example using two pieces of evidence 
_____ Addition   (evidence #1 + evidence #2) 
_____ Subtraction  (evidence #1 - evidence #2) 
_____ Multiplication  (evidence #1 * evidence #2) 
_____ Division  (evidence #1 / evidence #2) 
_____ Averaging   (evidence #1 + evidence #2)/ 2 
_____ Other 
 
3) Did you find the results of any of the tests on the old urns surprising? (Yes / No) 
4) If yes, indicate which ones and whether they were higher or lower than expected. 
(Please look back to see your four selections on page three and then circle higher or 
lower below). 
First Choice Surprising  higher   lower 
Second Choice Surprising  higher   lower 
Third Choice Surprising  higher   lower 
Fourth Choice Surprising  higher   lower  
 
5) Please go back to page three again and, without removing any more stickers, write 
down on the stickers what you think the value of the tests would be that you did not 
choose to perform. 
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All Conditions 
 
6) Circle one or more of the following racial / ethnic groups that best applies to you. 
African American 
Caucasian 
Latino / Hispanic 
Asian / Pacific Islander 
Native American 
Other 
 
7) Circle your gender.  Male   Female 
 
8) What is the number of college level statistics classes you have completed? 
__________ 
 
9) What is your college G.P.A. (on a 4 point scale 4=A, 3=B etc.) ____________  
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Appendix B 
Instructions. 
 Participants will be told to read the experimental instructions and to raise their 
hands when they have a questions or when they have completed the experiment. They 
will be told not to talk to or look at their neighbors papers. 
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Appendix C 
Demographic Variables. 
1) Race  (African American, Caucasian, Latino / Hispanic, Asian / Pacific  
  Islander, Native American, Other) 
 
2) Gender  (Male, Female) 
 
3) Number of college level statistics classes completed. 
 
4) What is your college G.P.A.  
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Appendix D 
Informed Consent Form. 
Decision Making Study 
 You are invited to participate in a research study conducted by Geoffrey 
Borthwick from Portland State University, Psychology. The researcher hopes to learn 
how people make decisions in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a doctoral 
degree, under the supervision of Barry Anderson. You were selected as a possible 
participant in this study because you because you have not participated in this study 
previously. 
 If you decide to participate, you will be asked to read a scenario and answer 
hypothetical questions in it, including making decision and asking you about how you 
made those decisions. The study will take approximately 30 minutes. While 
participating in this study you may feel uncomfortable in answering these questions. 
You may receive extra credit from the instructor in the class from which you were 
recruited. 
 Any information that is obtained in connection with this study and that can be 
linked to you or identify you will be kept confidential, except the possibility of 
reporting your participation to your instructor solely for the purpose of your obtaining 
extra credit in that class. This information will be kept confidential by separating it 
from your name and storing all materials in a locked room. 
 Your participation is voluntary. You do not have to take part in this study, and 
it will not affect your relationship with Portland State University. You may also 
withdraw from this study at any time without affecting your relationship with Portland 
State University. 
 If you have any concerns or problems about your participation in this study or 
your rights as a research subject, please contact the Human Subjects Research Review 
Committee, Office of Research and Sponsored Projects, 111 Cramer Hall, Portland 
State University, (503) 725-4288. If you have any questions about the study itself, 
contact Geoffrey Borthwick at borthwg@pdx.edu or (503) 725-3989. 
 Your signature indicates that you have read and understand the above 
information and agree to take part in this study. Please understand that you may 
withdraw your consent at any time without penalty, and that, by signing, you are not 
waiving any legal claim, rights or remedies. The researcher will provide you with a 
copy of this form for your own records. 
 
_____________________________________ ________________ 
Signature      Date  
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Appendix E 
Pilot Study Integration Strategies. 
 
Integration Strategies found in pilot study, and the number (and percentages) of 
subjects who used each (Borthwick & Anderson, 2001).  
 
Strategy (Numbered as in the present study) Number of 
participants   
Percentage  
1 Bayesian 0 0% 
2 Highest probability conditioned on focal island 5 (Sub-strategies not 
distinguished in pilot 
study) 
9.4% 
11 Highest probability, conditioned on and 
expected to favor focal Island 
3 Average of all available conditional probabilities 5 9.4% 
4 Average of the probabilities conditioned on focal 
island 
5 9.4% 
5 Average of the base rate and the probabilities 
conditioned on focal island 
1 1.9% 
6 Sum of all probabilities conditioned on focal 
island 
24 (Sub-strategies 
not distinguished in 
pilot study) 
45.3% 
7 Sum of all probabilities conditioned on focal 
island, minus the sum of all probabilities 
conditioned on the non-focal island 
8 Sum of all probabilities conditioned on focal 
island plus the base rate, minus the sum of all 
probabilities conditioned on the non-focal island 
9 Base Rate  6 11.3% 
10 Even (50%-50%) 2 3.8% 
12 Base Rate with non-numeric adjustment 5 9.4% 
 
 
